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**POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON SARIKAMIS ATTACK OPERATION***"Sarıkamış must live as the manifestation of the great heroism in the souls of the Turkish Mujahideen."*

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Öz- I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Rusya'ya karşı açılan Kafkas Cephesi, Türklerin, Türkistan Coğrafyasına açılan kapısı olarak görülmesi ve Anadolu müdafaasında ilk cephe olması sebebiyle önem arz etmektedir. Bu cephede Rusların, gücünü fark eden ve geleceği ön gören Enver Paşa, Kafkasya'ya açılan kapıyı Ruslara devretmemek arzusu ile bir taarruz planı hazırlamıştır. Bu plan öncesi Enver Paşa'nın, öngörülü tavrı ile Kafkasya ve Rusya bölgesine gönderdiği Türk ajanlar ile başlamış; sonra taarruz ile devam etmiştir. Taarruz Ruslar tarafından şaşkınlık ve psikolojik hezeyan olarak karşılanırken, Enver Paşa komutasındaki Osmanlı, psikolojik zaferi elde etmiştir ve sıcak karşılaşmada iki taraf da çarpışarak karşılıklı zayıat vermiştir. Rus kaynaklarına Türk azmi, inancı ve cesaretini yazdırarak, düşman kaleminden başarı yazdıran bir harekât olmuştur. Uzun vadede Enver Paşa'nın gönderdiği ajanlar tarafından çıkartılan isyan, Rusya'da ihtilale sebep olmuş Rusya sınırlardan tamamen çekilmiş ve Sarıkamış İhata Harekâtı uzun vadeli bir zaferin adı olarak, tarihin üzeri örtülmüş gerçekleri arasına yazılmıştır. 70.000 kişi olan Osmanlı III. Ordusu ile yapılan harekâta, 90.000 askerin hiç kurşun atmadan ve Rusya ile karşılaşmadan donarak öldürüldüğü iddiası ile gündem oluşturma gayesinde olan bir grup tarafından tarihin gerçekleri örtülmüş ve Enver Paşa karalanarak Sarıkamış Harekâtı uzun yıllar büyük bir hezeyan olarak anılmıştır. Rus ve Osmanlı kaynaklarında kayıplar ayrı ayrı düşmüşken, kaynaklara dayandırılmadan yapılan bu gerçekleri karalama hareketi, bugün gün yüzüne çıkmıştır. Bu çalışmamızda; Sarıkamış İhata Harekâtı'nın öncesi ve sonrası durum değerlendirmesine gerçekler penceresinden objektif olarak bakarak, oluşturulmuş gündemi tarihle yargılayacağız.

Anahtar Kelimeler – Gündem Oluşturma, Sarıkamış İhata Harekâtı, Enver Paşa.

Abstract – The Caucasian Front, which opened against the Russian forces in the First World War, is important because it is seen as the gateway of the Turks to Turkistan Geography and it is the first front in the defense of Anatolia. Enver Pasha, who realized the power of Russians on this front and predicted the future, prepared an offensive plan with the desire to not transfer the door to the Caucasus. This plan continued with Turkish offenders sent to the Caucasus and Russia region with Enver Pasha's predictive attitude in the background. While the attack was met by the Russians as astonishment and psychological delusions, he had gained the Ottoman psychological victory under the command of Enver Pasha and both parties collided and gave mutual casualties during the hot encounter. It has been an operation that has printed Turkish success, belief and courage to Russian resources, and succeeded by the enemy pen. In the long term, the rebellion by Enver Pasha sent by the agents, Russia has caused the revolution in Russia has been completely withdrawn from the borders and Sarikamis Heritage Operation as the name of a long-term victory, the history has been written among the covered reality. The Ottoman Empire, which was 70,000 people, was attacked by a mob of 90,000 soldiers, who claimed that 90,000 soldiers had been killed by freezing without encountering Russia, and that they had been killed by Russia. While the losses in Russian and Ottoman sources have fallen apart, the act of doodling these facts without reference to the sources has come to light today. In this study; We will judge the created agenda by looking at the window of facts before and after the Sarikamis Ihata operation.

Keywords – Create an Agenda, Attack Operation of Sarıkamış, Enver Pasha.

1. INTRODUCTION

The geography of the Caucasus is of great importance for the Turks. The region appears as both a road leading to Turkestan and a border line in the direction of Russia's energy resources. Therefore, while maintaining the importance of this region, it is also important in terms of serving the **Turkish Union** desires of Enver Pasha, the Deputy of Ottoman Wary. With this consideration in mind, when we interpret history, our alliance with the Germans in World War I and our attempt to armistice with the Russians on the Caucasus Front, we see a long-term plan, not a short-term plan. This plan is to reaffirm the existence of the resurrection in the international arena as a result of the struggle for liberation by reaffirming the credibility of the Ottoman Empire, which has been described as collapsed, and to become a bright ally that forces the wheel of war, not a dim-witted stakeholder in World War. As a matter of fact, in the long term, the events developed in a way that meets the aims and the Turkish Nation started to disappear and its reputation was sharply renewed with the operation of Sarikamış Heritage. However, the post-operation agenda created an image that went beyond the reality of the operation. When we look back to the past, there are many comments and many numbers. In this study, the situation assessment before and after the Sarikamış Operation Operation will be carried out. Then, by looking at the events through the agenda setting theory; established agenda will be evaluated in the light of the findings.

2. PRE-OPERATIONAL SITUATION

The blockades that started in the 19th century in the global arena formed the basis of World War I. In the developing world societies through discoveries and reforms, the disarmament movements that developed after the search for raw materials and colonies between the states were of course threatening the Ottoman Dynasty which had strategic and political importance in the international arena and had an effect that attracted the war. During this period, the Trilateral Alliance between Italy, Germany and Austria, while the Triple Entente founded by France and Britain, formed the sides and fronts of World War II.

