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African Missions of the European Union in the Context of Security Strategy

Güvenlik Stratejisi Bağlamında Avrupa Birliği'nin Afrika Misyonları

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ÖZ

Güvenlik Stratejisi bağlamında AB, ticaret, iş birliği, barış ve güvenlik alanları dahil olmak üzere farklı sektörlerde Afrika ile ilişkilerini geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB'nin artan kurumsal ve askeri kapasitesi bağlamında, Afrika'nın kriz bölgelerine müdahale etmeye istekli olması doğrultusunda son yıllarda AB ile Afrika arasında güvenlik adına iş birliğinde bir artış görülmektedir. Bu eğilim, AB'nin gerektiğinde erken, hızlı ve güçlü katılımını destekleyen Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisinde de yansıtılmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği'nin Afrika'daki misyonlarının başarısının birçok faktörden etkilendiği yadsınmaz. Çatışmaların doğası ve karmaşıklığı, coğrafi, sosyal ve stratejik boyutları, kaynakların mevcudiyeti ve üye devletlerin siyasi iradesi ve farklı çıkarları, örgütsel düzeyde koordinasyon ve iş birliği, AB'nin krizleri yönetme, çatışmaları önleme ve çözme şeklini doğrudan etkilemektedir.

ABSTRACT

In the context of Security Strategy, EU aspires to improve relations with African countries in a variety of sectors, including trade, collaboration, peace and security. Because of the EU's growing institutional and military capacity and readiness to intervene in African crisis zones, there has been an increase in security cooperation between the EU and Africa in recent years. This trend is reflected in the European Security Strategy, which mandates that the EU create a strategic culture that supports early, prompt, and robust engagement when necessary. The primary responsibility for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves. It is undeniable that several factors affect the successes and failures of the missions in Africa. Nature and complexity of the conflicts, geographical, social, and strategic dimensions, availability of resources and the member states' political will and different interests, coordination, and cooperation at the organizational level influence how the EU manages crises, prevents, and resolves conflicts.

1. Introduction

The European Union has several procedures and laws in place to prevent and handle conflicts with both internal and external players. One of the most crucial tools for resolving conflicts inside the EU is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy

(CSDP). Conflict prevention has been a significant part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) since the early 2000s. Investments in civilian peacebuilding and conflict prevention skills are in line with the Union's function as a civilian or normative power. However, the strategic backdrop for the Union's and its Member States' efforts to deter conflicts and advance

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peace also evolves in line with the changing global order. It is important to evaluate how the EU sees its role in preventing conflicts and how it really plays it, as well as the effects of the growing strategic autonomy argument. In addition, the European Union has implemented several conflict-prevention measures, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which aims to promote stability and governance in member states that border the EU. The EU also has a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate that oversees managing and organizing the EU's crisis response initiatives. The EU has also played a key role in mediating disputes in different regions of the world, including the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. The EU has taken part in several peacekeeping operations and has been instrumental in resolving conflicts and promoting reconciliation. Given that the European Union (EU) has established itself as a global crisis management organization, there is a clear need for EU crisis management missions. In addressing crises and conflicts around the world, such as those in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans, the EU has grown in importance over time. The primary goals of the EU's crisis management missions are to assist peace processes, avoid or resolve conflicts, and provide aid to those who are harmed by the conflicts. These missions are regularly carried out in collaboration with other international organizations such as the UN and the African Union.

The European Union has been placed high focus on Africa. Africa and Europe are geographically, economically, and culturally connected. Union has declared that "we are connected by our common history and location. The Africa-EU Partnership and the new Partnership Agreement with the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) are two complementary frameworks that serve as the foundation for cooperation between the EU and Africa". These are the formal statements are taken from the official web site of the European Union. These words are important in exploring Union's perception in the context of Africa. The EU's security strategy in Africa is comprehensive and uses several tools, including diplomatic relations, mediation, and legislative frameworks. The EU wants to strengthen its ties with African nations in areas including commerce, cooperation, and peace and security. The EU's initiatives to resolve conflicts in Africa are intended to advance regional security. The EU's peacekeeping strategy is determined by the interests of European Member States or EU institutions to deploy and maintain peacekeepers, although being responsive to an evolving African peace and security system. The UN must identify relevant areas in which the EU may apply its complementary competencies for the EU to fulfill its role as an intermediary and contributor of peacekeeping.

The EU has often stated its commitment to conflict resolution strategies that focus on addressing the underlying causes of instability. Since 2002 the European Union has been deeply involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The EU participates in African peacekeeping efforts and

new international cooperation structures, both of which influence its peacekeeping strategy. The European Union has several missions in Africa that deal with a wide range of topics, including migration, development, and humanitarian policy. The EU's initiatives in Africa seek to uphold human security, address issues surrounding migration, encourage economic and political development, and support regional peace and stability. Africa continues to be a strategic partner for the EU, and officials from the EU and its member states are increasingly turning their attention to Africa. In general, the EU's missions in Africa demonstrate its commitment to fostering regional security, development, and cooperation while also addressing issues like migration and regional stability. This article aims to examine the impact of institutional cooperation on the EU's Africa strategy. We will try to deal with not all but some of the most important peacekeeping and some of the training missions in Africa with EU engagement (Operation Artemis/2003, EUFOR DR Congo/2006, the EU's support mission to AMIS/ 2005–2006, Operation Atalanta/EU NAVFOR/2008, and EUFOR Chad/CAR/2008–2009, also some training missions such as EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali and EUTM RCA). The reason of that these cases were selected is because they represent the most noteworthy EU-led peace operations in Africa, when it worked alongside the African Union and United Nations. By examining the results of collaborative peacekeeping efforts made in tandem with other International Organizations, this essay challenges the idea that the interests of Member States and EU institutional interests alone are adequate to explain the growth of EU's peace operations in Africa. Instead, it is thought that the EU's position in Africa is shaped by a developing regional security framework involving the AU and the UN that displays functional convergence. Also, we will try to demonstrate how changing regional governance systems in African peacekeeping are influencing the EU's engagement on the continent in addition to the emphasis on intergovernmental approaches that emphasize the interests of European Member States both individually and collectively. Respectively, after providing thorough information about the potential of the European Union in the area of security, then EU's Security Strategy, and an examination of the EU's security strategy in relation to Africa will be conducted. Additionally, some of the missions that we mentioned above of the European Union in Africa will be discussed after mentioning the partnership between Africa and the importance of Africa for the EU.

2. Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Ability of the European Union

The European Union has a significant potential to help and resolve problems that are occurring outside of its boundaries. But to fully realized this potential there must be strong political will. EU has the capabilities, knowledge, and resources to facilitate conflict settlement. There are numerous tools available to the EU and its member states. Some of these include conventional diplomacy, foreign

policy, trade, and assistance in development. This helps parties of the conflicts resolve more complex structural problems in addition to the immediate reasons of the conflict. It is crucial to acknowledge the EU's contribution to building and maintaining peace among European nations. It's critical to identify the factors that have enabled it to make a beneficial contribution. These elements and methods must be enhanced if the EU is to continue serving as an instrument for conflict prevention and settlement within Europe. The forces that are opposed to the core principles and ideals of the European Union are becoming more powerful today. As nationalism, isolationism, and demands for strong leaders are on the rise, the fundamental tenets of the European political order appear to be in jeopardy (Ahtisaari, 2017:196-198).

The European Union is the best example of conflict prevention when seen in the context of contemporary European history. When the EU was founded in the early 1950s, one of the key goals of its founders was to avert future conflicts by forging a security community, which Karl Deutsch defined as a group of nations where states do not threaten or use force to settle disputes. Another way to look at the Union's recent and ongoing enlargement is as a massive conflict-prevention effort meant to propagate the Union's democratic and legal values over the entire continent. By imposing strict requirements (Copenhagen Criteria) for membership, the EU has been able to extend the Western European zone of peace, prosperity, and stability towards the East. This was accomplished by using a combination of incentives and sanctions (basically financial and technical assistance, trade concessions, and political cooperation) (Cameron, 2007: 173).

When discussing conflict prevention and resolution, it is naturally including regions outside of Europe. Nevertheless, it is frequently overlooking the political will and efforts that were and still are necessary to establish and uphold stability and peace in Europe. One may claim that increasing national economic and political integration has facilitated collaboration and conflict avoidance among historical EU member states. With the end of the Second World War and the founding of the European Union's forerunner, it is being questioned more and more as to whether the statement is still true today (Ahtisaari, 2017: 195).

The 2017 Global Peace Index (GPI) shows that Europe is still the world's most peaceful region. According to the GPI, European nations make up eight of the top 10 most peaceful nations in the world. Portugal, which has seen the biggest improvements in the area, is second in the global rankings after Iceland, which has maintained its top spot (Global Peace Index 2017). Even though European countries are among the most peaceful in the world, social tensions, political unrest, and economic disparity continue to pose obstacles to the region's ability to remain peaceful and stable. The European Union has developed several tools and initiatives to address these problems, including the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP). The political will of the member nations to collaborate and allocate funds to peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives, however, determines how effective these instruments and policies will be. The EU has also stressed the value of collaborations with other international entities, such as the UN and regional organizations, to advance peace and stability throughout Europe and beyond.

