



The Transition: Change and Continuity in the Greek War Effort, November-December 1920

Geçiş Süreci: Yunan Savaş Çabasında Değişim ve Devamlılık, Kasım-Aralık 1920

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Abstract

This article examines the political and institutional dynamics of the Greek military command transition between November and December 1920 during the Asia Minor Campaign. Challenging popular narratives of abrupt rupture, it argues that significant continuities persisted, particularly at the regimental and divisional levels, while the changes in the higher echelons of command—driven largely by political considerations—had disruptive consequences. The analysis focuses on key appointments, the strategic logic of the new government under Gounares, and the role of figures such as Ptolemaios Sarigiannis in maintaining institutional memory. The article concludes that while lower-tier cohesion sustained short-term operational effectiveness, the fragmented structure of high command compromised coordination and strategic clarity, setting the stage for failures in the 1921 offensives.

Key Words: Turkish War of Independence, Greco-Turkish War, Asia Minor Campaign

Özet

Bu makale, Kasım-Aralık 1920 döneminde Küçük Asya Seferi sırasında Yunan askeri komutasındaki siyasi ve kurumsal dönüşümü incelemektedir. Ani ve köklü bir kopuş yaşandığına dair yaygın anlatılara karşı çıkarak, özellikle alay ve tümen düzeyinde önemli kurumsal sürekliliklerin devam ettiğini ileri sürmektedir. Üst komuta kademesindeki değişikliklerin ise büyük ölçüde siyasi saiklerle şekillendiği ve operasyonel bütünlüğü zedelediği savunulmaktadır. Analiz, yeni hükümetin stratejik yaklaşımına, atanan kilit isimlere ve Ptolemaios Sarigiannis gibi figürlerin kurumsal hafızayı sürdürmedeki rolüne odaklanmaktadır. Çalışma, alt düzeydeki birlik bütünlüğünün kısa vadeli operasyonel etkinliği sürdürdüğünü, ancak üst komuta yapısındaki bölünmüşlüğün stratejik eşgüdümü sekteye uğratarak 1921 taarruzlarındaki başarısızlıkların zeminini oluşturduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk İstiklâl Harbi, Türk-Yunan Savaşı, Küçük Asya Seferi

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this article is to briefly present part of the political context of the decision and implementation of the Greek operations on the Bursa (Prusa)-Eskişehir (Dorylaeum) axis and Uşak - Afyonkarahisar axis between January 1921 and April 1921¹(new calendar dates) during the Turkish War of Independence. These operations led to three major battles, the Battle of First İnönü (known in Greek military historiography as Battle of Bozüyük) the Battle of Second İnönü (known in Greek military historiography as the Battle of Avgin - Kovalıca), and the Battle of Aslıhanlar -Dumlupınar (known in Greek historiography as the battle of Dumlupınar).

The operations of January-April 1921 are seen as a missed opportunity to destroy the army of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) while it was still in the midst reformation and weak, and while they were still engaged in hot conflicts in the Caucasus, with France, and with the last of the anti-TGNA insurrections. What makes these operations interesting, is that they were decided and implemented in the context of a complete political change in Greece, with an associated and broad change in military persons. Here I present the elements of change and continuity in the Greek command of the war-effort in the period from November 1920 to December 1920. My argument is that the scope of the change is not as large as many works of popular history tend to present it as, though some of the changes were very crucial. I am planning to cover the change in continuity in the war planning in the same period in another article in the future. A common thread here is the role of Deputy Chief of the Staff of the Army of Asia Minor Ptolemaios Sarigiannis as a repository of institutional memory between the Venizelist and Constantinist military commands.²

THE AFTERMATH OF AN ELECTION

With the defeat of Eleftherios Venizelos in the elections of 14 November (1 November) 1920, the United Opposition of anti-Venizelist and Constantinist parties came to power. A transition government under veteran politician Demetrius Rallis came to power, with Demetrius Gounares, the most powerful and fanatical anti-Venizelist politician, taking on the crucial Ministry of Military Affairs on 19 November 1920.³ This new government had no intention of evacuating Asia Minor. Although some local activists of the United Opposition discussed evacuation and demobilization, the central government had no intention of withdrawing from Asia Minor.⁴

¹ Throughout this article modern Gregorian calendar is used. As a warning to the readers the Greeks were using Julian calendar and the Turks modified Rumi calendar.