2.1. Situation on the Ottoman Front

"During this period, the relations of England, France and Germany with the Ottoman Empire could not be isolated both politically and economically. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman military institutions had become open to the mentioned states for the purpose of correction. The Navy was handed over to the English navy headed by Amiral Limpus, to the German delegation headed by the land army Liman Von Sanders, and to the French delegations headed by General Baumann, the gendarmerie." (Kanal, 2014:88)

The Ottomans were forced to seek alliances in order to enter the First World War with the perception of the internal depressions and the external mihrabs towards the minorities inside, the international grouping and the rise of the voices of other nations on their own lands. The agreement was signed with Germany in August 1914 after it was rejected by England and France. Therefore, despite the insufficient

military conditions, the Ottoman Empire became a party in the war in which it would become difficult. On the night of October 28, 1914, under the command of Admiral Souchon, the Ottoman ships, which opened to the Black Sea waters for the exercise, officially entered the war with the bombing of the ports of Russia after a secret order taken by the Admiral. This order is as follows:

"To the Navy Command: The entire fleet must maneuver in the Black Sea. As soon as you find the situation available, attack the Russian fleet. Open the secret order we gave you before the accountancy starts. The Turkish fleet must gain control over the Black Sea by force. Search the Russian fleet and attack wherever you find without declaring war. 9.10.1330 (25 October 1914) Signature: Enve Pasha, Deputy Commander-in-Chief." (Sabis, 1992: 85)

With this secret plan, Enver Pasha aimed to ensure the superiority of the sea and to make a brilliant entry into the war. As a matter of fact, Russia is the first party to be defeated in order to achieve our goals on the Caucasus. This situation will also benefit Germany, while the Turks distract the Russians in the south; Germany will move freely in Europe. There are two main reasons behind the Ottoman orientation towards Germany; the first is the Armenian Problem, which has become critical with the instigations of Russia, and the second is the events of the Balkan Wars. (Keleşılmaz, 2000: 368).

2.2. Situation on the Russian Front

The unwilling throw of Russia into the war brought about inadequate conditions that led to debts. Russia, which was not developed in the arms industry at that time, faced with insufficient ammunition despite the fact that the people came under arms for victory. The flow of the great labor force into the war has caused a general decline not only in the war industry, but also it has become difficult to meet basic needs such as clothing and food except military ammunition. In the face of these conditions, Russia, Britain and France continued to exist in the war as a large amount of debtors (Kurat, 2014: 441-444). On the Ottoman quest for intelligence on behalf of Russia, Enver Pasha sent men to the Caucasus to create a revolution and used them as intelligence tools. While Russia had no significant tendencies and forces on the Caucasus front during the war, the Russians turned to the Caucasus with the possibility of Ottoman war.

2.3. Opening and Situation of Caucasian Front

Caucasia; of the nominal position is a geographic area in northeastern mountainous region extending into the Black Sea to the west of the Apsheron peninsula Taman peninsula and the Caspian Sea territory extending to the Iranian border with Turkey. The region is a transitional geography that forms part of the Turkestan Geography which is marked as Central Asia. Although the Caucasus Front is a deeply important front for the Ottoman Empire, it is also a key area of important policies. Enver Pasha's highly controversial manifestations are formed the Ottoman Empire's desire to remove Russia from the oil deposits on Iran and to recapture Kars-Ardahan, which was lost by the Berlin Agreement, as

well as a policy of a Turkish unity and the ability to act with the Azerbaijani Turks. Russia's orientation to the Caucasus was developing with the aim of establishing a route in terms of implementing the policies developed with Petro I.

“Russia has turned the region into a full barracks for 40 years in order to land in the Mediterranean. In order to eliminate the Turkish fabric of the cities, new buildings were built based on Russian architecture. New garrisons and roads were built. Troops in the Caucasus were reinforced in accordance with the offensive operation. Kars and Sarikamış were connected to the South Caucasus railway. Thus, while the military and supplies needed by the Russian army would be transported in a short time, the Ottoman army would have to cross a tough geography by land.” (Karabekir, 1994: 123-128)

Germany's forcing the Ottomans to open the Caucasus front is one of the factors that led to the opening of the Caucasus front. Because Germany thought that it would be more comfortable in Europe if the Ottomans kept the Russians in the south, and the fact that the Russian ports were bombed by the Ottoman navy in the German commanding committee explained this fact. In this way, both the Ottoman officially entered the war as a German ally, and between the Russians and the Ottomans began a truce to steer the Russians to the south. The Caucasus Army first created a Caucasian front as a defense response when Russia crossed the Ottoman border in the direction of Erzurum in Sarikamış region on November 1, 1914, the day before Russia declared war on the Ottomans (Nalçacı, 2015: 671). On these events and ongoing events as a result; the Caucasus Front was formed in the regions of the Caspian Sea in the east, South Azerbaijan in the south, the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea in the north, the south of Lake Van-Mardin-Urca line and the Euphrates River-Malatya-Sivas-Samsun in the west and the Ottomans fought against the Russians in these regions.

2.3.1. Status of the Ottoman 3rd Army on the Caucasian Front

The Ottoman 3rd Army on the Caucasian Front is commanded by Hasan İzzet Pasha and German Lieutenant Colonel Guse. As a result of German-Ottoman military cooperation, staff officers were chosen from German officers in regiment-army structures whose commanders were Ottoman officers. the 3rd Army began to form troops as of August, when the mobilization was announced. In December, the 3rd Army is as follows.

9. Corps; Commander: Mirliva Ahmet Fevzi18, Chief of Staff Major Serif

17th Infantry Division: 49th, 50th and 51st Infantry Regiments, 17th Artillery Regiment.

28th Infantry Division: 82th, 83th and 84th Infantry Regiments, 28th Artillery Regiment.

29th Infantry Division: 85th, 86th and 87th Infantry Regiments, 29th Artillery Regiment.

