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TURKEY AND THE WEST IN THE CHANGING WORLD: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

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With revolutionary changes in the system, Turkey's strategic position has started to being evaluated. In this context some observers in Turkey¹ and the West² have been examining how Turkey to be affected by these developments and how to continue to be potentially important actor in Europe, the Middle East and Asia politically, economically and strategically. They try to answer to a critical question is that whether Turkey will continue to be a bridge between the West and the Middle East or not. In other words, it would be continue to be an important question is that whether Turkey accepts itself a European country or an Eastern country. So, the purpose of this essay is to examine threats and problems which Turkey face to face by evaluating last developments and how Turkey's political and strategic role and status in the Western Block being affected by these developments. By doing so, policy options which Turkey may adopt will be trying to explored.

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¹See, Ersin Onulduran, "The New Shape of Politics and Security in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XVII, No. 1-2 (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1993); Ali Bozer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Changing World," *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Summer 1990); Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April-June 1995). This work analyze Turkish perceptions of its evolving security environment in the post-cold war era as it impact Turkish interests and policies.

²For a detailed analysis, see Graham E. Fuller et. al. ed., *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993); see Also, Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (New York: Royal Institute of International affairs, 1991).

Introduction

In the late 1940's, the notion of common or mutual interests was predominant and this was central to Turkey's joining the alliance. Since Turkey's contribution to the alliance as substantial, it was seen not just as a Middle Eastern country, but as a European country. In the 1980s, however, the increasing attention to Turkey's role in the defense of the Persian Gulf underscored Turkey's importance. In this context, Turkey's role in deterring possible Soviet adventuresome in Iran and its potential role in protecting the West's access to the oil in the Persian Gulf was highlighted in October 1982 by a US-Turkish co-located operating base agreement.³

Collapse of the Soviet Union and the diffuse of the blocs haven't decreased strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey, in history, with its location maintained its importance and by the policies that she has pursued, showed to be able to change balances in the region as well as in the international system. This reality will continue as geographic feature doesn't change.

*"As the Cold War wound down, Turkey's 'value' to the West began to be questioned in some circles and this created considerable anxiety among the Turkish political leaders. The 1990 Gulf crisis appeared at a juncture when these doubts were being openly discussed. Turkey's rapid and steadfast support of the Western position may have been in part influenced by these thoughts. Whatever the reason, Turkey once again regained its position as an indispensable ally and expectations began to rise in the country that a more central role might be given to Turkey on decisions involving the future shape of the Western alliance, or at least of the region. ... as the new Western Coalition takes shape and takes charge of security policies of a significant part of the world, Turkey's position in the region will be strengthened"*⁴.

However, Turkey's difficulties with Europe, its increasingly close association with the Middle East and (Asian minor) and the occasional reassertions of Islamic values in Turkey have combined to raise questions about the role that Islam may play in Turkey's political future. Turks have begun to question their identities and to wonder whether they should consider themselves as Europeans first, and then Middle Easterners, or the other way around⁵.

³For more details, see Bruce Kuniholm, "East or west? The Geopolitics of Turkey and Its NATO Alliance," in Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan ed. *Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), p. 144-146; and also for a detailed study of the role played by Turkey in U.S. strategic thinking in Europe and the Middle East in the early postwar years, see Kuniholm, *The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952* (Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic Press, 1984).

⁴Onulduran, op. cit., p. 23.

⁵Kuniholm, op. cit., p. 143. But Turks believe that religion should be seen neither as a substitute for, nor as a threat to the nationalist-oriented, secular political order, but as a source of support for it. For more detail see also Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Islam and Turkey's foreign Policy," George Harris ed., *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1985), pp. 51-54.

In fact, as noted earlier, Turkish attitudes remain heavily weighted toward the Western political and economic system, to the extent that alternative opportunities in the Middle East, Central Asia and around the Black Sea are often promoted as vehicles for increasing Turkey's value to Europe and the United States⁶.

