How to Lost a War: Strategic Command Faults and Defeat in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878

Authors : Umut AKCAKAYA

Pages : 1-33

Doi:10.24186/vakanuvis.1203717

View : 20 | Download : 8

Publication Date : 2023-03-26

Article Type : Research Paper

Abstract :Considering the results of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, it was one of the most important wars in the Ottoman history. The war was a tough exam for the Ottoman army, but the defeat could not be prevented. The most important reason for defeat was the mistakes made in strategic command. The Ottoman war plan was prepared on the basis of wrong predictions and important mistakes were made in the deployment of the forces. These mistakes allowed the Russian army to easily cross the Danube. Ottoman decision makers could not take precautions in time and the Russian army was able to seize the Balkan passes quickly. The mistakes in the strategic command continued throughout the war. A multi-headed system was created for the command of the war, and it was not possible to establish a unity of command. In addition, incompatibility and personal struggles among the commanders at the front paralyzed the command system. Under these conditions, it was not possible for the Ottoman forces to carry out a coordinated operation. The only significant success of the Ottoman army on the Balkan Front was the defense of Pleven. With the defeat the Ottoman rule in the Balkans was largely eliminated.
Keywords : 1877 1878 Osmanlı Rus Harbi, Balkan Cephesi, Stratejik Komuta, Plevne, Şipka