Within the 9th Corps: 27 battalion infantry, 24 machine guns, 6 machine gun troops, 24 field guns, 48 mountain guns, 4

cavalry troops (25th Guardhouse Cavalry Regiment) and 4 troops of sappers and back service units are available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993) (Genelkurmay, 1993: 41-43).

10. Corps; Commander: Mirliva Ziya 20, Chief of Staff Major Lange

30. Infantry Division: 88th, 89th and 90th Infantry Regiments, 30. Artillery Regiment.

31. Infantry Division: 91th, 92th and 93th Infantry Regiments, 31st Artillery Regiment

32. Infantry Division: 94th, 95th and 96th Infantry Regiments, 32nd Artillery Regiment.

Within the 10th Corps: 27 battalions infantry, 24 machine guns, 6 machine gun troops, 24 field guns, 32 mountain guns, 4 troops of cavalry (19th Guardhouse Cavalry Regiment), 4 troops of sappers and back service units are available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993) (Erickson, 2001: 55).

11. Corps; Commander: Mirliva Galip22, Chief of Staff Major Sevk

18. Infantry Division: 52nd, 53nd and 54th Infantry Regiments, 18th Artillery Regiment.

33. Infantry Division: 97th, 98th and 99th Infantry Regiments, 33rd Artillery Regiment.

34. Infantry Division: 100th, 101st and 102th Infantry Regiments, 34th Artillery Regiment.

11. Corps Total: 27 battalion infantry, 16 machine guns, 4 machine gun troops, 24 field guns, 44 mountain guns, 4 troops of cavalry (20th Guardhouse Cavalry Regiment) and 4 troops of sappers and back service units are available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993). (Allen & Muratoff, 1953: 251)

13. Corps; Commander: Colonel Ziya

37. Infantry Division: 109th, 110th and 111th Infantry Regiments, 37th Artillery.

Total: 9 battalions infantry, 4 machine guns, 1 machine gun troop, 8 field guns, 12 mountain guns, 1 cavalry troop (31st Guardhouse Cavalry Regiment), 1 troop of sappers are available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993).

2. Guardhouse Cavalry Division; Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf İzzet

9th and 11th Cavalry Brigades: a total of two brigades; There are 16 cavalry units, 2 machine gun troops, 8 machine guns and 4 cavalry cannons. The 19th, 20th and 25th Cavalry Regiments of the Division were included in the corps. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993)

Erzurum Fortified Location; Commander: General Poselt

6. Artillery Brigade: 202 guns of various diameters and sizes. 10 gendarmerie depot battalion, a cavalry troop, a troop of sappers are available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993).

Cavalry Reserve Corps

1, 2, 3 and 4. Provincial Cavalry Divisions (109 troops in total), these units consist of Kurdish Tribal Regiments. On the other hand, the Provincial Cavalry Corps was abolished on November 21, 1914, due to the abandonment of positions,

the rapid disintegration of conflicts, and the uneducated and undisciplined movements. Useful human beings and animals of these units joined the 2nd Cavalry Division and the rest were sent to their homeland. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993)

Van Provincial Independent Cavalry Brigade

4 cavalry regiments: 20 cavalry units available. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993)

Total of 9th, 10th, 11th and 13th Corps and 2nd Guardhouse Cavalry Division in the 3rd Army: There are 90 infantry battalions, 76 machine guns, 80 field guns, 140 mountain guns, 29 cavalry units and 13 engineers. Infantry battalions are divided into three parts and consists of an average of 750 infantry, cavalry units are available in 115. There are 67,500 infantry and 3,335 cavalry in these units as combat soldiers. A total of 10 gendarmerie battalions, 130 cavalry units, 202 guns and one engineering squadron were formed in Erzurum, Van and reserve cavalry units. (Turkish War in the First World War Caucasus Front 3rd Army Operation, 1993) (Genelkurmay, 1993: 46-49).

3. OPERATION PLAN

3.1. Formation Process of Operation Plan

Due to the strategic importance of the geography where the Caucasus is needed and its deep nature for the Turks, it was important for the Ottomans in a broad time. On the other hand, the fact that the protection of long-term and short-term political goals resulting from the formal conditions of entry will have consequences that will change the course of the war is a thesis in the Ottoman mind. As the Ottoman priority; While aiming to unite with the Central Asian Turks and to dominate the Crimea-North Caucasus border, it aimed to prevent the Russian orientation towards the North Caucasus rule and to prevent this from possible Georgian-Russian cooperation. With the strengthening of the dominance of the Russians in the Caucasus that endangered these goals with the First World War, the idea emerged that a siege was needed to change the course of the war.

Enver Pasha, which was taken from the Caucasus Front, which was opened as a defense front with the direction of Russia with the continuation of the events and certain aims, believed that a siege operation should be done by giving up the front attacks. Upon this situation, an operation plan was created which changed the course of the war in order to create new opportunities for the Ottoman Empire. The difficult conditions, the situation of the Ottomans, the perception that the Russians were more powerful and the weakness of belief were opposed to Enver Pasha and this plan was discussed with the German side. The fact that the Germans weakened as a result of the victory of the Germans against the Russians at Tannenberg recently encouraged the Ottomans in this siege and that the German side supported the siege for their own interests became one of the reasons that directed the Ottoman Empire. During the event, the Turkish attaché in Berlin reported in a report to Istanbul; He asserted that attacking Russians in battered positions would not be beneficial, and that the most effective movement

against the Russians would be siege (Genelkurmay, 1993: 348). With this siege, Enver Pasha set goals far beyond the German manifestations. Enver Pasha predicted that the Caucasian peoples would start a rebellion in favor of the Turks after the repulsion of the Russian forces and as a result of the work of the men he had prepared and sent the ground before, and thus the path of Turkistan would be opened. It was a dream to establish the Turanian Empire by extending Enver Pasha to the Turkestan on the Caucasus, which led him to the Sarikamış Offensive (Ahmet İzzet Paşa, 1992: 194). He explained this plan to Lemon Von Sanders, Sanders stated in his memoirs as follows:

"Enver drew a sketch of a movement to be made by the 3rd Army on the map in his hand. According to this, Enver Pasha stalled the Russians with the help of the 11th Corps from the direction of the highway and from the front, the other two corps (9th and 10th Corps) will turn the Russians around Sarikamış with a walk to the left and through the mountains for days, then the 3rd Army will conquer Kars... At the end of the speech, he put forward imaginary and remarkable ideas. He even said goodbye to me, saying that he would even walk to India through Afghanistan" (Sanders, 1968:55)

Enver Pasha, who did not pay much attention to the views of the 3rd Army Commander Hasan İzzet Pasha, who was among the pashas who believed in the impossibility of the operation, was not allowed to go to the region and evaluate the situation by the parliament and sent Hafız Hakkı Pasha instead of Enver Pasha. Hafız Hakkı Pasha sent a report after the assessment of the situation. In his report, he stated that a successful attack could be made to the Russians by means of a corps from the front and two corps through Bardız-Oltu, that he examined on the spot and that the army commander and the corps commanders did not have enough perseverance and courage. If he was corrected, he stated that he could do this job (Bayur, 1983: 356). Enver Pasha received exactly the report he requested from Hafız Hakkı Paşa. Upon this answer, he used Otto Von Feldmann and Yavuz armored to convince the army and be the commander if necessary, he went to Erzurum via Trabzon and went to the front. Enver Pasha, who came to Erzurum, also issued an order hopeful to bring military enthusiasm on the difficulty of the conditions while touring the front:

"Soldiers have visited all of you. I saw that you didn't have shoes and coats. But the enemy before us is afraid of you. We will soon enter the Caucasus by attack. You will have all kinds of bounty there. All the hope of the Islamic world is looking at your last effort." (Çulcu, 1998: 160)

With these words, Enver Pasha, who gave hope to the soldier and kept alive by remembering the indomitable character of the Turks, explained that the belief in the military would defeat the impossible and that the aims of the state were worth taking this risk. Hasan İzzet Pasha, who stated that he could not express his opinions against Enver Pasha as a result of the investigations of Enver Pasha, stated that he

participated in it, and when Enver Pasha left the region, he explained the situation with a letter and demanded his dismissal. Upon this, Enver Pasha, who took the command, changed the corps commanders who were in conflict with the younger and brave commanders and renewed the attacking team, thus taking a definite and advanced step in the attack. With this change; The 9th Corps Commander Ahmet Fevzi Pasha was replaced by Giresunlu Ali İhsan Pasha, the 10th Corps Commander Ziya Pasha was replaced by Hafız Hakkı Bey and 11th Corps Commander Galip Pasha was replaced by Abdülkerim Pasha (Görgülü, 1993: 107-108).

3.2. Operation Preparation and Plan

Enver Pasha, in particular, thinks that the Russians are weak and vulnerable to the turning maneuvers, and he planned to use the weakness of the Russian army to engage in an attack by the Ottoman army. Winter conditions and the situation of the army posed a great risk to this offensive work, which encompassed the region and created a plan that minimizes distances. The main purpose of Enver Pasha was to capture the Russians unprepared, because the conditions of the winter and the situation of the army predicted that the situation would be further weakened after the advancement of the region, making it necessary for the other party to be caught unprepared for victory. He then ordered that no action be taken to the enemy side prior to the offensive. According to Operation Plan:

"3. The army shall be divided into two groups, one weak and the other strong; while the weak group prevented the attacks of the Russians from the two sides of the Aras River in the direction of Erzurum, the other strong group would make a deep and besieging attack on the right flank of the Russian position. For this purpose, the 11th Corps and the 2nd Guardhouse Cavalry Division were assigned to stop and stall the enemy from the front. The 9th Corps were assigned to encircle the northern wing of the enemy in the direction of Pitkir-Çatak and the 10th Corps was attacked via Oltu in the direction of Bardız-Sarıkamış to the rear parts of the Russian Position. The Ştanke Bey detachment in the Artvin region and the border troops and other special militia forces will proceed in the direction of Oltu-Vantanik via Olur-Şenkaya and facilitate the operation of the 10th Corps" (Genelkurmay, 1993: 308).

According to this attack plan, Enver Pasha wanted to remove the enemy's forces from Kars direction to the south towards Aras valley, that is, to disconnect from the front and to destroy them.

4. SARIKAMIS OPERATION

After taking over the command of the army, Enver Pasha signed the offensive order which will begin on 22 December 1914 on 19 December and officially started the operation. However, Hafız Hakkı Bey did not listen to the fact that Enver Pasha emphasized the importance of avoiding a

movement that would warn the enemy side and he started small-scale offensive against the Oltu Platoon under the command of General Istomin two days before the operation. The fact that the Russian side was not sure that there would be an uprising from the Ottoman front and that it did not develop a force by not understanding the purpose of the operation for a long time during the operation, rendered Hafız Hakkı Bey's infringement safe. On the Ottoman front, the 9th, 10th and 11th Corps of the 3rd Army and the 2nd Guardhouse Cavalry Division participated. Just before the operation, the 11th Corps was reinforced with 3 border battalions, 4 gendarme battalions and 6,000 supply troops from Erzurum.