But Turkey's relations with the West in general terms are not less problematic. However, the relation between Turkey and USA is becoming a desired level after the radical changes that ended the Cold war and East-West conflict. Besides the customs union relation, the prospect for Turkey's joining Europe and the possibility of becoming a full member of the EU and Western European Union (WEU) is getting high, but not soon.

On the other hand, the West, the United States and Europe that cooperated to contain Soviet Union and preserve peace and order in the Europe as well as in the world, started to struggle and rival each other in the regional and global policies. So, Turkish political decision makers in the new period are face to face a dilemma. Because, the interactions between these two major players, the United States and Europe, will dominate and especially shape the future of the area. For example, as Phebe Marr points out, despite the obvious convergence in their interests, values, and institutions, the United States and Europe do have distinctive differences in their relationship with the Middle East⁷.

*"A third problem lies in the structural imbalance in US-European relations with the Middle East. Europe's interactions with the Middle East are primarily though not exclusively commercial in focus. This drives in part from Europe's greater dependence than that of the United States on Middle Eastern oil, which must be paid for by the sale of goods and services, but also through a long-standing network of commercial ties. In 1991, more than 45 percent of the imports of six Middle Eastern countries came from the European Union. The Middle East is also a source of capital, which flows mainly from wealthier oil states to European banks and businesses. In an era in which international commerce is expected to play an evermore vital role, not only in income growth but also in job creation, Europe's commercial and economic ties to the Middle East are an essential component of its stability."*⁸

⁶Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War", in Fuller et. al. ed., 1993 p. 102.

⁷For a more detail see, Phebe Marr, "The United States, Europe, and the Middle East: An Uneasy Triangle," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 212.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 214-215. Europe lacks both the military muscle and the security institutions to protect these economic interests in the Middle East is overwhelmingly the preserve of the United States, whether it is exercised unilaterally or under international auspices such as the United Nations... Without an independent military capacity to respond to or threaten to respond to challenges to its interests. Europe must rely for protection and deterrence on the United States. Europe is acutely aware of this vulnerability, but also uneasy with US military interventionism.

This military dependence is a linchpin of the US-European relationship regardless of the nagging discomfort Europe may feel over the disparity in power projection and

1. Turkey and the USA

The Cold War and the strategy of containment could be said to have had their origins in the eastern Mediterranean with the Truman Doctrine and the US. Commitment to bolster the "Northern Tier" of Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan as a bar to Soviet adventuresome in the Middle East. Thus begun the cycle of strategic perception in which Turkey's importance in American eyes has been defined alternately in Middle Eastern, European, and, again, in the aftermath of recent developments in the Gulf, Middle Eastern terms. The first bilateral military aid agreement, signed in June 1954, provided the basis for more extensive security assistance and set a precedent for numerous subsequent agreements on defense and economic cooperation⁹.

"The tilt in the American Administration toward Turkey in the early years of the 1980's had come about in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the panic and ambiguity in the early years of Iran-Iraq War, the initially strong anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric of Prime Minister Papandreou, and the military coup in Turkey. The American interest in bolstering Turkey's defense effort has reversed itself, however, to reach new lows in the second part of the 1980's, the clear evidence of which is shrinking volume of defense assistance over the last few years."¹⁰

In the meantime, the Kurdish problem and the broader issue of human rights in Turkey is likely to emerge as a more immediate obstacle to Turkish policy in Washington as well as Brussels¹¹. On the other hand, Cyprus question, 7-10 ratio in the amount of assistance to Greece and Turkey, refusing to open up American markets to Turkish exports in greater amount, public expression of anti-Turkish sentiment in the Congress in the context of Armenian claims directed at the territorial integrity are still main issues and real problems with Turkish-American relations in the new era.

The Kurdish question and how Turkey will deal with it are heavily affecting Turkish foreign policy, especially its military dimension threatens to jeopardize relations with USA and Western Europe.

influence in the region. Nevertheless, unless the relationship is nurtured, it could produce friction about mutual aims and goals in the Middle and decreased European support for US activities in the region. The absence of an independent military option is also an underlying cause of Europe's emphasis on economic ties to the region as a means of mitigating security threats.