² Pronounced as Ptolemeos Sareyanis.

³ On the anti-Venizelist fanaticism of Gounares see Marianna Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares* (Athens: Foundation of the Hellenic Parliament, 2017) This book is the most recent biography of Gounares in Greece. There is only one other, which is a bit of hagiography written in 1946. Due to the loss of the personal archive of Gounares in 1922, these two sources are the main citations on his activity in 1919-1922. As in the case of Venizelos, there is no political biography in Turkish of Gounares, even though he was the main political director of the war effort in 1920-1922. On the date of his ascension to the position of Minister see *Skrip*, (6/11/1920), 2.

⁴ For the position of Gounares and the United Opposition on the issue of the war during the election see Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares*, 252-268. Also see Ioannis Nioutsikos, "The Greek Military Strategy in the Asia Minor Campaign, 1919-1922: An Application of Clausewitz's Theory on Culmination," in (ed) Konstantinos Travlos, *Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek Turkish War 1919-1922* (London: Lexington Books, 2020), 149.

For figures such as Athanasios Athanasios Nikolaides - Souliotes this was driven by national sentiments. Gounares himself exhibited reservations about the Asia Minor Campaign, but once in power was committed to winning the war. This was partly out of a personal wish to prove himself better than Venizelos. All Greek political leaders, including Venizelos, viewed the Asia Minor Campaign as a means to overcome the National Schism and foster national unity.⁵ For Gounares and other anti-Venizelist leaders the events of 1916-1917 clearly showed the vulnerability of the Greek political system to domestic insurgencies, such as the National Defence (Amynta) movement from their perspective, supported by Great Britain.⁶ The domestic threat of a Venizelist coup was paramount in his view. He wanted to cut any foreign support to such a move by committing the Greek government to the continuation of a policy that had seemed to have British support. Thus, British support for the Asia Minor Campaign would translate to British support for the Constantinist regime.

THE TRANSITION OF GREEK COMMAND IN ASIA MINOR

Immediately after the election result, Greek Army Commander Lieutenant General Leonidas Paraskevopoulos and his Chief of Staff Major General Theodoros Pangalos requested to be relieved of command. Both were Venizelists and resented by many of the voters of the United Opposition due to their role in the executions in order to suppress the 1918 mutinies. Paraskevopoulos was also personally implicated in a potential attempt to use force to contest the election results.⁷ Gounares was determined to maintain as much control over the military effort as he could and ordered the demobilization of the General Headquarters that Paraskevopoulos had ruled. Instead, the war effort in Asia Minor/Anatolia was to be prosecuted by a new field command, the Field Army of Asia Minor (FAAM).

⁵ See Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares*, 255-258.

⁶ See Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares*, 221-268. For a deeper analysis of the whole National Schism see Mavrogordatos, 1915: *The National Schism*. Let us also remember that the Anti-Venizelists themselves had experience with trying to overthrow a government from exile from their 1917-1920 activities, though Gounares and the other Corsican exiles played a smaller role than men at the exiled court in Switzerland, including retired admiral Mikhail Goudas and retired major general Georgios Chatzanestes. The obsessions with the threat of Venizelism can readily be seen by the dominance of that issue in the front pieces of the Constantinist newspaper *Skrip* between November 1920 and 1923. The war effort takes a distinctively secondary role. Digital copies of *Skrip* can be accessed at the Digital Library of Newspaper and Magazine of the National Library of Greece <http://efimeris.nlg.gr/ns/main.html>.