More and more requests are made of the European Union to handle crises both inside and outside the organization. Today many crises, which range from terrorism to financial crises, natural disasters to international conflict, put pressure on people to collaborate across geographical and functional boundaries (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013). There is a clear demand for EU crisis management missions because of the EU's emergence as a global crisis management organization. The EU's high level of political legitimacy, perceived impartiality, and economic resilience all contribute to its attractiveness. The Union has now become a recognized civil-military player, and with the variety of tools at its disposal, which are unmatched in the industry, it can take the lead in integrated crisis management going forward (Charbonneau, 2009 quoted from Giegerich, 2008: 24).

The European Union's attempts to improve its military and civil capability are crucial considering the current threats and difficulties. The European Union is a major player in crisis prevention and response since it is a global organization with significant influence over third countries. The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are the two sectoral policies the EU has available for external governance. Using diplomacy and upholding international law, the CFSP oversees settling disputes and promoting global understanding. The CSDP oversees carrying out both military and civilian tasks as well as disseminating laws that, in various ways, influence how security management is improved in third countries through their inclusion. The European Union is developing into a significant security vector at the international level by adopting the modern, global approach to crisis management, both military and civilian, and continuing to strengthen its capacity for action and analytical tools. Its expeditionary missions under the Common Security and Defense Policy provide obvious evidence (Wojnicz, 2019). The European Union (EU) has been actively promoting lasting peace and conflict prevention outside of its boundaries for the past 20 years. Given the vast array of tools and resources that can be mobilized under EU external action, it is stated that the EU has a particularly promising potential to help to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Closing the early warning-response gap, increasing collaboration with other international partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, strengthening civil-military coordination, and ensuring local ownership are the four main challenges the EU still faces in this area (Juncos and Blockman, 2018: 131).

Although the EU may not yet have all the required tools, distinct aims, shared interests, strategic thinking, or political will to engage as a global actor in security problems, it is generally commonly recognized that the EU has a competitive advantage in crisis and conflict management. This benefit was intended to be highlighted by the Lisbon Treaty, which also gave it a new legal foundation that allowed for its full utilization. The Member States' commitments to new Headline Goals, building and pooling capabilities, a new Security Strategy, and other initiatives would enable the achievement of the remaining goals. The truth is that the EU is increasingly involved in crisis management and war prevention on a global scale, establishing a distinctive character through the Common Security and Defense Policy. The security component of the CSDP has established the EU as a key player in this field and solidified its position as an unbiased broker, even though the defense component is still underdeveloped. This is thanks to the civilian and military crisis management. Now, the EU is committed to pursuing a comprehensive strategy to conflicts, from conflict prevention to crisis management and post-war reconstruction, drawing on a set of tools that no other international player possesses. This is made possible by the Lisbon Treaty (Oproiou, 2012: 40).

It is crucial to keep in mind that the fundamental principles of the EU go beyond those of Europe alone. They aren't particularly Western either. They are primarily international and every nation that belongs to the United Nations has vowed to uphold these principles which are stated in UN Charter. Without political will, statements and strategies do not result in effective action. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty (The Treaty of Lisbon, formerly known as the "Reform Treaty" was amended and signed by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the 27 EU member states.) the EU seeks to advance certain ideals including democracy, the indivisible natural rights for humans and fundamental liberties, respect for human dignity, the ideals of solidarity and equality, the rule of law, universality, and adherence to the United Nations core values and basic principles of international law. It will support multilateral approaches to solving issues that affect everyone, particularly within the framework of the United Nations (Treaty of Lisbon, Title V, Chapter 1, Article 21, <http://en.euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-treaty-3edition.pdf>).

The European Union (EU) is now a significant player on the global arena in many areas of policy, including security cooperation, because of the Lisbon reforms. Even though the EU's member states primarily determine its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), research on the EU as a foreign and security actor increasingly views the organization as a self-contained entity that develops strategies and carries out initiatives independently of those of its member states (Müller, 2021: 413-414). The European Union's conflict resolution guiding principles underwent numerous alterations following the Lisbon Treaty. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)

was one of several new provisions included in the Treaty that were intended to improve the EU's ability to manage and avert disputes. The management of crises, especially the averting and resolving of conflicts, and coordination of foreign policy initiatives for the EU are under the purview of the EEAS. The European Defense Agency (EDA) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which oversee strengthening the EU's military capabilities and assisting its crisis management efforts, were also established by the Treaty.

In addition to the legal and administrative changes the Lisbon Treaty brought about in the CFSP and CSDP, it also altered the Common Security and Defense Policy's organizational structure and the EU's approach to conflict management. It basically makes the case that each of these - an updated legal framework enabling a thorough approach to conflict, institutional adjustments to the CFSP and CSDP that improve coherence, and expanded Petersberg Tasks - accounts for a sizable portion of the Lisbon Treaty's contribution to the EU's effectiveness as a conflict manager. Regarding the EU's security and defense strategy, the Lisbon Treaty contains substantial reforms. First, the Treaty emphasized the EU's ability to utilize military and civilian tools within the CSDP in order to uphold peace, avert conflicts, and promote international security. By extending the Petersberg missions' purview to include joint actions for disarmament, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance missions, conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions, combat force crisis management missions, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization missions, as well as tasks involving advice and assistance to the military, this tactic was novel. All these responsibilities could be utilized to aid in the fight against terrorism, including by supporting a third country's efforts to do so on its own soil. As a conclusion the Treaty of Lisbon establishes the European Union's normative commitment to conflict avoidance, management, and resolution as well as to boosting global security in general. It also aspires to give the EU a more forceful yet morally sound presence on the world arena (Oproiou, 2012: 40-42).

The CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) is the framework within which operations by EU forces on the ground to control violently inclined disputes are launched and carried out. Between 2003 and 2010, the EU conducted five military missions. Involved militarily in conflict resolution in Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2003, the European Union (EU) established a military conflict manager to promote the decrease of violence in international disputes. Since then, the EU has deployed 35 operations, including 13 comparable military conflict management operations, around Europe and Africa (EEAS 2020).

The EU's first peacekeeping mission in Macedonia is called Operation Concordia. The mission of the operation, which began in 2003, was to aid in the execution of the Ohrid

Framework Agreement, a peace deal for Macedonia. The operation, which was carried out in compliance with the Berlin Plus agreement, which permitted the EU to use some of NATO's military resources for its own peacekeeping missions, involved military forces from several EU member states. Just in time for the start of the EU's first peacekeeping deployment, "Operation Concordia" in Macedonia, the Berlin Plus agreement was signed in March. At a meeting in April to examine ideas for an autonomous Union headquarters to coordinate future military actions, the four EU nations represented included Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The United States and many European countries fiercely opposed the idea for concern that it would undermine NATO (Reichard, 2004:177).

The military operation known as EUFOR Althea started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. Its main objectives were to maintain the safety and security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to further the country's efforts to accede to the Euro-Atlantic community. The start of the operation was given the go-ahead by the UN Security Council and the EU. EUFOR Althea replaced the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was previously directed by NATO. Althea is a military mission that primarily carries out civilian responsibilities and teaches the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces; its "civilization" reflects the CSDP's emphasis on being largely a civilian crisis management instrument. Althea works within the framework of the Union's "comprehensive approach" to regional development and the Western Balkans' application for EU membership. The main objectives of EUFOR Althea are to support the entire EU policy in the country, strengthen the capabilities and train the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and maintain a secure and safe environment by assisting all local efforts geared toward that process. Given the operation's relatively low cost, it can be considered partially successful and efficient. In accordance with a UN mandate, EUFOR Althea as an EU operation that represented and carried out the wishes of the international community. Since EUFOR took over for SFOR in December 2004, there have been no deaths because of armed conflict. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which was drafted to end the conflict, is successfully upheld, and it continues to contribute to a peaceful and secure environment (Sweeney, 2018:14).

With more operations deployed than any other organization, the European Union (EU) has recently emerged as the conflict manager with the highest level of activity. From 2003 through 2019, a total of 13 military actions were conducted in Europe and Africa. The discussion at the European Union level places a strong emphasis on both the value of humanitarian norms and the security of its constituents. The relevance of norms is acknowledged in the literature, which also suggests that they may have a direct or indirect impact on behavior. Some argue that normative drive has no effect at all also quite the opposite. It is argued that the main variables determining the EU's decision to conduct military operations are exposure to war and the

distribution of power. Normative considerations of a humanitarian kind, however, are also at the core of European conflict management, according to EU discourse. For instance, it is emphasized in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS that the EU should continue to uphold the 2005 UN World Summit Agreement and that it is our shared responsibility to protect people against acts of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. There is a focus on the influence of normative concerns on EU actions, specifically whether those standards are the necessary and sufficient conditions - drivers - for conflict management. This fits into the EU's narrative of a normative power that upholds morally just rules of a humanitarian nature. It can ask that humane standards can be only relevant causes to direct the use of EU military operations (Magalhães, 2020: 9-10).