Considering the situation of the Ottoman 3rd Army, 31.500 in the Sarıkamış region and 40.500 in the Oltu region; It consisted of 72,000 infantry, 3,500 cavalry, 72 machine guns and 232 balls of various diameters. Considering the organization structure of the army, it can be said that there are 63,250 infantry, 5,460 cavalry, 122 machine guns and 172 guns of various diameters in Oltu and Sarıkamış regions of the Russian Caucasian Army (Genelkurmay, 1993: 53). It is known that the number of Russians was around 100,000 together with the Armenian Leyjon while the 3rd Army of the Ottoman Empire was 75 thousand. The siege operation, which started on 22 December 1914, became a raid for the Russians and thus enabled the Turkish side to seize the chance. The type that began with the operation prevented the advance of the 9th and 10th Corps towards the Russian forces and the winter conditions of the region followed a course in favor of the Ottomans. The Operation Plan was put into practice as manifested. According to this, Enver Pasha proceeded with the 9th Corps which will start the operation. On the first day of the operation, the 9th Corps defeated the enemy forces and the 10th Corps passed by taking Oltu. The Turkish Party made a successful entry into the operation and the conditions supported it. The fact that the Russians have not yet taken a precaution is a chance that requires rapid progress. According to the Operation Plan, on the 24th of December, while the 9th Corps should go in the direction of Kötek and 10th Corps in the direction of Baldız; Hafız Hakkı Bey evaluated the situation with his own will and made an unscheduled action and extended the road and proceeded in the direction of Oltu-Ardahan. After this, Enver Pasha, who proceeded with the 9th Corps heading towards Baldız, the lock of Sarıkamış, reported that the Kötek side was closed due to winter conditions in the course of changing the route and formed a new plan for the route of the old plan. This extended facade made it more difficult for the troops advancing in winter conditions.

He did not give up the Oltu region and continued on Ardahan. Hafız Hakkı Bey's inconsistent attitude and the fact that he made the situation more difficult in difficult conditions on a plan made the events that would deem the operation delirium. Hakkı Bey, who persistently proceeded to the direction of Ardahan and extended the road considerably, caused the disconnection between the 9th and 10th Corps

with increasing weather conditions and distance, and from that time onwards, the corpses made their own will, ie unplanned progress. On the 3rd day, the Russian side tried to take measures by directing its forces to the Sarikamis position, but the Turks, who were advancing despite the difficult conditions, pushed the Russians into a hopeless state. On the other hand, the 10th Corps, which had to move towards Sarikamis as soon as possible, moved away on the will of Hafız Hakkı Bey and headed to the mountain of Allahu Akbar, which caused many soldiers under the command of Hafız Hakkı Bey to freeze to death.

Enver Pasha, who arrived at Bardiz, the lock of Sarikamis on 24 December, believed that the Russians were weak and needed to move forward. In addition, the high-level command committee fell into disagreements and the delegation favored the rest of the army. However, time was running against the Ottomans, therefore, it was necessary to proceed continuously and Enver Pasha continued to proceed by not listening to the delegation in the first place. While these were happening on the Ottoman front, the Russian Front noticed the attack and Graf Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army in Tbilisi, sent his deputy General Myshlayevski to Sarikamis to manage the war. On 24 December, General Myshlayevski arrived at the headquarters of the Sarikamis Group, Micigirt, and held a meeting. Army Chief of Staff General Yudenich made an offer; Since the Turks had started a siege operation with great forces from the right wing, he proposed that the offensive launched by the Sarikamis Group on the main front be stopped immediately and that some forces from the Aras valley were immediately sent to Sarikamis and withdrew from there. Upon this situation, Myshlayevski left the main front to General Bergmann and moved to Sarikamis with his staff and chose this place as his headquarters. Realizing that the Turks were seriously threatening the region in the face of the landscape he faced in Sarikamis, Myshlayevski repeated his previous order and ordered the troops to return to their previous positions on the night of 24 December.

In spite of this backward attitude of the Russian side, events that would turn in their favor took place. Although a great panic atmosphere has been formed with the Turkish offensive, the events have turned the concrete results in favor of Russia. General Voropanof, the Commander of the Sarikamis Platoon, is in a state of amazement. The necessary measures for the defense of Sarikamis are generally taken as a result of the personal efforts of some officers who were there by chance. On the return of Tbilisi, Colonel Bukretov, by order of Myshlayevski, formed a detachment of scattered forces and reached the gate of Bardiz on the evening of 25 December. Artillery officer Mushelov, who by chance was located in Sarikamis, placed two howitzer cannons near the church in the main square of the city. The Russians thus succeeded in creating the first defense force for the defense of Sarikamis (Maslovski, 1935: 79).

While these negative events took place on the Russian side, Enver Pasha, who reached the Bardiz Pass, fell into a conflict with the delegation again; İhsan Pasha was oppressive about

the fact that the soldier would stay in this area overnight and continue. However, Enver Pasha rejected this request by planning to enter Sarikamis without giving the enemy an opportunity to recover. Enver Pasha's attack on the night, which started after the sunset on December 25 with the order of attack, enabled the Russians to withdraw from the Bardiz gate to Sarikamis. Enver Pasha, who could not resist İhsan Pasha further after this victory, allowed the army to rest and put the operation against the Ottomans in the direction of time. This process allowed the Russian forces withdrew to Sarikamis to randomize their defenses and gave them time to accumulate in the region. In the face of this, Turkish forces lost their power, and from the night of 25 December, time began to work against the Ottoman Empire.

The Turks, who persistently proceeded in spite of the difficulties of the conditions, created a psychological horror on the Russians and the Russian side, which was sufficiently feasible, became desperate in the face of this irrepressible effort of the Turks, and a courage and perseverance were won against the Ottomans. Myshlayevski, who has been certain that the Turks have won the war since the beginning of the operation, has repeatedly presented the danger of the situation to the Caucasus government center and the bad news brought by Myshlayevski from the front caused a great panic for the Russians on the Caucasus side. On December 28, the two Turkish corps that besieged Sarikamis suffered a violent collision with the Russians and both sides suffered high casualties. The Ottoman army, which withdrew on this, realized the plan theoretically over the Russians and gained a psychological victory and achieved a short-term delusion and a long-term victory. The struggle of the Ottoman-Russian forces in the region, which continued for three years, created a basis of rebellion, which was the real purpose of the men sent by Enver Pasha for intelligence, and the Russian forces withdrew.