⁷ On the mutiny of the 2nd regiment see Aristedis Omeridis-Skilitsis, *The Greek Army during WW1 1914-1918: The Participation of Greece in the War 1918*, vol. 2 (Athens: Army History Directorate Publications, 1961 [1988]), 258-288. For the mutiny of the 12th see Mavrogordatos, 1915: *The National Schism*, 296-305. On the attempt of Paraskevopoulos to start a military coup to contests the election results see Prince Andrew, *Doryleoum-Sangarius 1921* (Paris: Agon, 1928), 18-20. This book has also been translated into Turkish by Cemal Tosun. See also Konstantinos Nerutsos, *The Campaign in Asia Minor: Philadelphia, Prusa, Usak Operations*, vol. 2 (Athens: Army History Directorate Publications, 1957), 265-268. When Venizelos learned of Paraskevopoulos plans, he recommended accepting the electoral result and obeying the government. Paraskevopoulos thus annulled his decision. In the meantime, the Cavalry Brigade regimental officers learned of the plans by intercepting communications of the 8th Cretan Regiment, the unit that would be used in the coup. In reaction the Cavalry Brigade junior and mid-level officers arrested the brigade commanding officer and the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, who was supportive of a coup, and planned to attack the train that would move the 8th Cretan Regiment to Smyrna/Izmir for embarkation. Finally, the Brigade refused to obey orders to move from Kasaba to Uşak. I would like to thank Brigadier General (ret.) Vasileios Loumiotes for the summary of this source.

For the command of the formation several names were offered. According to Prince Andrew, King Constantine had suggested Major General Stefanos Gennadis (62 years old),⁸ a veteran of the Balkan Wars, with experience in the command of division and army corps level. Gennadis was assigned to the crucial command of the Greek Gendarmerie on 25 November 1920, a choice that is indicative of the dominance of domestic political issues for the new government.⁹ A popular argument that Iohannis Metaxas suggested Xenophon Stratigos (aka Strategos, 51 years old) does not seem to be supported by the primary sources.¹⁰ In addition, there was the issue of making sure that the position of Commander in Chief of the Field Army was filled by an officer who had the rank of Lieutenant General. This did not leave many choices. Beyond Gennadis, the only other available Lieutenant General was Napoleon Soteles (60), initially tasked with evaluating the promotions of officers purged between 1917 and 1920 and now reinstated. He would later be given the Supreme Military Command of Macedonia, again a position important for domestic reasons.¹¹ This led to the decision to assign the command to the recently raised to the rank, Anastasios Papulas (aka Papoulas and Papules, 63 years old). This decision was criticized by Victor Dusmanes (then in the role of adjunct of the King Constantine and in opposition to Strategos and Metaxas) as he considered Papulas lacking in military knowledge and incompetent for the direction of major operations.¹² Papulas had raised to his rank from the ranks without any formal military training. He had mainly commanded divisions, and briefly the E Army Corps during its operations in Northern Epirus/South Albania in 1914-1915.¹³ In general, Papulas was not considered an officer capable of staff work. This was a common perception among Greek officers. It was shared by Passas, the author of Papulas' apologia, as well as by Christos Carassos, Director of the II Office of the Field Army Staff

⁸ Pronounced Yenades.

⁹ See Andrew, *Doryleoum-Sangarius 1921*, 21. For Papulas appointment see *Skrip*, (12/11/1920), 1.

¹⁰ On the fallout between Metaxas and the other Corsican exiles see Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares*, 240. There is no reference to such a suggestion in the entry of the Metaxas diary about his meeting with Gounares.

¹¹ Georgios Hatzianestis (aka Chatzanestes, 57 years old) was restored to service with the rank of major general on 27 November 1920 and thus did not meet the rank requirements. See *Skrip*, (14/11/1920), 3. His final activation was on 29 November 1920 as per *Skrip*, (29/11/1920), 3. On the military career of Chatzanestes and his political activities before 1920 see Georgios I. Sokos (editor in chief), *Great Military and Naval Encyclopaedia*, vol. 6 (Athens: Publications of Great Military and Naval Encyclopaedia, Athens, 1930), 573; Mihail L. Roda, *Greece in Asia Minor* (Athens: Self Published, 1950), 306-307; Christopoulou, *Demetrius Gounares*, 245. Two Lieutenant Generals were promoted around early January 1921 and thus not part of the available pool in November 1920. See *Skrip*, (12/1/1921), 3. One was Lieutenant General Andreas Bairas (64 years old) who as major general was assigned to the E Army Corps in Epirus. The other was Lieutenant General Andreas Mompheratos (58 years old) who was assigned as a major general to the command of the Army of Thrace, see *Skrip*, (1/11/1920), 3. Other options not considered were to return to the army the veteran but retired Lieutenant General Konstantinos Kallaris (62 years old). *Skrip* reported that he would be called back to the military, see *Skrip*, (29/11/1920), 3, and that he cooperated with Gounares on 14/12/1920, see *Skrip* (15/12/1920), 3. But nothing came of it. The other existing Greek officers that had retired at that rank were probably considered too old or of frail health. These were Nikolaos Delagrammatikas (67 years old), Iohannis Yiannakitsas (67 years old), and Konstantinos Moschopoulos (66 years old). This list was created by cross-referencing the list of officers with the rank of major general during the 1915 mobilization as published in Aristedis Omeridis-Skilitsis, *The Greek Army during WW1 1914-1918. Volume 1: Greece and the War in the Balkans* (Athens: Army History Directorate Publications, 1958), 1987, with their respective entries in the *Great Military and Naval Encyclopaedia*.