3. Security Strategy of the European Union: From Past to the Present

The EU's Security Strategy (ESS), which addresses both internal and external threats and places a strong emphasis on cooperation and autonomy, is a flexible framework that directs the EU's approach to security and defense. With the help of numerous strategic documents, the security strategy of the European Union has changed over time. These include the 2003 Security Strategy, the 2016 Global Strategy, and the 2022 Strategic Compass (SC). With a focus on issues like crisis management, regional stability, and citizen protection, these documents have been instrumental in forming the EU's approach to security and defense. In addition to addressing external threats, the EU's security strategy emphasizes the significance of internal safety and the relationship between internal and external aspects of security. Strategic autonomy is a key idea in the EU's security strategy, and it refers to the EU's capacity to choose its own priorities in terms of foreign policy, security, and defense. On December 12 and 13, 2003, the first strategic document pertaining to the Union's foreign and security policy was adopted. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was titled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Leaders of the EU laid out the organization's goals for its foreign and security policies, along with the strategies for achieving them. The document also listed significant dangers to the continent's security, including terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions, local conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. Therefore, it wouldn't be surprised to say that the presented catalog quickly proved to be insufficient due to the dynamics of events in the EU itself, as well as in its immediate neighborhood, and that the majority of the adopted operational methods soon ceased to be appropriate to the global situation (Willa, 2019: 49-50).

As a result, arguments for updating it or even developing a new, complex strategy for the EU's engagement with the global community quickly gained traction. Unfortunately, given that it wasn't adopted until the 28th of June 2016 (European Global Strategy, 2016), it went against the letter of the document. Furthermore, this is a "typical" European

Union document that avoids being categorical or straightforward and is overly general. It even lacks an enumerative list of the threats that the ESS mentioned. In a nutshell, it describes and indicates the interests of the EU and its citizens, explains the principles and standards that guide its external actions, outlines the top priorities for international policy activities, and finally describes the strategies and tactics for implementing the presumptions that have been adopted. The new Strategy's ability to enact the procedures establishing the Union's defense policy is the most crucial aspect of this document (Samadashvili, 2016: 34).

In doing so, it correctly makes the connection between internal and external security and assumes that internal security depends on international stability. Therefore, it anticipates external activities on a larger scale to provide the Union's internal safety. As it solely depends on the member countries' will, the question of whether its records will produce tangible and quantifiable activities is still somewhat up in the air. And past events have shown us that it is not necessarily inevitable, as populists with Euroskeptic attitudes are currently assuming power in many governments of Union member states (Willa, 2019:50). Additionally, a shift in perspective is necessary to approach the Union's role as the world's protector of order. The fact that the Strategy was followed by significant decisions has led to the experts' moderate and covert optimism about realizing the Strategy and thus reawakening the CSDP. It was decided to establish a military planning cell (Military Planning and Conduct Capability, MPCC) during an EU summit in June 2017. The European Defense Fund was established (funded by the Union's common armament programs; the PESCO procedure for regular structural cooperation was established. As a result, the strategy is implemented on both an economic and an international level thanks to a NATO agreement (Willa quoted from, 2019: Koziez, 2018: 2 and Kuzniar, 2018: 65).

By clearly articulating the policy's objectives in the new hybrid-warfare security environment, the EU Global Strategy must open the door for upgrading the strategy, means, and capabilities of the EU defense policy - the EU's strategic defense review. One of the biggest challenges as the EU moves forward with a policy review for collective security will be figuring out how to enhance the EU's defense capabilities without duplicating NATO functions. The risk is that the new EU defense strategy will focus more on the southern neighborhood as NATO devotes more resources to bolstering its eastern flanks in response to an increasingly assertive Russia. Without a strengthened framework of cooperation in the security sector, the eastern neighbors of the EU will not be able to carry out the reforms demanded by the ENP. Many of them continue to deal with "frozen" conflicts, which could quickly melt (Samadashvili, 2016: 34-35).

The European Union's security and defense policy for the following ten years is outlined in The Strategic Compass, a

significant document that was adopted in March 2022. Building on earlier strategic documents like the Security Strategy of 2003 and the Global Strategy of 2016, it serves as a roadmap for the advancement of the EU's ambitions in security and defense. The 2003 European Security Strategy was a valiant effort to create the security tools needed for Europe to begin standing on its own two feet. The project was nevertheless ambitious and ultimately proved to be beyond the Union's current capacity. In 2016, the European Union Global Strategy offered a second opportunity. A more cautious attempt is made to build a security foundation for the Union considering the 2003 Strategy's misguided lesson. As the title of the document implies, security cannot be attained by relying solely on oneself but rather requires a global approach. The 2016 Strategy was widely tempered and, as a result, more likely to succeed, according to even the harshest EU critics. It was followed by the 2020 European Commission Security Union Strategy and the Defense and Space Packages, which were both unveiled by the same European Commission in February 2022, to add even more strength (Branda, 2022:237).

The Strategic Compass (SC) analyzes the strategic environment of the EU and works to strengthen the coherence and sense of purpose among the EU's security and defense initiatives. The SC stresses the significance of gradually bolstering the EU's civilian and military command and control structures as well as making sure that the Military Planning and Conduct Capability is fully capable of organizing, supervising, and commanding non-executive and executive tasks and operations. The SC also specifies that, once EU Battlegroups have reached their maximum operational capacity, they will be under the command and control of a predetermined national operational Headquarters or an EU Military Planning and Behavior Capability operating within the ERDC framework (Tulun, 2022:2).

In order to manage and improve EU security and defense capabilities, the Strategic Compass aims to establish a framework. The document highlights the need for an all-encompassing and integrated approach to security, acknowledging that threats to the EU come from a variety of sources, including military, hybrid, and non-military threats. It puts a strong emphasis on topics like crisis management, resilience, capability development, and strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Strategic Compass emphasizes the value of collaboration and partnerships, both within the EU and with other international actors, and aims to strengthen the EU's position as a major player in global security and defense. The Strategic Compass, in its entirety, is a crucial document that directs the EU's strategy for security and defense, aiming to improve the EU's capacity to address present and future security challenges and safeguard its citizens. The Strategic Compass refers to global security from a geographic perspective. However, it places a strong emphasis on the nations that border the EU, highlighting their unique significance to the bloc. More specifically, it urges a boost in political and military cooperation between

the EU and NATO. The 2021 EU-US Summit Statement, a political declaration of partnership between the two countries in many sectors, also calls for maintaining the momentum it started. The EU's immediate east and Africa, particularly the Sahel and West Africa, are highlighted as additional neighboring regions. In fact, the EU has repeatedly identified Africa as a region of primary geostrategic importance as the continent's unrest spreads across the Mediterranean, while Russia's aggressive and destabilizing behavior is felt in Europe's east from Moldova to Georgia. The Strategic Compass does not aim to displace NATO or weaken it. Instead, by putting it into practice, the EU will become a more valuable partner for NATO and the US, as the document emphasizes numerous times. Considering Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the document is supported by several significant announcements for increased defense spending. For the United States, this implies that the EU will take additional steps to ensure its own security (Atlamazoğlu and Moyer, 2022).

4. Relations Between European Union and Africa: Strategic Partnership

The West has greatly influenced both Africa's past and present, and it will continue to do so in the future. Is it possible to understand Africa's complexity without also considering how complex its connection with Europe is. At the end of 1993, when Maastricht was becoming effective, the world was made aware of the seriousness of Africa's new security gap. Africa has contributed significantly to the peace and security agenda of the UN since the early 1990s, and it has remained at the bottom of the UN Development Programs' human development index (Petland, 2005: 922). Both the size of Africa's security gap and the decline in the number of external suppliers after the end of the Cold War are well known facts. Russia, the former Soviet Union's successor, has largely withdrew from Africa. China is not yet a significant influence in African security, despite its growing economic interests in the region. American participation in Africa is restricted to a few mineral or oil-rich countries and, more recently, to regions where terrorism is an issue due to the legacy of Somalia. Naturally, many EU nations' connections to Africa date all the way back to the time of colonization. The legacy of the British, French, and even Portuguese presence is apparent in persistent economic, military, and cultural linkages. In a remarkable number of cases, they have weathered the turmoil of decolonization and the conflict over the postcolonial international economic order. These multilateral trade, assistance, and investment ties between the EU and the African states, which have grown over the past 40 years, are now layered on top of these bilateral relations (Petland, 2005:923). The nature and trajectory of the conflicts that Africa presents to it, Africa's strategic positioning within the larger international order, and Europe's continued commitment to and increasing capacity to develop and implement a common foreign and security policy will all play a role in how successful it is in this role (Petland,

2005:934).