4.1. Post-Operational Status Assessment

After the operation, both sides suffered a profound loss, while Germany is the winning side of this operation. Nikolai Yudenich, the commander of the Russian Army in Sarikamis, recalled that the loss of the Ottomans was 18,000 dead and 6,000 prisoners, while the loss of Russia was 32,000 dead and 12,000 prisoners. Within the framework of these losses, Russia did not have the perception of a victory or defeat. Written by Dukakinzade Feridun (Dirimtekin) for the 1926-1927 grading of the Erkan-ı Harbiye Mektebi, "The Great War Turkish Fronts" gives more clear and reliable information about the Turkish losses in the Sarikamis Battles. According to the information given by Dirimtekin; In the telegram sent by the 3rd Army Headquarters on 23 January 1915 to the Ministry of War, the total force of the army is given as follows;

9. Corps 2800 soldiers

10. Corps 2400 soldiers

11. Corps 2400 soldiers

Artillery and 2nd Cavalry Division 4800 soldiers

Total: 12,400 soldiers.

The army reported that during the battles, except for the martyrs and the missing, the prisoners lost a total of 30000 people due to illness and freezing.

Although the operation could not achieve the desired purpose in full sense, it provided a basis for achieving the objectives in the long term. Both the loss of the Russians and the German gain in Europe in this case and as a result of the withdrawal of the Russians realized their operational objectives to some extent and significantly changed the course of the war.

5. SARIKAMIS OPERATION IN PUBLIC OPINION

Silence was issued in the public after the operation. Until 1922, the people were not aware of what happened in Sarıkamış. Şerif Köprülü, who determined the direction according to the political winds prevailing in those years, signed his first work on Sarıkamış. Although this work is not based on facts, it was written with the aim of forming the agenda, but it was the bibliography of the slander that 90.000 martyrs died without throwing a single bullet. Köprülü has presented the Sarıkamış Operation to the public with a very interesting style and an exaggerated expression (Şerif Bey, 1998: 197). Although the losses were recorded in the Russian and Ottoman sources and clearly stated in the correspondence and memoirs of both Russian soldiers and commanders, the first words about Sarıkamış were not subjected to a filter and adopted by the public. Most later statements and comments on Sarıkamış were shaped according to this claim. The martyrs of Sarıkamış were remembered with 90.000 soldiers lie and both the intellectual orientation was made in the public opinion and the history was slandered as a success delusion. They described Enver Pasha and his plan as a dreamer by fitting the struggle of the Caucasus Front which lasted 4 years to 15 days. Enver Pasha, one of the leading actors of the War of Independence and having signed many victory plans, wanted to fit Enver Pasha in Sarıkamış and fall into the pages of history with an unsuccessful note. Operation Sarıkamış, which changed the course of World War I, noted the enormous genius of Enver Pasha and the irreplaceable courage of Turkish soldiers in Russian history; Turkey has created history in a new agenda with remote knowledge of the facts.

5.1. Operation of Sarıkamış from the Agenda-Building Perspective

5.1.1. Agenda Building Theory

Agenda is a set of issues and events arranged in order of importance at a certain point in time. Agenda-setting approach; It provided an alternative to the findings of limited impacts and directed the mass communication researchers to examine this issue (Rogers ve diğerleri, 1997:226). The society needs mass media in order to establish the subject - problem - event in the range of events in which it is and audience. Mass media have effects on public opinion: Awareness, Acquiring information, Attitude determination and Behavior change. With the realization of this effect of mass media, the concept of image creation has come to life (Atabek ve Dağtaş, 1998: 205). With Donald Lippman's

description, life is the image that one imagines in political and social terms. According to this definition, establishing the basis of this image is equivalent to changing the mind of the society, which is possible by creating an agenda. In other words, the media can influence and shape the public agenda and shape it (McCombs, 2004:1).

There are three main breaks in determining the Public Agenda. These are: The Media Agenda is the perception resulting from the personal knowledge accumulation and development of public opinion makers and learning through direct experience. According to this definition, the interpretation of the event brought to the agenda by the media or the interpretation of a surprise that has taken place in the society is a situation that draws character on the event. Therefore, these factors play an active role in bringing an event to the public's mind with the desired image. McCombs and Shaw (1972) conducted the first agenda-setting research systematically named in the literature and named the approach. However, the intellectual basis of agenda-setting research is based on Lippmann's Public Opinion, published in 1922 (Takeshita, 1997: 19). Establishing Agenda and making the mind guided in the public point to time. All psycho-analysis research and studies prove that the correct and inaccurate knowledge is acquired in the human mind with time before the sources, that is, even if the first learned is wrong, it always has an advantage in the mind and the subsequent information is subjected to a defense mechanism.

Based on all these definitions, mass media help to place the events in our minds that we cannot directly learn and understand our experiences. Bernard Cohen in his Press and Foreign Policy (The Press and Foreign Policy) describes the agenda-setting approach, which includes the discourse of image placement into the mind, as the Press is quite successful in telling people what to think but not what people think about (Cohen, 1963:13). This aid can become a perception management mechanism under the heading of information, which in effect is the ability of the public to manage what they will talk about and discuss. The agenda that can be created through the means of mass media, especially as a result of the attitudes of the actors accepted by the society, plays an active role in determining the agenda materials to be used and the idea of which the agenda materials will be accepted.

5.1.2. Operation of Sarıkamış from the Agenda-Building Theory Perspective

Agenda-forming theory and the mass media we highlight as subject and the influence of the actors accepted in the society are revealed when we consider Sarıkamış as a sample. Operation İhata, which aroused curiosity in the public with the edict of silence in the mass media, ensured the unconditional capture and direction of the society. While the facts take place in the sources as accessible and today it is much easier to reach this information, the first learned and the first created perception cannot be overtaken by the society. The agenda-setting approach, which corresponds to

the English agenda setting and is defined in our language by the terms media agenda or public agenda, is transmitted to the public in parallel with the function of the mass media used.