¹² Viktor Dusmanes, *The Internal View of the Asia Minor Entanglement* (Athens: Pyrsos, 1928), 26-27. Papulas was made a lieutenant general on 22 November 1920, with the same Royal Degree that appointed him commander of the Field Army of Asia Minor. See *Skrip*, (9/11/1920), 2; Dusmanes, *The Internal View of the Asia Minor Entanglement*, 26-27.

¹³ For a brief military biography see Vasileios Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor in December 1920 and March 1921," *Stratigein*, no.1 (Summer 2019), 42, note 24.

during his command. Carassos characterizes him as a gentle and easy-going character, especially in his interaction with his officers, but one that had no technical ability to critically engage with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff.¹⁴

Papulas was chosen for political reasons. Unlike, Strategos, Metaxas, Chatzanestes, and Dusmanes, he had not left Greece in 1917-1920, going to prison for his activity against the Venizelist government. This had the beneficial consequences that he was not caught up in the internecine political struggle among the exiles. He was thus politically a safe choice. He was also considered popular with the troops, a soldier's general. Importantly while he was anti-Venizelist he had been a member of the Military League of 1909 which was something that connected him with many of the officers of the Army.¹⁵ Finally, his easy-going and genial character were seen as able to help manage any issues that would arise due to the presence of many Venizelist officers, especially in junior ranks, in the army.

This is significant because, while the popular narrative leaves an impression on an immediate purging of the Army from Venizelists, the reality is that this was a long process that lasted well into March 1921. This is because the replacement of divisional commands had to wait for rank advancements for Constantinist officers returning to the army, a process that consumed November and December 1920.¹⁶ The commanders of A Corps (Nider), B Army Corps (Mavromichales), and the commanders of I Division (Papathanassiou), II Division (Vlachopoulos), III Division (Trikoupes) V/Crete Division (Tsimikales), XI/Magnesia Division (Gargalides), XIII Division (Manetas), and the Calvary Brigade (Spyropoulos) were not changed in November-December 1920. Only some commanders were immediately relieved in November 1920.

These were concentrated in C/Smyrna Army corps where accusations of electoral fraud had been heavily concentrated. Both the corps commander, Demetrius Ioannou, and constituent division commanders were replaced. Ioannou was replaced by Colonel (later Major-General) Konstantinos Petmezas. In the Archipelagos/VII Division, Tseroules was replaced by Colonel Karakalos, and the commander of Smyrna/X Division, Mazarakis-Ainian was temporarily replaced by Boukouvalas, his Infantry Chief. The other major change was in the command of Cydoniae Division which had been moved to Greece for the election, where Othonaios was replaced by Colonel Mompheratos.¹⁷ At the regimental level the change was at a smaller scale. Of the twenty-four Infantry and two cavalry regiments present in Asia Minor in November-December 1920, the commanders of fourteen were not changed in this period, and in three the person removed from command was assigned the position of deputy commander. In most cases the deputy commanders assigned under Paraskevopoulos were not changed.¹⁸

¹⁴ See Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor", 42-44, and Christos D. Carassos, *Asia Minor War: The March 1921 Operations*, vol. 1 (Athens: Self-Published, 1968), 96-97, note 2.

¹⁵ See Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor", 42, note 24.