⁹ Lesser, *ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁰ Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the year 2000," *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989), p. 90. The United States and Germany in particular have incorporated a substantial human rights dimension concerning Turkish Kurds in their overall approach to relations with Turkey. The protection of Iraqi-Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq by coalition forces stationed at the Incirlik Airbase at Adana and the United Nations embargo on Iraq also have contributed to tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations, largely because of their high political, economic and social burdens on Turkey." Sezer, "Turkey's New Security..." p. 163.

¹¹ Lesser, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

*"As the most serious internal threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey, the Kurdish question forces an important portion of Turkey's internal energy and resources to be diverted to the management and resolution of the issue. Such diversion automatically undermines and restricts the ability of Turkey to confront important foreign policy issues, and, should the need be perceived, to choose alternative policies. In other words, as long as Turkey is not in full control of the domestic situation, its freedom of movement in foreign and defense policies will be necessarily subjected to and limited by the requirements of the Kurdish question."*¹²

In this context, as noted by Kasic, "with the Kurdish issue being the single biggest problem for Turkey, and with its negative effects on other problems such as the economy and local politics, Turkey could not voluntarily allow the establishment of a de facto autonomous Kurdistan."¹³ Like many Arab states in the region, Turkey did not want to see Iraq destroyed. If that scenario had been allowed to occur, it would have destabilized the balance of power in the region and opened the door to expanded Iranian influence. "The International community's failure to bring about a democratic Iraq has significantly undermined Turkish domestic and foreign policy interests. On the other hand, the entire region would likely be thrown into greater dislocation in the event of the fragmentation of Iraq."¹⁴

In Turkey, sensitiveness of the public opinion to these matters is very high, and wrong policies adopted and pursued would affect political structure and decision makers adversely. Unfortunately, American assessment of Turkey's position not reflecting the broader geopolitical realities of the post-cold war and inactivity of NATO in Bosnia leads many Turks to believe that Turkey's future would be guaranteed by a return to a strict reliance on Turkish strengths and the Islamic world.¹⁵ However, the developments related to American support on the implementation of customs union accord in the process of Turkey's integration to the West seemed to change this believing gradually.

In this context, the reassertion of Turkey's regional role in the Balkans, around the Black Sea,¹⁶ in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East would introduce an

¹²Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy," p. 75. More problematic may be Ankara's desire for US backing in its policy toward the Kurdish insurgency. A hard-line response to increasingly severe PKK attacks could prove an impediment to closer relations with the United States as well as Europe, where Turkey's human rights record has long been the subject of scrutiny. See, Lesser, *ibid.*, p. 127.

¹³Obrad Kasic, "American-Turkish Relations at a Crossroads", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 99-100

¹⁴Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, ..." p. 163.

¹⁵Kasic, *ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁶The leading architect of the Black Sea project regards it as perhaps Turkey's first independent regional initiative in fifty years, and one with potentially important security, as well as economic and political consequences. According to some observer in the West, if successful, it could raise the value of Turkey to its Western partners. In this context, Black Sea project has also been as welcome evidence that Ankara is developing interests beyond the difficult issue of EU membership. Finally, active cooperation

entirely new and less predictable element into relations between Ankara and Washington. Given the disinclination on both sides to view Turkey as a Western gendarme in regional matters, the emergence of Turkey as a regional power raises the important question of whether US and Turkish interests will be divergent or convergent over the longer term. According to some Turkish commentators, US interests in the stable evolution of political and economic systems around the Black Sea and the Middle East, and in preventing the emergence of regional hegemonies (eg., Iran) are broadly compatible with Turkey's regional preferences.