The history of the relationship between African nations and the European Union goes back much further than just colonialism; as a result, the relationship has been formed by this history, which has also given rise to narratives that continue to be used in literature and the media. It has been stated that the relationship between Europe and Africa is asymmetrical. Considering this, the EU's foreign policy and interests have traditionally been centered on relations with Africa and the African Union (AU). The Lomé Convention (1975), which sought to preserve ties with the former colonies and to establish a new economic system, served as a starting point. The Cotonou Convention, ratified in 2000, which replaced the Lomé Convention, and its primary goal was to restructure the cooperation between the parties and place a stronger emphasis on development. The need for the European Union to adopt a proactive foreign policy is becoming more and more apparent. Therefore, EU measures aim to indirectly support African states in addition to direct engagement on the ground. This assistance is given in exchange for a number of restrictions that export a liberal-democratic model. Thus, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was founded in 2001 in Nigeria, was founded on the values of democracy, human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. These values are consistent with the fundamental tenets of the Maastricht Treaty-governed and Lomé/Cotonou-complemented external cooperation of the EU (Taylor, 2010: 51-52).

The Post Cotonou Agreement negotiations between the EU and the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) ended in April 2021, establishing the parameters for future political, economic, and sectoral cooperation. Most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are OACPS nations. These treaties serve as the legal and political framework for collaboration between Africa and Europe, and as a result, they paved the way for more international agreements, funding schemes, and regulatory frameworks. But historical, cultural, and geographic proximity have had, and continue to have, an impact on diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political interactions between the two entities (Carmilla, 2021:2). The OACPS seeks to advance cooperation, growth, and its member states' interests. It was founded to improve relations between its member nations on the political, economic, and cultural fronts and lessen reliance on the European Union (EU). The OACPS plays a significant role in international negotiations and keeps in touch with a number of regional and global partners, including the EU. The group works to promote sustainable development, regional integration, and greater cohesion among its member states. Overall, the OACPS serves as a platform for cooperation and diplomacy among its member countries, promoting their interests and facilitating collective action on global issues (Carbone, 2021).

The role of the EU could be explained by a variety of variables. Due to their proximity, the EU, and West Africa

face many of the same security concerns, such as transnational terrorism, migration, and climate change. It doesn't seem like the EU's involvement in West Africa is solely a function of proximity and strategy. Unintended consequences exist because of the EU's dominant position in West Africa and the fact that its actions don't always align with its stated goals, indicating that other variables affect the EU's *de facto* role in the region (Müller, 2021: 416-417). The European Union's (EU) efforts to prevent conflicts in Africa are a component of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has been used to respond to individual crises and strengthen capacity for reconstruction, particularly in the context of the African Security and Peace Architecture (APSA) (Arconada-Ledesma, 2021: 24).

Recent years have seen an increase in security cooperation between the EU and Africa, which reflects the EU's rising institutional and military capacity and readiness to intervene in African crisis zones. The European Security Strategy, which stipulates that the EU must establish a strategic culture that promotes early, quick, and where necessary, robust engagement, reflects this trend. The EU has consistently based its African strategy from the ESDP's formation in 1999 on the notion of African ownership by creating a standard language that reads as follows in most of its publications referring to African security issues: "The primary responsibility for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves" (Brosig, 2011: 110-111).

At the meeting on December 15 and 16, the European Council approved the following text about The EU and Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership in 2005. At the introduction part of the document a comprehensive vision is declared that "Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their peoples". Moreover, it has been declared that to support African efforts to create such a future, the European Union will implement the actions outlined in this strategy with Africa 2005 and 2015. It is a policy of the entire EU for the entire continent of Africa. It considers the national strategies of African countries as well as regional and country-specific needs. Its key objectives are to accomplish Africa's sustainable development, security, and good governance goals as well as the Millennium Development Goals. The plan is inspired by important developments made by Africans themselves. Equal opportunity, partnership based on human rights and international law, and reciprocal accountability are its guiding principles. African ownership and accountability, including working through African institutions, is its basic principle. (Council of the European Union, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367), paragraph, 1-3).

Paragraph four of the document has the title of "peace and security". According to that, there is strong emphasis that, there cannot be lasting progress in the absence of peace. There cannot be permanent peace in Africa without African

leadership to end African conflicts. In order to accomplish this goal, collaboration between the African Union (AU), sub-regional organizations, and African countries is required in order to anticipate, prevent, and mediate conflict, particularly by addressing its underlying causes, and to uphold peace on their own continent. By providing sizeable, long-term, flexible, sustainable support, we will boost the Africa Peace Facility in particular. We will build on current Member State initiatives to provide training and advising, technical, planning, and logistical support in order to assist Africa in developing its capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force; CFSP and ESDP initiatives, military and civilian crisis management missions, and prospective deployment of EU battlegroups might all be used to directly support African Union, regional, or UN efforts to enhance peace and stability; ESDP Africa Action Plan implementation should continue, and the conversation with EUROMED nations should be expanded; In order to ensure long-lasting peace and development, we should increase our support for post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. We will pay particular emphasis to the security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and strengthening of weak nations in Africa; We must intensify our efforts if we want to halt the supply of illegal weapons, especially small arms. We will advocate for border management measures, a global weapons trade agreement, and the adoption of minimal common standards by others so they can join the EU Code of Conduct on weapons Exports. Additionally, we will work to prevent transfers that fuel instability and create plans for disseminating and responding to information about these transfers; Join to fight terrorism globally with African nations. We will continue to promote the execution of global counterterrorism accords while offering the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers technical aid, improved information exchange, and support (Council of the European Union 15961/05 Presse 367, paragraph, 4).

In "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership" (2005), it is also mentioned that Africa is eager to actively develop its capacity to cope with conflict situations and to improve cooperation with the UN. However, the political push for the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership came from the Lisbon EU-Africa Summit in 2007, which also marked the beginning of a new framework for the EU's regular and sustained engagement in peace and security initiatives in Africa. The First Action Plan (2008-2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership now outlines a far more detailed set of goals. It lays out a precise structure for capacity-building initiatives financed by the EU for the AU. It calls for the creation of a regular channel of communication and consultation between the two organizations, as well as the improvement of capacity building for peacekeeping operations (military, logistical, and financial), joint missions for assessment, the sharing of experiences, the search for best practices, and the closing of funding gaps for AU-led peace operations. While a case-by-case study will determine whether the EU will directly intervene by deploying peacekeeping forces, the primary

goal of APSA strengthening is to support “African organizations for African-led operations”. Between 2008 and 2010, the EU EURO RECAP effort, also known as the Amani Cycle, will offer a variety of training sessions with the goal of operationalizing the ASF through staff development. (Brosig, 2011: 111).

Earlier to the 2010s, the EU’s security cooperation in West Africa was limited to bilateral ties with a number of nations, with help given to ECOWAS, the region’s top security body, as a supplementary measure. French interests typically aligned with EU support because of France’s significant security responsibilities in the area. Although the EU’s security cooperation is still essentially consistent with that of its member states, it differs from them in that it places a strong emphasis on regional organizations as its key partners in the partnership. More recently, the EU’s engagement with the West African region has diversified in the security sphere in response to several recently emerging transnational security threats and perceived inaction by ECOWAS. Significant support has gone to other regional actors, such as the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTC), and its security cooperation has been refocused away from tried-and-true methods and towards a restriction of migration flow. Charges of institutional control by the EU have arisen because of the view that the EU is dictating the terms of its involvement with regional players in West Africa (Müller, 2021:415).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to lead the continent in terms of security and peace. Despite the EU’s backing for the continental African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which fosters close security cooperation with the African Union (AU), significant regional security changes are implemented at the sub-regional level (Müller, 2021: 415). In essence, the EU’s current growing involvement with the AU in peace and security issues is a result of behavior in response to external actors who are not abiding by the EU’s own principles in this policy field, as well as proactive attitudes on the part of the EU or European lead countries. The notion of African ownership, the capacity-building approach based on demand, and the commitment to effective multilateralism serve as entry points for outside forces to affect the course of EU security and peacebuilding operations. In fact, without the significantly altered institutional security context that presently obtains in Africa, the EU’s current approach to Africa would be difficult to imagine. This is the result of the African Union (AU) taking over from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is now expanding its peacekeeping capabilities to combat the pervasive culture of impunity and the OAU’s frequently criticized unwillingness to act forcefully in the event of a humanitarian crisis. By implementing the concepts of regional ownership, demand-driven capacity building, and effective multilateralism, the EU has had more opportunities to become more involved in Africa. Even the EU admits that the substantial advancements made by Africans themselves form the foundation of its policy for the continent (Brosig,

2011: 111-112).

The 2000 Cotonou Agreement replaced the 1975 Lomé Convention with the ACP countries. The Post Cotonou Agreement negotiations between the EU and the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) were finished in April 2021, creating the framework for sectoral, political, and economic cooperation over the next 20 years. The majority of Sub-Saharan African nations are OACPS members. A “common foundation” that outlines the values and guiding principles that unite our nations and identifies the strategic priority areas that both sides intend to work on make up the new Partnership Agreement. It is combined with three distinct regional protocols, focusing on the requirements of each region (Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific). The European Union places a high priority on Africa because it is both our sister continent and its closest neighbor. Africa and Europe are geographically, economically, and culturally connected. We are connected by our common history, location, and interests. The Africa-EU Partnership and the new Partnership Agreement with the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) are two complementary frameworks that serve as the foundation for relations between the EU and Africa. The official political channel for the EU’s relations with Africa is the Africa-EU Partnership. The EU’s political partner in Africa is the African Union (AU), an intergovernmental organization with a headquarters in Addis Abeba and 55 member countries. Beyond the joint high-level meetings that guide relations (such as Summits, Commission-to-Commission meetings, and Ministerial meetings), the EU holds discussions with a variety of partners to advance on priorities that have been mutually agreed upon. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which was adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, continues to serve as the framework for the Africa-EU Partnership, which was established at the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000 (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/africa-and-eu_en).