¹⁶ See *Skrip*, (20/12/1920), 4.

¹⁷ See *Skrip*, (23/11/1920), 3.

¹⁸ The list of officers of major units given in Appendix A of Demetrios Gedeon, Eupraxia Paschalidou, and Angeliki Dima-Dimitrou, *A Concise History of the Campaign in Asia Minor 1919-1922* (Athens: Army History Directorate Publications, 2003), 521-526 is problematic. More accurate information can be found in the Abridged Unit Histories that are part of Konstantinos Nerutsos, *The Campaign in Asia Minor: Offensive Operations December 1920 and March 1921*, vol. 3 (Athens: Army History Directorate Publications, 1963[1986]), 350-394. The information of regimental

In other words, when Papulas arrived at Izmir/Smyrna to take the position of Commander of the FAAM on 9/22 November 1920, most of his Army Corps commanders, the bulk of his divisional commanders, and many of his regimental commanders had been appointed under his predecessor. While many expected to be relieved of command, or had requested to be relieved of command, the government was not in a hurry to do so. For example, Papulas persuaded Nider to delay his request for being relieved of command.¹⁹ Going into 1921 the FAAM was still the army of Leonidas Paraskevopoulos.

Papulas was thus chosen to facilitate the protracted transition process with the appointees of his predecessors, as well as avoid offending any of the internal anti-Venizelist factions in government. He was not expected to actually command the army in an operational sense. This was to be conducted by his Army HQ Staff. This was partly renewed.

The government chose Colonel (Arty) Konstantinos Pallis as Chief of Staff of the FAAM (49 years old). Dusmanes claims that the recommendation was his, seeking to balance the inexperience of Papulas with a competent staff officer. On the other hand, the official military history ascribes to Papulas the initiative for choosing Pallis.²⁰ Pallis was a graduate of the Prussian War Academy, and part of the tight clique of staff officers that had made up the staff of the General HQ during the Balkan Wars (Metaxas, Dusmanes, Strategos, Staikos), but had avoided becoming embroiled in their subsequent factionalism.²¹ Carassos considered him good mannered, approachable, hard-working, calm, and unwilling to create problems. But he criticizes him for being too willing to accept the opinions of Sarigiannis in the initial phase of the campaign.²²

Institutional continuity with the previous high command was provided by the decision to retain two officers in their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Spyridonos remained as head of the IV Office of the FAAM Staff. More crucial was the retention of Colonel (Eng.) Ptolemaios Sarigiannis in the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAAM. Sarigiannis provided direct connection to the operational intentions for 1921 formed by Paraskevopoulos and Pangalos. Sarigiannis was the acting Chief of Staff of the Field Army in the period between the aftermath of the elections and until the appointment of Pallis. Sarigiannis held the unique position of being one of the few Greek staff officers in service, to have graduated from the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre of France, rather than the Prussian Kriegsakademie. Carassos considered him active and hard-working with exceptional staff training, and supreme in his ability to write operational orders. However, he criticizes him as being mercurial and easily perturbed by unexpected events.²³

The expectation was that while Papulas would administer the army, it would be Pallis and Sarigiannis that would provide operational command. Loumiotes argues that this meant that the politically un-responsible Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff would essentially dictate the actions of the politically responsible Commander and Chief of the FAAM. Papulas lacking the necessary staff

commanders and deputies is taken from there. The fact that Boukouvalas had temporary command can be ascertained by the entry for the battle of İnönü in the Sokos, *Great Military and Naval Encyclopaedia*, vol. 3, 541.

¹⁹ Roda, *Greece in Asia Minor*, 193.

²⁰ Dusmanes, *The Internal View of the Asia Minor Entanglement*, 26-28; Nerutsos, *The Campaign in Asia Minor*, 5.

²¹ For a brief biographical note see Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor", 42, note 25.

²² Carassos, *Asia Minor War*, 96-97, note 2.