As noted by some American political scientists as well as Turkish scientists, Turkey's geographic position allows it to exert influence in three different areas: the middle East, the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans. All three have considerable Islamic populations and are experiencing social, political, and economic instability, which makes them prime targets for infiltration by Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the presence of large Turkic-speaking populations throughout the former Soviet union fueled the American belief that Turkey would be a major influence in this region. Playing on commonality of language, Turkey would gain an advantage over Iran's efforts at expanding influence and at the same time limit Russia's influence among the NIS in Central Asia and Caucasus. So, the Bush and Clinton administrations especially viewed the Turkish model as an important influence in the political development of democratic and secular states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹⁷ Finally, Turkey will seek US support for its regional policies and initiatives as part of an active strategic relationship. Support for the Black Sea plan and Turkey's application for EU membership will be priorities for Ankara.¹⁸

II. Turkey and the Europe

As noted by Eric Rouleau, a former French Ambassador to Turkey, "Turkey's determination to become an integral part of Europe is the fruit of a national consensus that could seem strange in a Muslim country with nothing more than a geographical toehold in Europe. In fact, this aspiration is not recent. The Ottoman Empire was itself a European power by virtue of vast possessions in the continent, and as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the reformist sultans sought to modernize the

around the Black Sea centered on Ankara could serve as a counter weight to Greek influence in the Balkans and enhance Turkey's position as a regional economic power. It will possibly improve Turkey's longer-term prospects for EU membership. And it is not seen as an alternative to the EU in Turkey. Because, Black Sea project has many obstacles to be a real integration movement.

¹⁷ However according to Kesic, the American expectations for Turkey's roles in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans were never fully fulfilled, which added to the growing tension between the two nations over Turkey's violent response to an increasingly active Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK). See, Kasic, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

¹⁸ To the extent that Turkey is frustrated in its relations with Europe, the bilateral relationship with the United States will acquire additional significance. Even as Turkey pursues new initiatives around the Black Sea and elsewhere, Ankara will look to the United States as a source of strategic reassurance and political and economic cooperation. Lesser, op. cit., p. 127-129.

empire by adopting the structures, behaviors and customs of its more developed Western neighbors."¹⁹

On July 31, 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership in the Community with a view to becoming a full member in the future, after a year later of which the European community was established with the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 and went in to effect on July 31, 1959. By the September of 1963, an association treaty was signed in Ankara. The Ankara Treaty of 1963 and the complementing protocols perceived the Turkish path to full membership to be comprised of three stages: a preparatory stage, a transitional stage, and a final stage.

So, by signing the Ankara Treaty, Turkey which explaining to be a member the European Community, finally in 1987 applied for full membership and expecting to be accepted to custom union with the European Union in the first step.

For the first time in Turkish history, all major Turkish political parties, for different reasons, are unanimously agreed that Turkey should work toward becoming a full member of the Community. Some feel that the European connection would enhance the sustenance of a political democracy, others feel that it would provide insurance for the growth and the entrenchment of a free enterprise system. All express that a Turkey outside of Europe cannot even be thought of²⁰.

"There is basic political consensus in the country that it will be a good thing to become a member of the notable exception of the conservative religious Welfare Party, agree that the policy followed by the government on full membership is correct one."²¹ "Because, "the long term linkage with Western Europe and the United States has affected closely the vision both the Turkish people and their governments have about what type of society and what type of a future they would like to have. This vision includes a modern political democracy characterized by high levels of economic prosperity."²²

To sum up, historical experience, economic relationships, perception of the world political system, and the resulting defense need, and the visions of the future have come together such that Turkey has come to view itself as a part of Europe, and it has persistently followed policies to achieve higher levels of integration with Western European countries and organizations. Although there are viewpoints and organizations in

¹⁹Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Nov/Dec 1993), p. 115-116. According to Rouleau, the heirs of Atatürk have neglected nothing to achieve this objective. With conviction and determination, they brought Turkey into NATO, the European Economic Community (as an associate member), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western European Union (likewise as an associate). Turkey also adhered to a whole range of European conventions. Two thirds of Turkey's exports go to the OECD countries, half to members of the European Community alone. Investment capital, technology transfers, remittances from millions of "guest workers," and equally considerable tourism revenues all flow Europe.

²⁰İlter Turan, "Turkey and the European Community: Toward the Year 2000" *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989), 38.

²¹Onulduran, op. cit., p. 26.