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, can be seen as the capstone doctrine of relations between Africa and the European Union. It has been significantly revised over the past ten years and has been built upon roughly fifty years of trade and development cooperation. It stands for the comprehensive long-term framework of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), along with an institutional framework and particular funding for putting its key initiatives into action. Africa’s top trading, aiding in development and providing humanitarian aid partner is still the EU. Key areas of cooperation have grown in significance over the past ten years, including governance, regional integration, energy, climate change, migration, and science and technology. Similar to previous Action Plans, the first priority area for cooperation between the EU and Africa is still peace and security, with the strategic goal being to ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security

and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth (The joint Africa-EU strategy - European Parliament, 2017, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/46520>).

The African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) made a joint declaration in 2017 during their summit meetings outlining their shared priorities, commitments, and goals called the AU-EU Summit Declaration. Despite the lack of specific references pertaining to the AU-EU Summit Declaration, a general overview based on a deeper understanding of the AU-EU partnership is possible. In order to address various issues of shared interest, the AU-EU Summit Declaration acts as a road map for cooperation between the two regional organizations. It frequently addresses topics like development cooperation, trade and investment, peace and security, governance, tackling climate change, migration, and empowering young people. The declaration seeks to fortify the alliance and encourage a more strategic, equal, and reciprocal relationship between Africa and Europe. The AU and EU reaffirm in the declaration their adherence to values like respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, inclusivity, and sustainable development. The declaration also highlights the shared ideals and problems that both continents face. Depending on the summit's year and setting, specific objectives, projects, and priorities may differ from those outlined in the AU-EU Summit Declaration. The declaration typically emphasizes how crucial it is to collaborate in order to address global issues, advance regional integration, strengthen economic cooperation, and guarantee the welfare and prosperity of citizens in both Africa and Europe.

In the context of security, the document recognizes that the EU and Africa face similar security threats. The stability of our two continents is being threatened by new regional and global security threats, particularly the rise of transnational crime and terrorist threats. EU agree that a framework document should be created as soon as possible to give our partnership on peace and security a more stable and structured foundation, considering the complexity of these threats and the need to address their root causes. In this regard, it is recognizing the need to strengthen the relationship between the AU and EU. The document also reaffirms our commitment to putting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) into action. Also, it recognizes the effective deployment of EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions as well as African peace support operations. This process will be strengthened by ongoing AU reform initiatives and actions to ensure predictable and sustainable financing. Reiterate the significance of supporting AU peace operations mandated by the UN Security Council, including the potential use of UN assessed contributions for those operations and decision to contribute to the Peace Fund. EU acknowledge and emphasize how crucial it is for the EU to continue supporting African efforts for peace and security and acknowledge the contribution of regional organizations in Africa to stability and security. In accordance with the AU

and UN agendas, EU will support youth and women playing an active role in conflict prevention, management, and mediation. For the time period leading up to the next Summit, strategic priorities will be: Investing in people through education, science, technology, and skill development; Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security, and Governance; Migration and Mobility; and Mobilizing Investments for African Structural Sustainable Transformation (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454-pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit.pdf)

5. EU's African Missions Before 2010

5.1. Operation Artemis (2003)

A civil conflict involving several neighboring nations has been raging in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1998. In July 1999, talks to negotiate a cease-fire and launch a UN-sponsored inter-Congolese discussion were initiated. In this regard, an agreement was reached between the governments of the DRC and Uganda in 2002, ending Ugandan military operations in the Ituri province of eastern DRC. Fighting broke out between the UPC (Union of Congolese Patriots, Union des patriotes congolais) and the FPRI (Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri) after the withdrawal of Ugandan forces in February 2003, causing a serious humanitarian disaster with 500,000–600,000 displaced persons. Resolution 1484 was adopted by the UN Security Council on May 30, 2003. EU Member States decided to begin the operation within the ESDP framework at France's suggestion. As the first military operation in Europe to deploy without NATO support, this would set a historical precedent. It was able to launch ESDP operations outside of the Berlin Plus framework thanks to the Europeanization of an initially French-led effort (Helly, 2009: 182).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo could be seen as the start of Operation Artemis in June 2003, marking the EU's first military deployment outside of Europe and outside of NATO. Operation Artemis's goals included enhancing the humanitarian situation, stabilizing security conditions in Bunia, the Ituri region's capital, and ensuring the protection of refugees in Bunia's refugee camps. The goal of the operation, which was under the direction of France, was to create a secure environment so that the United Nations goal in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed. Despite eventually receiving an EU insignia, it had French origins and French command and control. Operation "Artemis" had the following goals: To enhance the humanitarian situation, support the stability of security in Bunia, the Ituri's capital, and ensure the protection of those who have been displaced in Bunia's refugee camps. Prior to the transition to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which had been strengthened, it was to serve as a temporary interim force for three months. Although the first test of the ESDP processes for commanding an autonomous operation can be

said to have been passed by the EU, this test was only partially thorough. Operational limitations resulted from inadequate strategic lift capabilities and a lack of a strategic reserve (Tamolya, 2015).

The UN and a regional organization collaborated on Artemis, which was viewed as “a remarkably positive experiment in the domain of peace and security. Operation Artemis was notable in a variety of ways while being constrained in terms of its duration, scope, geographic reach, and force participation. For several reasons, the operation did not follow the mold of a self-contained EU operation. Even before the EU started to take an active role, operational and force planning were well under way at the national (French) level. Because of this, crucial components of the EU’s quick response planning process were not tested. Artemis was more of a French operation with an EU cover than a French-led EU effort. The EU operation would not have taken place without French leadership. Because it might be used to demonstrate the importance of an EU military presence in peacekeeping, Artemis became an EU mission. An expert of the Great Lakes region of Africa based in Nairobi claims that Operation Artemis was politically motivated by a need to demonstrate unity following the failure of European foreign policy in Iraq. Before the operation began, there were significant military shortfalls that were already known, most notably a lack of strategic mobility (Homan, 2007: 153).

Although Operation Artemis made an important contribution to saving MONUC’s credibility. In the line with the provisions of the Luanda agreement, the Ugandan army was forced to leave Ituri in May 2003. Despite the Ugandan army’s rather dubious participation in Ituri between 1998 and 2003, this resulted in a security vacuum. Only one battalion of MONUC could be stationed in Bunia, the capital of Ituri. Then, several local armed organizations started to use violence. Pogroms and small-scale ethnic cleansing took place despite MONUC’s lack of military power to stop them. Even though EU troops were only stationed in Bunia, their use of targeted, proportionate force had a significant impact on local armed groups. The supply of weapons, which were primarily airborne, was severely constrained by air monitoring. The impact of the military and air monitors was also strengthened by exceptionally effective psychological operations. This bridging operation with MONUC, whose mandate and troop ceiling were strengthened during the Artemis mission, was highly successful. Additionally, Artemis helped to ease regional tensions at a time when Rwanda and Uganda were on the verge of war. The Rwandan government, its proxies and armed opponents in Ituri, Uganda, to the west, and anti-government rebels, to the north, felt as though they were “besieging” the Ugandan presidency. Kampala believed that breaking the “siege” and reducing the “Rwandan threat” would require an effective international intervention in Ituri. Artemis had the unintended consequence of easing diplomatic mediations between the two nations and lowering tensions in the region. But regarding UN-EU

cooperation, the operation revealed that both groups were still getting to know one another (Braud, 2006: 73-77).

New concepts for military ESDP were operationalized by Artemis, including autonomous action outside the NATO framework, action with a UN mandate, and action at the request of the UN. Additionally, Artemis achieved several important operational objectives, including quick deployment in a distant location, the ability to defend civilians while causing the fewest possible casualties, and coordination with other international organizations and humanitarian groups. A successful small-scale enterprise is exemplified by Artemis because effective outcomes were obtained when a military tool had political backing. (Braud, 2006: 73). As a conclusion, Artemis was seen as ‘a remarkably positive experiment in cooperation between the UN and a regional organization, in the domain of peace and security. The operation created rather high expectations from the UN about the prospects of ESDP launching more operations in Africa but European peacekeeping in Africa has remained limited.

5.2. EU’s Support Mission to AMIS (2005-2006)

The European Union has always supported the African Union’s involvement in the Darfur conflict. Between January 2004 and December 2007, the EU’s backing for this role increased. According to the Action Plan for ESDP in Africa (adopted in November 2004), the EU Strategy for Africa entitled “Towards a Strategic Partnership” (which is adopted in December 2005), and the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts (adopted in November 2006), this support was divided into three categories: diplomatic support, operational assistance, and financial aid (Franke, 2009: 257).