²³ See Carassos, *Asia Minor War*, 96-97, note 2.

experience and technical training, simply could not critically analyse the operational plans submitted to him by his Staff. Crucially, if the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff disagreed, Papulas could not adjudicate between the two. Dangerously this also meant that many times Pallis and Sarigiannis, both colonels, had to directly intervene with Corps commanders, who often outranked them both in rank and seniority.²⁴

The final change was the reactivation of the Army Staff Service, deactivated between 1917 and 1920, and the assignment of Major General (raised to rank on 17/30 December 1920) Aristoteles Vlachopoulos (54 years old) as deputy chief in November and chief in December. This institution had little input in army operational matters, being more similar to the same institution in the army of Napoleon III in 1870.²⁵

CONCLUSION

What were the consequences of the command changes in the Greek army between November 1920 and December 1921? At the level of regimental commands, we can argue that they were negligible. The fact that many officers who served in the 1918-1920 period remained in positions of command either as regimental commanders, lieutenant commanders, and infantry chiefs. This means that officers trained in the 1917 French Infantry Doctrine commanded men trained in the same doctrine. This doctrinal congruence explains the relative higher tactical flexibility and lower casualty rates of Greek infantry regiments in the operations of January-July 1921 when compared to the same factors during the Sakarya offensive. In that case the expansion of the army, and further purging of 1917-1920 officers, led to a massive influx of reservists and officers who had missed training in the 1917 French Infantry Doctrine and reverted to the high casualty-low flexibility tactics employed in the Balkan Wars.²⁶

At the level of divisional command, the actual experience of the operations of January-July 1921 indicate that the supposed differences between post-November 1920 and pre-November 1920 officers are not as significant. Boukouvalas, who remained, can be argued to have exhibited less command acumen, than the newly appointed Karakalos during the Battle of First Inonu. Long serving officers like Leonardopoulos who replaced Karakalos, exhibited lower command acumen

²⁴ For an extensive criticism of this arrangement and sources see Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor", 43-44.

²⁵ For a summary of the history of the institution and its role see Loumiotes, "The Higher Direction of the Operations of the Field Army of Asia Minor", 47, note 46. It is wrong to speak of a Greek General Staff in this period. From 1917-1920 there was the General Staff of the General Army Headquarters under Paraskevopoulos. De-facto it operated both as what we mean by the term General Staff and since there were no army level formations in the Greek order of battle, except for the brief Occupation Field Army of Asia Minor, and as a field formation general staff. During 1920-1923 the tasks we associate with a General Staff were mainly executed by the Field Army of Asia Minor Army Staff, the Field Army of Thrace Army Staff, directly by the Minister of Military Affairs, and to a secondary degree by the Army Staff Service. This condition would end only in 1923-1924 with the creation of modern General Staff. On the appointment and rank of Vlachopoulos as deputy chief see *Skrip*, (30/11/1920), 3. For his raise in rank see *Skrip* (17/12/1920), 4.

²⁶ On the Greek Infantry Doctrine in the period see Demetrius Christodoulou, "The Evolution of the Organization of Greek Infantry Small Units: From the Balkan Wars to the First World War" in *First World War 1914-1918 100 years from its termination: Published Transcripts of Meetings of the Committee of Greek Military History Thessaloniki* (27 September 2017), *Larnaka* (30 May 2018), *Athens* (15 June 2018), edited by Major General Georgios Rahmanidis (Athens: National Defense General Staff Committee of Greek Military History, 2019), 77-97.

than newly appointed ones like Frangou. The stable infantry core of the divisions can be argued to have mitigated the impact of divisional commands.

It is at the level of Corps and Army command that the changes were catalytic. The commander of C Corps, Petmezas would prove wholly inadequate. His replacement and close friend, Vlachopoulos would also prove a disappointment. The negative consequences of the Battles of Frist and Second Inonu are their responsibility, both in spirit, and by behaviour²⁷. Both were political appointments chosen by Gounaris for their loyalty to each other and to him. The arrangement at the high command of the FAAM would prove catastrophic. Papulas failed to coordinate his staff. Throughout his tenure, Pallis and Sarigiannis were unable to fully coordinate. The planning of operations was heavily influenced if not hijacked by other external institutional actors. And the ability of the Field Army headquarters to coordinate subservient commands suffered for this.

²⁷ See Konstantinos Travlos, "Yunan Gözünden I. İnönü (Bozüyük) Muharebesi," *Toplumsal Tarih* Nisan 2021, Sayı: 328.

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