²²Ibid., s. 40.

Turkey which challenge the European connection, they have never constituted the mainstream of Turkish political life of thought.²³

In this direction, Turkey and European Union concluded an historic accord on Monday 6, 1995 to establish a customs union among themselves with a view to further economic integration in line with the stipulations of the Ankara agreement of 1963. After three documents adopted by the Turkey-EU association Council, Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın said he welcomed the outcome of the Association Council. On the other hand, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, said that the signing of the customs union would not only lift customs barriers but also pave the way for political and financial integration with Europe²⁴.

Although economic in essence the decision to conclude the customs union was expected by officials from both sides to have wide ranging political and social ramifications as well. For the Turkish side this means new steps in the direction of political integration with a view to realizing the eventual aim of full membership in the Union. For the EU side, on the other hand, there was a lucrative economic aspect as represented by the large market and the young and dynamic population of Turkey, all promising net benefits for European investors and businessmen.²⁵

On the other hand, some voices rose against the customs union. For example, according to Rıza Müftüoğlu, vice chairman of NMP: "The first steps Turkey should take, before the customs union, is to strengthen the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, have a common market with the Turkic republics and to have ties with the Middle Eastern Countries." On the other hand, according to Oğuzhan Asiltürk, vice chairman of Welfare Party, and Doğu Perinçek, the leader of ultra-left wing Labor Party, the customs union accord is a colonization agreement and by entering the customs union, Turkey has accepted the conditions to be a colony.²⁶

However, EU countries have reasons that some of them stem from Turkey and as well as some of them stem from themselves, for not to adopt Turkey as a full member in the short run. Let us look at those economic and political reasons.

First of all, the level of development of the Turkish economy is not sufficient and has important problems to be solved possibly to integrate as a member of European Union. On the other hand, to be accepted as a full member of EU is not realistic for Turkey with foreign debt of 60 billion dollars, inflation rate of 70 percent (ten times the EU average), high rate of population (roughly 2.5 percent annually, ten times the EU average) and unemployment rate of 30 percent (five times the EU average). So "Chronic unemployment, the loss of purchasing power of wage earners and the erosion of the currency have already led some five million Turks to seek employment in Europe before Europe itself was struck full force for recession. Given the current unemployment situation in the EC countries, Turkey's admission to the organization, which would

²³Turan, Ibid.

²⁴See, Turkish Daily News, March 7, 1995.

²⁵See, Ibid.

²⁶See, Ibid.

involve the lifting of all restrictions on population movement, would result in an intolerable situation for the European member states."²⁷

Besides, these economic deficiencies, in the eyes of Western politician, Turkey has a number of political problems that, left unresolved, stand in the way of its EU admission. The first of these is democratization, which will have to be completed before Turkey can join. The members of the European Union appear to be agreed that Turkey has been moving in the direction of more, not less democracy. At the moment, progress is not deemed to be sufficient. "It should be noted that Turkey has achieved significant and rapid progress despite three military coups d'etat since 1960. The multiparty system and an elected parliament both quite satisfactorily and many of the public freedoms, particularly of the press, are to a great extent respected... This does not change the fact that certain effects of the military regime that ruled from 1980 to 1983 have not been eliminated. The constitution and a number of laws and regulations significantly curtail other basic rights, or are worded in such a way as to enable the courts and the security services to interpret them in an abusive manner."²⁸

In this context, first, Kurdish problem affecting Turkey's all foreign relations should be resolved or kept under control. This problem increasingly dominates domestic politics. It undermines the credibility and stability of the government. It poisons the traditionally harmonious relations between Turkey's two main ethnic groups, and in the long run could even threaten the country's cohesion.²⁹

However, "the Turkish relationship with European countries have naturally been not one sided. As the Ottoman Empire expanded into Europe, the Turks were first seen as a threat to the European way of life. Later, as Turkish military prowess slowly declined, it came to be perceived as the 'sick man of Europe.' The sick man was important enough, however, that at the Paris Peace Conference following the Crimean war, in 1856, the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a member of the European community of nations."³⁰ However, "in contrast to Turkish orientations of pursuing integration with Western Europe, one cannot escape the impression that Western Europeans have had ambivalent feelings about how European Turkey really is. Such ambivalence derives both from historical-cultural sources and concrete matters of political and economic interest. The historical-cultural sources and concrete matters of political and economic interest. The historical-cultural dimension owes much to religious differences, and a sense of geographical distance which easily translates into psychological distance."³¹

²⁷See, Rouleau, p. 118

²⁸Rouleau, op. cit., 118-119.