The EU’s contribution to AMIS is part of its broader commitment to global peace and security in the context of its vision of being a global actor. The aim of the EU’s support mission to AMIS (2005-2006) was to provide support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to enhance its presence and effectiveness in Darfur. The goal of the mission is to stabilize much of Darfur and to address the deteriorating security situation there (Seth Appiah-Mensah, 2005). Like the UN Security Council’s strategy, the EU’s response to the crisis relied on diplomatic and humanitarian tools. (Williams and Bellamy, 2005: 33). The EU’s responsibility was to support AMIS financially and logistically, especially by providing air transportation for African nations who contributed troops to the conflict in Darfur (Neethling, 2011). At the request of the African Union (AU), the European Union formed an EU civilian-military action to support the AMIS, the African Union’s expanded Mission to Sudan and Darfur, on July 18, 2005. Both a military and a civilian component were included in the EU’s supportive effort. It made equipment and resources available, gave planning and technical support, and dispatched military observers. It assisted with tactical and

strategic transportation, trained African troops, and assisted and trained police (Besenyo, 2009: 30).

From July 2005 to December 2007 (the period covered by the EU's operational support for AMIS), it offered what it referred to as a comprehensive package of civilian and military actions. This package gave the AU mission two and a half years' worth of critically needed supplies like vehicles, portable generators, and water tankers, as well as technical support, media support, police training, aerial observation capability, and strategic and tactical air transport for more than 2,000 troops. Several dozen military and civilian people were also supplied by the EU to aid AMIS (Franke, 2009: 258).

One lesson learned by the EU from its support mission to AMIS is that it is preferable for the EU to coordinate with an AU operation rather than to support it. The EU gave AMIS a lot of resources, yet it struggled to have an impact on decisions. It has been proposed that the EU ought to demand sufficient control over operations and assume accountability for the money allocated in the future (Derblom et.al., 2008: 41). AMIS was unable to establish peace in Darfur despite the tremendous degree of help from Europe. While there were many factors that contributed to this failure, most of which had to do with the AU's limited resources and lack of peacekeeping expertise, the EU's involvement was not without its share of issues. Also, it lacked strategic coordination with actions taken by other parties, such as the UN and NATO.

However, a much more significant weakness was that, despite first seeing the Darfur crisis as a serious problem, the EU failed to properly comprehend how much the mission's expanding requirements would strain the AU's fledgling capabilities. As a result, it failed to give the mission the operational and financial support it needed to succeed. Although changes were made when the goal changed, the levels of assistance were always insufficient for the current needs. Although the EU has contributed significantly to the mission, it is still true that AMIS never had enough of the essential force enablers, such as vehicles, helicopters, and communication equipment, to accomplish its goals. This is true even when considering the claim that the AU's capacity to absorb outside support may already have been stretched. The EU has ultimately proven incapable of contributing to AMIS in a manner consistent with its future ambitions and historical responsibilities for Africa even though the crisis began at a time when neither the CFSP nor the ESDP had been consolidated, nor had the EU's Africa policy (Howorth, 2007: 215-217).

5.3. The EUFOR RD Congo (2006)

The UN requested the EU to consider sending a military force to support MONUC during the DRC elections, which were scheduled for summer 2006, in December 2005. In March 2006, the EU Council resolved to begin the military-strategic planning process and adopted an option document to show the EU's support for MONUC. The UN approved

UNSC Res.1671 (2006) on April 25, authorizing the EU's military involvement in the DRC after the EU had settled on the command structures and the contributing states. It gave the EU permission to send troops to reinforce MONUC. The mission was founded in 2006 with the intention of assisting the MONUC (Mission of the United Nations Organization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in upholding stability and security in the country's eastern region (Peters, 2011:654).

The EU Council then approved the Joint Action (JA) 2006/319/CFSP, which refers to the duties established in UNSC Res 1671, on April 27, 2006 (Major, 2009: 313). According to the mission statement, EUFOR would operate in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination with them and MONUC. The specific agreements for EU-UN cooperation, which included a technical agreement for logistics and intelligence, were completed separately in July 2006. The EUFOR RD Congo mission was the first independent military operation by the European Union in Africa. The main goal of EUFOR RD Congo was to contribute to the stabilization and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Only the European Union Forces (EUFOR) planned and carried out the operation (Handolin and Elomaa, 2007: 245).

Around 2,300 military soldiers from 21 EU member states and Turkey participated in the mission. A third of the combined force was based in Kinshasa, while the majority was moved to Libreville in Gabon, which is a neighbor of the DRC. Although there were sporadic violent outbursts during the election process, which started on July 30 with legislative elections and the first round of the presidential elections, the general level of violence was far lower than what the UN and the European Union had previously feared. President Kabila was declared the winner of the runoff election against Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba by the DRC Supreme Court in late November, which upheld the results of the second round of the presidential elections, which were held on October 29. Bemba complied with the decision, and the election was over. The EUFOR RD Congo mission also came to an end on November 3 (Brummer, 2103:9).

It is easiest to understand why the EU decided to launch its first fully independent mission because of the EU and UN's mutual dependencies and interactions. The EU was first asked by the UN to send an interim force to Ituri. As a result, the UN took the initiative. The EU's military powers matched its requirement for more, quickly deployable forces. The UN's request for a quick and locally focused support operation matched the EU's capabilities and political desire to act, notwithstanding the lack of political will to launch a long-term, extensive military campaign in the DRC. However, Operation Artemis' success also rested on the UN's capacity to raise its military strength once EU forces left the DRC. A reciprocal dependency is the defining characteristic of bridging activities. The interim force is expected to take over duties and obligations assigned by an

ongoing comprehensive peace operation, typically led by the UN, based on short-term requirements. It must also finish its duty quickly, otherwise it must get ready to transfer the mission over to the primary organization. Moreover, a mutual dependence governs how both organizations respond to the circumstances on the ground (Brosig, 2011:114).

The contact with MONUC and environment adaption were the other difficulties encountered on the ground. The local population first questioned the impartiality and military prowess of EUFOR. It instantly made fun of EUFOR by nicknaming it “EU-Faible” -means “weak” in French- because it was a small force with a narrow mandate. Additionally, locals believed EUFOR was biased and in favor of outgoing President Kabila. Thus, EUFOR launched a targeted media campaign to explain its existence, define its function in comparison to MONUC, establish a deterrent reputation, and create a distinct character. Collaboration with MONUC turned out to be very difficult. It had issues with coordination, a lack of mutual understanding, and insufficient mechanisms for cooperation. Second, the difficulties in cooperating were made worse by the convoluted processes for assigning EUFOR to help MONUC. Except for emergency situations, the UNSG had to make a formal request to the EU to secure EUFOR’s participation. It required a drawn-out and complicated authorization process, making it difficult to guarantee a timely intervention. In addition, the absence of a written agreement on the exchange of safe information hampered coordination between the two missions (Major, 2009:317).

During the occurrences in August, EUFOR was able to change into a deterrence force and show its ability to respond quickly. Overall, and notwithstanding the procedural inconsistencies mentioned above, EUFOR was effective in minimizing the number of incidents and in managing the potential spread of violence at critical junctures in the election process in collaboration with MONUC. But some international observers, thought that neither the MONUC nor EU troops in Kinshasa acted quickly enough to prevent the August violence from escalating. Additionally, they contend that even while they acknowledge that EUFOR succeeded in ensuring the elections, it was unable to handle more difficult military tasks. They voiced the complaint that the mission’s dissuasive nature was hampered by the short timetable. Also, they assert that EUFOR would not have been able to handle more difficult military obstacles, even though they acknowledge that EUFOR’s mission in terms of ensuring the elections was accomplished. They also argued that the mission’s deterrent nature was hampered by the short timeframe. Some criticize the Union for approving the operation primarily for internal purposes because it provided a chance to display the EU flag and show off the Union’s military prowess and independence. The cooperation was severely hampered by the absence of an intelligence exchange agreement, the convoluted processes for committing EUFOR to help MONUC, the logistical missteps, and a lack of communication (Major, 2009: 318-

320).

5.4. Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR-2008)

A naval operation called Atalanta (2008) was conducted off the coast of Somalia to protect local shipping and combat piracy. Operation Atalanta was started by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) in December 2008 to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The major objectives of the operation were to save fragile ships, including fishing boats and merchant ships, as well as to ensure the safety of sailors. The operation’s primary goal is to increase security in the Indian Ocean and off Somalia’s coast. It also aims to support Somalia by providing humanitarian assistance and development assistance (Wojnicz, 2019: 172).

Operation Atalanta involved people from NATO and non-EU countries including Norway and Ukraine, as well as several naval ships and aircraft from several EU member states and other partner countries. The initiative has been successful in reducing the number of pirate attacks in the region and ensuring the safety of maritime routes. In addition to its anti-piracy mission, Operation Atalanta has been involved in several activities, such as the security of ships carrying supplies to Somalia, monitoring local fishing operations, and training regional naval forces to strengthen their ability to combat piracy. The operation is still going on and is still playing a big part in stopping piracy off the coast of Somalia. The EU has pledged to continue its efforts to safeguard international commerce and trade in the area and has repeatedly extended the operation (IMPETUS, 2019:8) most recently to December 2022.