The first news, newspapers, magazines and derivatives published as the headline in the most effective and widespread mass media, television or radio broadcasts, is used as a headline in today's modern age. Another topic that is most commonly shared is the topic called Trend topic and even the first news published in the news sites that appeal to the masses through the internet is the first news priority. The information spreading to the public and having the first step in the priority ranking forms the basis of the agenda setting approach. The priorities of individuals in current life practices, the situations that are essential to solve and the conditions deemed necessary to improve are closely related to the individuals while the contents that occupy the societies constitute the agenda of the society. The issue that constitutes the first step in the priority ranking of individuals and societies constitutes the agenda of social systems.

The Sarıkamış Operation, which was transferred by Şerif Köprülü within the current conditions of the period, has taken its place among the priority issues of the Turkish society as an issue capable of forming the agenda. Because of being the first, Sarıkamış Operation has taken place in the memory, extent and content of Şerif Köprülü. For this reason, he was sentenced to reveal himself in the face of the facts, lies and exaggeration recorded for Operation Sarıkamış, the only explanation of this situation is that the agenda was determined and an image was drawn. Speaking on a long silence, Şerif Köprülü drew the first image with the needy and questioning explanations in the confirmation. While this situation takes its place as reality in the public's mind, the facts are ignored. This is a successful product of the ability to create the agenda. Operation Sarıkamış İhata has unfortunately yielded a successful result for this theory.

Enver Pasha's grandson Osman MAYPETEK gave an interview to Vatan Newspaper on January 11, 2014; He underlined that the work of defamation of Enver Pasha was made, the propaganda of the psychologically defeated Russians was made in Anatolia as well, and history was tried with magazine interpretations. Maypetek said that Sarıkamış was an unprecedented achievement in history and that the soldiers who fought there were very successful. He expressed that this public opinion was a magazine interpretation and aimed to support Russian propaganda. Murat Bardakçı, Mehmet Niyazi and Mustafa Çalık, especially the experts in their fields, have displayed an attitude that sheds light on the agenda by translating the agenda. Equipped with deep work and welding scanning and magazine-based perception operations, documents are presented and exposed.

6. CONCLUSION

The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War by confronting Russia on its Caucasus-oriented goals; Turkish war ethics will and courage, has proved an operation in the international arena. The fact that the first statement on Sarıkamış Operation, which was not mentioned with the deep

sorrow of Enver Pasha throughout the history, was groundless and exaggerated, engraved Sarıkamış Operation as a delusion where 90 thousand soldiers froze without throwing a single bullet. As a result of the emergence of the Ottoman archive and the Russian sources objectively revealing the truths, the facts were revealed. Unfortunately, the operations that could lead to victory in the short term, unfortunately, could not be achieved exactly as a result of Hafız Hakkı Bey and İhsan Pasha, who insisted on the Allies and insisted on the time, in a short-term offensive.

With the agenda-setting approach, which aims to attract the priorities of the media agenda to the center of the public agenda, the Sarıkamış Export Operation was attempted to be placed at the center of the agenda of the Turkish nation and tried to move to the focus of the idea of the Turkish nation with unfounded claims. The content that is frequently and intensively processed through the mass media and frequently repeated issues will create selectivity in the perception of the public, thus making it possible for the public to regard the relevant content as important. The mass media makes an agenda for the public with the prioritization of certain titles among many information and news. The first presentation of the Operation Sarıkamış in the light of the data prepared in addition to the public and real data casts a shadow on the reality of the operation and there is no parallel between the presented data and the realities. The facts of the operation are covered with fog screen. The agenda presented by the mass media is not only an information for individuals and communities. The priority of the content presented to the public, the frequency of the presentation (repetition), the emphasis made within the content constitute a priority order in the memory of individuals and societies. For this reason, the content of the Sarıkamış Operation transferred by Şerif Köprülü left a deep impression on the agenda of individuals and societies in terms of priority ranking in the minds of individuals and societies. However, as the content is questioned, the actual data on the operation is clarified and historical documents and literature are analyzed with an objective perspective, the Sarıkamış Operation becomes reality in the historical process. The content of the operations that Şerif Köprülü had created on the agenda was finally supported by real and objective data and gained the ability to create unbiased agenda.

When the short and long term results of the operation are examined, it has been proved by the sources that the objectives are relatively achieved. This offensive, which changed the course of history, was recorded as an important event representing high courage, an indomitable struggle, and a psychological victory that updated the Russian mind. If we open a parenthesis to the claim that Enver Pasha is "in a hurry" on the axis of all claims, Ziya Nur AKSUN makes the following determination in his work Enver Pasha and Sarıkamış: *"Despite the footsteps of others, Enver's insistence on the operation seems to be justified and very accurate according to the case. Because every delay in the operation will strengthen the position of the Russians in Sarıkamış."* Because the Russians have unlimited human resources. The Turkish army, on the other hand, has limited

opportunities as it is scattered across four fronts. Therefore, this offensive is essential for defending and serving the objectives while maintaining integrity.

Sarıkaş Russian Army Chief of Staff Maslofski; While Enver Pasha was remembered as a brilliant plan prepared by his hand; It is clear in the telegram sent by the Russian Caucasian Army Commander-in-Chief to France and Britain: *"The cold and winter, which stopped even the telephone conversations, does not prevent the Turkish army. By opening a second front, if the progress of the Turkish army cannot be stopped, the Baku oil will pass into the hands of the Ottoman-German alliance and the path to India will be open to them."* These words, made by the enemy, have never been a complete defeat, but have gone down in history as an echo of victory. Today, when we interpret the history from a large window, we see this fact clearly.