²⁹Rouleau, op. cit., p. 122.

³⁰Turan, op. cit., p. 40.

³¹Ibid., p. 41.

According to a western observer, "the fundamental issue for many Europeans is whether Europe can or should embrace an Islamic country of 57 million. Significantly, the issue is being posed at a time of mounting intolerance and xenophobia in Western Europe, much of it directed against Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey."³² As Rouleau also noted "Westerners are often misled by erroneous comparisons with Khomeinist Iran, confusing Islam with fundamentalism and failing to distinguish between a practicing Muslim and a partisan of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia."³³ In the same way Professor Dodd, a leading British expert on Turkey, sees fundamentalist Islam as becoming a vital issue blocking Turkey's EU membership. According to him, a view that is mostly stressed in Turkey—that because of religion, the EU does not want Turkey to be a member—is to some extent right. Although it is not said publicly, unfortunately it is correct.³⁴ Whereas in Turkey, decision makers insist that religion should not affect political decisions as well as Turkey as well as Turkey's membership in the EU and WEU³⁵.

In this context, it is very disturbing that Turkey is being trying to be excluded from the efforts to construct a European defense identity around the WEU (by giving a non-voting, associate status in the organization). Uncertainty about the future role and significance of NATO will reinforce Turkish interests in emerging European defense arrangements. Turkish exclusion from full participation in these arrangements would be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the continent. Also, Turkey's concerns about its role in future European defense arrangements have been of two sorts: The broader fear of a security future cast largely in extra-European terms; and the narrower concern that the European security umbrella would be extended to Greece but exclude Turkey,, with serious implications for stability in the Aegean³⁶.

Whereas, both, in the overall NATO defense and in the more specific European defense, Turkey still occupies a strategic position that is discussed above. While existing a mutual threat to both Turkey and European countries themselves, they didn't give enough military aid to re modernize and reconstruct its defense structure, now it is not realistic to thing that they give necessary support after dramatic developments in the

³² Lesser, op. cit., p. 105.

³³ Rouleau, op. cit., p. 119.

³⁴ According to Dodd, thirty years ago Turkey's image in Europe was of a modernizing, Atatürkist state. No one then thought of Turkey as a Muslim state. But the country suffered not only from what is called a revival of Islam in Turkey but also from the revival in the Middle East. And this view has changed in recent years. Particularly the importance in politics of fundamentalist Islam is giving the impression to Europe that any one who is Muslim must be a fundamentalist. This view also influences the admitting Turkey into the EU. See, Turkish Daily News, Friday, January 27 1995.

³⁵ Özal hinted that at the risks inherent in allowing religion to drive political decisions in Europe's institutions, asserting that if Islam emerges as an overt bar to Turkey's membership in the EC and or the WEU, this might drive Turkey into a closer relationship with the Middle East, encourage the spread of fundamentalism, and "send a wrong message to the rest of the Arab world." Lesser, *ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁶ See, Lesser, op. cit., pp. 106 and 108.

system that changed quality of threat and security perceives and with different foreign policy evaluations from Turkey toward Eastern Europe and Caucasus Region.