The region has developed into a testing ground for international military naval coordination with over 20 nations and two dozen international vessels patrolling the area (China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, and Russia all have ships in the area, in addition to the Combined Maritime Forces - CMF, 25 NATO and EU coalition vessels). However, the substantial military presence in this particularly delicate area also indicates escalating geostrategic rivalry among regional countries in Eurasia (Helly, 2009: 398-399).

From the EU point of view in the brief history of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Atalanta has been an operational success, possibly one of the most significant. However, a constant, continuing marine presence is necessary to preserve this upward momentum. Without the ongoing deployment of the EU NAVFOR mission, piracy would surely resurface as a tempting alternative for Somalis and others looking for rich economic opportunities, increasing the risks to maritime security in the region once more (IMPETUS, 2019:8; Arconada-Ledesma, 2021: 29). The Atalanta mission, being the first such military action, is an illustration of how EU activities have evolved within the context of global activities (Wojnicz, 2019: 173).

Atlanta has been essential in fostering communication with major international players like Russia or China because of these advancements in coordination. For the first time in four centuries, China is now a maritime power in the Indian Ocean. Its navy has worked hard to establish a reputation for being proactive in pursuing anti-piracy goals, directing the events in the Gulf of Aden, and engaging in international coordination. India's brash presence reflects its aspirations to project and act as a regional force in the Indian Ocean. For Atlanta, Russia has shown to be a helpful partner. In many ways, Atlanta set a new standard as the first naval operation of the EU. In the midst of France and NATO's reconciliation, it established ties, and this knowledge might guide ESDP and NATO relations in the future. Beyond piracy, the unexpected increase in naval activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean indicates the emergence of new maritime power struggles. In addition to the connections, it built with the US-led coalition in the region, Atlanta has proven to be a crucial tool for the EU to communicate with regional and global maritime actors like China and Russia. The EU can guarantee that suspected pirates are prosecuted in accordance with global human rights norms because of its comprehensive approach that includes rule-of-law and Community measures to strengthen judicial institutions in the region (Helly, 2009: 399-401).

5.5. EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008-2009)

Javier Solana, the EU's secretary-general of the Council and high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, has made a number of statements that can be examined in relation to the preferences of the EU. On July 13, 2007, Solana stated his intention to send troops to Chad in order to protect the refugees from Darfur. The military operation EUFOR in the Central African Republic and Chad was started by the European Union on January 28, 2008 (Claude-Fahron Hussey, 2019:159).

The UN's local presence, the countless refugees from neighboring Darfur, and the protection of the civilian population were all part of its mandate. The purpose of this study is to explain and analyze the political-strategic and military-strategic planning phases of this operation to comprehend how the military instrument was supposed to produce the anticipated political outcomes. From a military standpoint, the EUFOR operation is founded on the idea of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of the use of force is employed to prevent potential disruptors from targeting the civilian population. The planning of EUFOR was challenged by numerous points of struggle, as with any military operation. This conflict appears to be caused, at least in part, by expectations that are not aligned at the political and military strategic levels. A less decisive operational stance than what the political goals would have suggested was the outcome of the numerous political and military-technical restrictions that the operation was prepared under (Mattelaer, 2008).

The EU's preferences for peacekeeping in Africa are

perfectly aligned with EUFOR Chad/CAR. Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA began in the middle of 2006. The international community noticed an increase in insecurity in eastern Chad, which borders the Darfur region of western Sudan. As a response, in June 2006, the UN Security Council sent a fact-finding mission, which suggested a security presence to guard refugees and displaced people at UN camps in eastern Chad, close to the Sudanese border (Seibert, 2010: 7). The mission of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation is to support the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and to ensure a safe environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid. The operation also attempted to assist the governments of Chad and the CAR in their efforts to bring stability and peace back to the area. There was little political room for fresh measures because the UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) had already received widespread backing internationally. The major goals of the 2008 EUFOR Chad/CAR mission were to protect civilians impacted by the conflict in Chad and the Central African Republic and to help stabilize the area. As a result of the battle between the government and rebel groups, the mission was started in response to the humanitarian situation that had developed in the area. A multinational group of troops from different EU member states carried out the mission, and its main duties were enabling the distribution of supplies to those in need, supplying security for refugees and internally displaced people, and assisting humanitarian aid activities.

The EU's preferences on peacekeeping in Africa, reflecting the values of multilateral collaboration with the UN, short-term deployment, and a clear withdrawal option, influenced the mission's character even though France took the lead for sending a European mission into the region. As a result of Chad's reluctance to a greater UN presence at the time of its deployment, EU peacekeepers *de facto* held a hegemonic position. While a larger UN mission was being established, the EU only performed a bridging role (Brosig, 2011: 120).

The EU's attention being drawn to the crisis in Chad was largely due to France. Considering this, it is appropriate to draw attention to a few aspects of the history of France and Chad that are of present relevance. Chad signed several military assistance agreements with France beginning in 1960, just like many other former French colonies. These bilateral agreements granted France the authority to pass the area and overfly it, as well as the ability to maintain military bases there. France promised its colonies external territorial protection in exchange and agreed to consider any requests for help in the event of insurrections or coup attempts. France additionally gave the Chadian military forces equipment, instruction, and guidance (Mattelaer, 2008:9).

In place of a UN force, France suggested deploying an EU force that would act as a stopgap measure until the UN force arrived. This plan offered at least two advantages for France. First off, a European army with a significant French presence would be much more likely to be welcomed in

Chad than a UN force. As part of Operation EPERVIER (also known as Operation Sparrowhawk), French personnel have been stationed in Chad for many years. France and Chad have a military-technical cooperation agreement. France was able to get enough political support despite the majority of EU member states' ongoing reservations to begin the EU's crisis management decision-making and planning process (Seibert, 2010: 9-11).

All foreign ministries of EU members got information from Paris on May 21 about a plan to act in eastern Chad. Considering the long-standing ties between France and Chad, the eventual EU operation would end up having a limited impact on a more intricate French Africa strategic plan. The UN and the EU were the natural policy instruments because the international community broadly supported the local humanitarian operations. The bilateral French-Chadian partnership would unavoidably continue to include more delicate topics like military aid. EUFOR would merely be deployed alongside EPERVIER in this scenario (Mattelaer, 2008:10). Establishing EU cooperation in Chad and the CAR in the context of UN efforts to establish a mission on the ground is also necessary. The UN's ability to launch its mission before taking control is critical to the success of EUFOR Chad/CAR. Both parties must make coordinated efforts. However, in the cases of Chad and the CAR, individual EU Member States' interests and the choices of the host nations had a significant impact on the EU/UN collaboration. Setting up both EU and UN peacekeeping operations has been spearheaded by France. In 2005, Idriss Deby, the president of Chad, continued to rule the country in violation of the constitution. The host countries' approval and multilateral collaboration with the UN make this a short-term operation with a clear exit option. Its main role is that of a bridging operation, laying the groundwork for a comprehensive, protracted UN mission to take over once the EU has left. The EU as an institution is now unable to deploy and retain a greater number of troops, despite efforts to strengthen the EU's autonomous military capabilities through the establishment of Battle Groups. Due to severe strategic airlift capacity shortages, Russian aircraft support was required for EUFOR Chad/CAR. EU military assets were not deployed as soon as they should have been (Brosig, 2011: 119).

The instance of EUFOR Chad/CAR is a good illustration of how the interests of individual EU Member States permeated EU organizations, while outside factors formed the mission's personality. Without France pressing for the establishment of an international peace operation in both the UN and the EU, EUFOR Chad/CAR would generally be inconceivable. The process of gaining support for EUFOR Chad/CAR in Europe was undoubtedly sped considerably by the French military presence there prior to the arrival of EU and UN forces. The EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008) mission was effective in attaining its goals since it contributed to the region's stabilization and the protection of the conflict's affected civilians. The mission also helped improve the general security situation in the area and delivered

humanitarian aid to individuals in need. The operation, however, had to overcome several obstacles, such as the rough terrain and the existence of armed organizations in the area. The EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008) operation was able to significantly contribute to the stabilization of the area and the protection of conflict-affected civilians despite these difficulties.

The interests of specific EU Member States have frequently been used to justify the EU's involvement in Africa. Britain and France have been singled out as leading nations using the EU as a tool to multilateralize their foreign policies toward Africa. In fact, both nations play a crucial role in shaping the EU's reputation as an international actor as well as in African peace operations. The deployment of EU military soldiers and civilian employees is not occurring in a vacuum because most peacekeeping operations are currently carried out in collaboration amongst IOs. Contrarily, the EU must coordinate the deployment of its missions with other IOs, most notably the AU and UN (Brosig, 2011:108-109).

Cooperating organizations must logically consider their own preferences and capacities in respect to partner organizations' operational needs, peacekeeping doctrines, and institutional capabilities. For those who touched by unselfish cooperation, the start of military actions for normative purposes would be a wonderful outcome. If nations were taught humanitarianism instead of a self-help process of competition where egoist interests' rule, this would open a world of chances for collaboration. The wish to think that the EU has conducted military actions to further its normative aspirations of a humanitarian nature is unfortunately incompatible with empirical data (Magalhães, 2020: 11).