In the light of all these data, Operation Sarıkaş does not pass through the filter of historical facts as accepted by the society. The main reason for this is that the written history is not an accurate source, the operation of which the delusion image is intended to be a political agenda falls within the network and the desired image is received in public. The actors accepted by the society undertook a dominant role and style and narrated history through magazine interpretation, misleading the society by obscuring the real face of history, focusing on the purpose that they wanted to form in minds hiding history, and defaming the Turkish history with unfounded and exaggerated sentences. While this smear campaign is a campaign that supports the Russians who make propaganda with the ambition of psychological defeat, the following details draw attention: Our failure to oppose the Russians on one front is criticized and the number of exaggerated martyrs is remembered. While we want to create public opinion by slandering Enver Pasha with the facts it contains on the basis of this image, we can see the dark mentality of the enemy front when we look at the filter of facts. Behind propaganda, even on the enemy front, the truth has fallen to the sources and praised the memories. However, the Anatolian front tried to defame the accuracy of the sources. Today, the agenda that emerged and the facts are created, tries to deny the false claims they have based on in the past. This is proof that the agenda-makers are progressing steadily and not giving up.

In the criticisms, while the idea of postponing the operation to the spring months is emphasized, there is a basic situation to be understood. It was the first weapon that hit the enemy and the psychological defeat that caused the attack to be carried out under difficult conditions. The Turkish soldier who crossed the mountain of Allah-u Akbar in the winter months settled not only during World War I, but at all times until today, as a fear that polled the enemy front in its manifestations on the Turkish side. Even the stance of the image that was created in the perspective of the above-mentioned information with the sources against the facts could not convince the agenda-makers. on the other hand, the

aim of those judging history with the journalistic information was to mislead Turkish history by creating him and his values, ideology and political agenda through Enver Pasha. In doing so, the climate of ideological thought that they were inspired by their inner world and their hatred towards Enver Pasha were the references of these historical theses. Sarıkaş Russian Army Chief of Staff Maslofski: "Enver Pasha prepared by a brilliant plan" was called. If this plan was followed, absolute success would be achieved and history would be written otherwise. Of course there were great risks. However, it is important to remember that behind every major success, there are great risks. Taking these risks, he wrote the successful ones as history and hero, and always judged the losers with discussions.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Caucasus is of great importance for Turkey geopolitically. This region causes both the road to Turkistan and Russia to reach energy sources. Therefore this country is not only preserving its own important but also important for the Ottoman Military deputy Enver Pasha to serve the Turan ideal. When we interpret the history, it is a long term plan that the Ottoman Empire was allied with the Germans in the First World War and entered into the armistice with the Russians on the Caucasion front. This strategic goal re-raised the reputation of the Ottoman Empire, which is described as collapsed after all the Ottoman Empire became an ally as socially, economically and politically in the international arena, which determined the course of war in the end of First World War. As a matter of fact, the events developed to meet the goals in the long term and the Ottoman staff management tried to renew their reputation with the operation of Sarıkamış İhata. The agenda created after the operation blocked and painted an image beyond reality. When we look at our past from today, we come across many comments and numerical data about the operation.

In this study, firstly, the blockages that started in the 19th century in the pre-war arena and the causes of the first world war will be emphasized. Disarmament movements that emerged as a result of exploration and reforms and inter-state raw material and colonial searches in the developing world societies had an effect that attracted the Ottoman state, which has political and strategic importance to war. During this period, the trilateral alliance between Italy, Germany and Austria were the rivals of the trilateral confrontation world war established by France and England. The Ottoman State was forced into the search for an alliance to enter the first world war due to internal confusion and the perception created by the external forces towards the minorities inside. After the Ottoman state was rejected by France and Britain, it signed an agreement with Germany in August 1914, intervened in the war and changed the course of the war. In the next part of the study, the strategic importance of the geography where the Caucasus is located in terms of Ottoman state was emphasized afterwards, the effects of the protection of the war in the direction of the short and long term political goals that occurred due to the conditions resulting from entering the war will change.

Two Turkish corps under the command of Enver Pasha, who surrounded Sarıkamış on 28 December, had a collision with the Russians and both sides suffered high losses. The withdrawn Ottoman army theoretically carried out the plan on the Russians, and achieved success with a psychological victory in a longrun. As a result of the three-year Ottoman Russian war, there became a revolution in Russia and the Russians withdrew with the help of the men sent by Enver Pasha for rebellion. Finally, in this study the operation in Sarıkamış was examined in terms of agenda. While the facts are accessible in the sources, the first learned and created perception cannot be thrown over the society. The facts recorded for the Operation Sarıkamış are forced to explain themselves in the face of lies. The reason for this is that the agenda is determined by malicious circles and negative images. While criticizing the postponement of the operation to the spring months, there is a situation to be understood. The operation was to be the first weapon to hit the enemy in difficult conditions and this is what creates defeat to the enemy. It is obvious that this time was chosen, which printed this operation in gold letters.

The Turkish soldier, who crossed the mountains of Allahuekber in winter, achieved a great success. Nevertheless, the agenda setters aimed to mislead Turkish history by defeating the ideology of Enver Pasha with false news. In forming this agenda, the ideological thoughts and hatred of Enver Pasha they inspired from their inner worlds constituted the reference of these theses. Enver Pasha's grandson Osman Maypetek underlined in his report to the Vatan newspaper on January 11, 2014 that Enver Pasha was badly misled and that Russian propaganda was carried out in Anatolia, too. Maypetek said that, Sarıkamış is an unprecedented success in history and stated that the soldiers there fought heroically. He stated that this public opinion is a magical comment and serves the Russian propaganda. In the light of all these data, Sarıkamış historical operation does not appear to be accepted by the society. This is due to the fact that the history written is not an accurate source, and the operation fell into a network of political agendas. The narratives of the actors accepted by the society in a magical way by following a dominant method have covered the real face of the history, mislead the society, defaming this movement that market the history of Turkish.