Another problem is that of the states of relations between Turkey and Greece. The problem is multi-dimensional, and contains within it the Cyprus problem, that the delimitation of the territorial waters, the air space and the continental shelf in the Aegean, the marking of the borders of the Flight Information Region, fortification of Greek islands in the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean. Beyond these issues is the separate but related question of the status and treatment of minorities; the residual Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul; and the more substantial Muslim (and predominantly Turkish) minority in Greek Thrace.³⁷ Other members of the Community express their fears that Turkish-Greek problems should not become an internal problem of the Community and that problems should be cleared before Turkish membership is considered. From the perspective of EU, the Greek-Turkish conflict should not jeopardize the integrity and interrupt decision making mechanism of the Organization.

Above all, Turkish relations with the West have been most seriously affected by the continuing dispute over Cyprus. In this context, according to EU countries, the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkey and the presence of the Turkish troops on the island are two outstanding issues that could be settled.³⁸ From the Turkish perspective these questions could only be solved by the integral dialogue between the two communities. Internal settlement achieved between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities could create a lasting peace in the island³⁹.

However, Greece has tried to use its relation to the Community as an additional resource, a bargaining point, in the settlement of its disputes with Turkey. In this context, Greece has been trying to use her membership as an instrument in influencing Turkish behavior. As long as Greece feels that it can use the potential of the Community in affecting Turkish behavior, and as long as other members of the Community insist that Turco-Greek problems should be settled prior to the consideration of Turkish accession, there is no reason why Greece should try to reach a compromise on any of the many problems it says it has with Turkey.⁴⁰

Whereas according to Lesser, a political scientist, "as NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish involvement in the EC could serve to anchor

³⁷For more details see, Şükrü Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)* (Ankara: Ümit Yay., 1993).

³⁸Professor Dood, a Western academician, noted that the Cyprus problem has always appeared as a major reason why Turkey cannot get in. Certainly the Greeks feel very strongly about that. Soon, a decision will be made about the entry of Greek Cyprus into the EU. If that happens, I think it will be a disaster as far as Turkish and EU relations are concerned. It means that Turkey will be considered as a foreign occupier in Cyprus." Orya Sultan Halisdemir, Interview with Professor Clement Dood, *Turkish Daily News*, Section two, Friday, January 27, 1995.

³⁹But from the Turkish side, the view that is stressed by the political scientists in the West, that resolution of the Cyprus problem would transform the overall climate of Greek-Turkish relation and facilitate the settlement of more practical questions concerning air and sea space and resources in the Aegean, is not convincing.

⁴⁰Turan, *op. cit.*, 43.

and stabilize Turkish-Greek relations, widely discussed in moderate circles in Athens and Ankara, may gain momentum. Members of the business community in both countries are among the strongest advocates of Aegean détente as a means of improving relations with the EC and as a source of opportunity in its own right."⁴¹ In this context, Couloumbis and Yannas, Greek political scientists, stressed that "Following a potential grad settlement, both Greece and Turkey will increase significantly (...) their trade, tourism, investment and joint ventures at home and abroad. Greece will also, abandon its policy of 'conditionally' regarding Turkey's entry. Simply, a European Community and will, in fact, seek to facilitate Turkey's entry. Simply, a European Turkey will be for Greece a much easier neighbor to live with than alienated, fundamentalist and militaristic Turkey."⁴² Also Turkish political Scientist, such as Onulduran sees that "Turkey and Greece are two countries whose destinies are linked by a common geography and whose national interests will be infinitely better served if the rivalry between them is converted into a cooperative partnership."⁴³

III. Turkey Eastern Orientation and Affects to Its Western Polic

Turkey is an important element of the Middle East sub-system as geographically and historically as well as a member of the Western alliance. So instabilities in the Middle East would inevitably affect Turkey, although it has been avoiding from regional troubles. So, a secure and peaceful atmosphere should be created and maintained in its south. As long as Turkey is an important stability element, it, as a regional power, has also a capacity to play an assisting role in the future of Middle East peace.⁴⁴ The cumulative impact on Turkey of this improving dialogue with the conservative Arab states and societies as well as Turkic states in the Central Asia and Caucasus region would improve Turkey's sense of confidence in itself as a credible regional power with improved diplomatic dexterity in the way it balances its foreign policy in the West. But it should be remembered that the long term implications of Turkey's intensive relations with the conservative regimes of the Middle East would inevitably raise questions in its relations with EU.⁴⁵

"Turkey's position is complex. Ideologically and politically, Turkey is a part of the Western community of nations. It is not only a NATO ally, but also a member of the Council of Europe and OECD, and hope to join European Community in the future. It is, however, predominantly, a Muslim country, though it has a secular policy with a special democratic tradition. Despite its western orientation and circumspect policies, by

⁴¹ Lesser, op. cit., p. 115.

