Does the Rise of Naturalism Mean the End of Conceptual Analysis in the Methodology of Jurisprudence?

Authors : Uğur Dinç

Pages : 101-135

Doi:10.60002/ebyuhfd.1583466

View : 97 | Download : 55

Publication Date : 2025-06-20

Article Type : Review Paper

Abstract :Recently, the method of conceptual analysis as the presumed method of analytic jurisprudence has come under attack by Brian Leiter. Relying on W.V.O. Quine’s naturalized epistemology displacing analytic-synthetic distinction on truth, Leiter offered the rejection of conceptual analysis and the adoption of naturalist method committed to doing empirical research in pursuit of providing cause-effect type of explanations in law. He argues that since conceptual analysis relies on the a priori intuitions of the conceptual theorist, this method fails to deliver the universal and necessary truths it set out to deliver. In this essay, I will analyse whether the charges Leiter levels at conceptual analysis stick to it. Drawing on the works of contemporary conceptual jurisprudents, I will conclude that conceptual analysis is secure from the defects that Leiter accuses it to have. I will argue that the questions the naturalist method and the method of conceptual analysis can succeed to answer are different sorts of questions about the law; conceptual analysis does proceed on a posteriori reasoning and its arguments are best construed as necessary truths upon contingent grounds. As a result, the naturalist method fails to replace the method of conceptual analysis.
Keywords : Hukuk Felsefesi Metodolojisi, Kavramsal Analiz, Doğalcılık, Zorunluluk, Rastlantısallık, A Priori, A Posteriori, Brian Leiter

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