⁴² T.A. Couloumbis and Prodromos Yannas, "Greek Security Challenges in the 1990s," *Balkans: A Mirror of The New International Order* (Istanbul: Eren Yay., 1995), p. 212.

⁴³ Onulduran op.cit., p. 26. According to Onulduran, The reasons for this rivalry and confrontation should be the subject of a different and longer treatise.

⁴⁴ Because, Turkey, as a first Muslim country to recognize Israel at the time of its creation in 1948, has maintained excellent relations with the Jewish state ever since. It was also the first non-Arab Muslim country to support the Palestine Liberation Organization's proclamation of the State of Palestine in 1988.

⁴⁵ For more discussion, see Duygu B. Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000," *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989), pp. 103-107.

geography and history, Turkey is an integral part of the Middle Eastern system. Its diplomacy and security are intimately linked to the region and are affected by the developments in the system. Dangers are felt directly. Some of the major threats to Turkey's internal and external security stem from conflicts and disturbances in the region."⁴⁶

Turkey should severely avoid a contradiction and conflict with the regional countries. Because, a conflict doesn't cause to gain something (not provide anything), but would harm for all countries in the region. "Despite all the unfavorable conditions, Ankara prefers to maintain a reticent diplomacy to deal with Syria as well as with other Middle Eastern neighbors. ... Although the river Euphrates provides a certain leverage on Syria, Ankara has never attempted to use it bluntly, and has repeatedly assured Damascus that it has no intention of withholding the waters of Euphrates for the purpose of inflicting damage to Syria."⁴⁷ Turkey, ultimately, wants to see no change in the status quo and the balance of power in the region. Because, in the region everything is related to everything else and the boundaries dividing local, national, regional and international are blurred.

Conclusion

During the Cold War years, in order to provide security for a country, it was eventually, enough to be in the Western or Eastern Block. Since a threat taken in to account as a threat toward all of the Block security, all member states could counter attack together possibly.

So, in order to secure the independence and territorial integrity of a country from the foreign attack, there was no need special diplomatic initiatives, and diplomatic skillful and knowledge. Basically, the value of strategic position of a country was important for the Block and so, policies that is suitable to Bloc policy was enough. However, post Cold War era, due to changes of balances and interests, states should decide new policies and see some developments in advance. States must set up defense systems, modernize their military structures and develop diplomatic facts from now on. In this context, today, for states revising their foreign policy organizations, and increasing organization structure is not only a selection but also a need.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war changed the global landscape and the dynamics of international relations. By the developments ended the cold war, its geography and geostrategic position provide to Turkey credibility, but also left her face to face by the new security questions. Russia probably would like to have some influence over the regional policies, especially in the Caucasian and Central Asian states called as a "near abroad" by Russia. "Clearly, Turkey, is disturbed at what it sees as a gradual return by Russia to a sphere-of-influence policy in the near abroad, a policy that would be grossly, incompatible with the independence of those countries. The near abroad countries have come to be viewed by both the Russian government and the opposition to

⁴⁶See, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Discreet Foreign Policy between Western Europe and the Middle East," in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan eds., *Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), p. 83.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 85-86.

hold utmost importance for Russian foreign policy and security interests."⁴⁸ In these conditions, the customs union accord signed between Turkey and the EU was also welcomed by both sides. It would provide political, military and economic advantages to the West as well as Turkey. However, Turkey should eventually overcome some difficulties such as human rights, democratization, kurdish problem and some uneasy problems with Greece.

⁴⁸For a broad analysis, see Sezer, op. cit., pp. 149-160.