The crisis in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR was only slightly affected by Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. But this does not necessarily imply that the procedure was unsuccessful. Instead, several assessments can be made depending on how success is defined. Operation EUFOR CHAD/RCA can be deemed a success by the EU if one adopts a limited view of what constitutes success. This assessment would be because Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA succeeded in achieving its main goal of assisting in the creation of a safe and secure environment. This result may not be satisfying because it seemed almost unthinkable that this goal had not been accomplished. Additionally, it seems to hide the fact that the European forces had a negligible impact on the ground or that the enhanced stability may have been brought about by variables unrelated to the force, like the sharp shift in the balance of power in favor of the Chad government. The impact of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA on the ground situation was virtually always going to be minimal. As a result, the lack of impact on the crisis is less a result of the execution process than it is of the pre-launch preparation, which led to operational limits that reduced the operation's total impact (Seibert, 2010: 41-42).

In conclusion, the EU's material and non-material capabilities were highly appropriate for a military response to the Chad/CAR crisis. Overall, the EU's agent characteristics were well suited for the Chad/CAR situation because both its capabilities and preferences were well suited for a military operation. Therefore, in terms of a military response to the crisis in Chad/CAR, the EU was a more suitable agent than NATO. The shape of the preferences of the key players within the principal regarding the agent for a military operation and the aggregation of the preferences within the principal were influenced by the agent characteristics of the international organizations. Although the US saw the EU as the proper agent, it was in favor of a military operation in the Chad/CAR. The UK and Germany opposed the idea of an EU operation in Chad and the CAR because they were opposed to any sort of intervention in the two nations. The EU operation in the Chad/CAR was strongly supported by France. Discussions were held in the EU Council and other venues to find a consensus position because the states' preferences varied. The principal's decision-making was influenced by bureaucratic players in NATO and the EU. The EU's representatives engaged in vigorous lobbying efforts and applied pressure to the states to move forward with an EU military operation in the crisis region, while NATO representatives did not advocate for a military operation by their organization in the Chad and the CAR. Officials from the EU emphasized the agent qualities of their organization by emphasizing that the EU had reliable military resources, extensive experience working with the UN in Africa, and preferences for protecting Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad and the northeastern CAR that aligned with the priorities of the key players within the principal. The anticipated delegation chains were also verified (Claude-Fahron Hussey, 2019:193-194).

6. European Union's Training Missions in Africa After 2010

The European Union (EU) carried out several missions and projects in Africa between 2010 and 2020 with the goal of resolving disputes, boosting security, and promoting development cooperation. The summits between the EU and Africa held in 2000, 2007, 2010, 2014 and 2017 and others were crucial venues for advancing a strategic alliance between the two sides (Rein, 2017). In addition, the EU's military operations in Africa helped put the Joint Africa-EU Strategy into practice. The political, economic, and developmental facets of the EU's engagement with Africa were all present. External perceptions of the EU; research have looked at how people in Africa perceive the EU from the outside, highlighting how those perceptions and stories have changed over time. Geographical factors were considered when addressing challenges, such as the northwestern coast of Africa. Africa was regarded by the European Union as a strategic partner, and long-standing ties were upheld. Between 2010 and 2020, the missions of the European Union in Africa had the following

characteristics: Establishing a strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa and institutionalizing cooperation. The EU-Africa Summits held during this time helped to institutionalize cooperation. Europe's goal was to exert normative power and apply European standards throughout Africa, with a focus on the importance of pan-African regionalization. Traditional development goals and new political objectives were both pursued by the EU missions in Africa. EUTMs are not required to participate directly in efforts to stabilize the situation, prevent conflict, or safeguard civilians. They nonetheless serve as one of the EU's tools in its integrated strategy, and their main objective is to support security sector reform (SSR), which improves the military capabilities of EU partners and enables them to provide security while upholding the law, thereby promoting public safety and peace. To achieve this, EUTMs support the formation, restructuring, and deployment of well-trained armed forces, and generally engage in training and offering advice on the reform of armed forces in order to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the defense sectors of partner countries. The effectiveness of armed forces has generally slightly increased because of EUTM training and advisory efforts, despite numerous challenging circumstances outside the control of the missions. Lessening the accountability and governance of the defense and security sectors through broader security sector reform and defense sector reform (DSR) initiatives has frequently had less of an effect. EUTMs do, however, have a function to perform.

6.1. EUTM Mali

The European Union (EU) conducted several missions in Mali between 2010 and 2022, aimed at providing training, stability, and security to the country. These missions were part of the EU's broader efforts to support Mali and address security challenges in the Sahel region. Two strategic goals have been assigned to EUTM Mali: help increase the Malian Armed Forces' operational capability while they are under the command of Mali's legitimate civilian authorities; Support the G5 Sahel by making the national armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries operational and the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel operational (Baudais et. al. 2022:4; Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:3).

The European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) encompasses the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). Along with the EU delegation there and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), it is a part of the EU's strategy to aid in the stabilization of Mali. With the intention of assisting the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMA) in conducting military operations aimed at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, EUTM Mali was founded in 2013 following the occupation of the country's northern regions by separatist and jihadist armed groups (Baudais and Maiga, 2022:1). When EUTM Mali first began to be implemented, the nation and its Army were seen as

potential allies in the fight against armed groups in the north of the country. Plans were still made in the Union's favor, but the counterpart was mentioned as a potential partner. Due to the military setbacks, the deteriorating security situation, and the involvement of additional terrorist organizations like AQIM or the IS, it was possible for the two partners to sever their ties (Micheal, 2021:72).

With EUTM Mali the EU aims to stabilize nations that are experiencing state weakness brought on by intrastate conflict. While the EU formally supports security sector reform (SSR) through its foreign policy, the EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia can be conceptualized as "counter-insurgency by proxy" as military trainees engage in local insurgencies soon after graduating. This begs the question of whether the EUTM missions are in line with SSR objectives, such as developing a security sector that is reputable, resilient, and under civilian control, or whether they unintentionally run the risk of having negative side effects over the long term (Skeppström et. al, 2014:353).

The initial strategy was to outsource European security concerns more in 2015. A possibility to save European lives, even at the risk of higher financial costs, was seen in particular in the creation of proxy armies that would be required to pay a higher blood toll in more dangerous scenarios. But after a year, it was clear that African Armies -including the Malian - were inferior or unable to deal with the threat on their own, and further investment in them was off the table. Because of the financial crisis, the EU spearheaded several attempts to increase cooperation, whether it was through structured field cooperation (PESCO) or military development (the single European Defense Market). As a result, civilian CSDP missions have become militarized, and counterterrorism, border security, and law-and-order policy have received more attention (Micheal, 2021:72-73).

The European Union considers that Mali's security forces need to receive superior training if the country is to experience long-term peace and stability. There will be no combat operations involving EUTM Mali. Due to the Northern Mali crisis in 2012-2013, numerous armed groups now rule large portions of the nation. Although a peace agreement was reached in 2015, not all areas of government control have been reinstated, and stability is still precarious. In recent years, the nature of the security crisis has changed. The majority of security incidents are caused by intercommunal violence, religious extremism, and criminal activity, sometimes linked to illegal trafficking. The crisis has made it clear that better governance and institutional capabilities are required if the Mali people are to be able to fully exercise their rights, including the rights to security and justice. In light of these events, the UN Security Council issued a direct request to regional and international organizations, including the EU, to coordinate assistance, knowledge, training, and support for the Malian Armed Forces' (MaAF) development in order to restore state authority. All of these developments led to the Council's

adoption of a resolution that outlined the goals and organizational structure of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali. It is crucial for Africa and Europe that Mali regains security and a long-lasting peace. EUTM Mali is a crucial component of the regional strategy used by the European Union to advance development and security in the Sahel and for the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). On February 18, 2013, European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali) was introduced. With the help of advice, instruction, and training, EUTM Mali is required to help the Malian Armed Forces rebuild their military capability. It aids the Malian government in building up self-sufficient Malian Armed Forces that are able to conduct military operations to restore Malian territorial integrity and lessen the threat posed by terrorist organizations. Additionally, EUTM Mali supplies the Joint Force and the G5 Sahel nations (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) with military support. The EU Council decided to extend the EUTM Mali's mandate until 18 May 2024 in March 2020. The mission's operational area has grown to include the entirety of Mali as a result of the new mandate. In addition, the Council authorized EUTM Mali to aid the G5 Sahel nations militarily. (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-mali/eutm-mali-european-union-training-mission-mali-military-mission_en)

With the aim of enabling the Malian authorities to restore and maintain a democratic and constitutional order as well as the conditions for long-term peace in Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali was created. Its other objectives include restoring and maintaining State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory through an efficient redeployment of its administration. The European Council extended the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali in January 2023 until 31 January 2025. While pursuing the EU's Sahel strategy and the regionalization approach, the Mission's structure and activities were adjusted to reflect the changing operational environment and its partners' needs. Basic aims are to reinforce the role of judicial and administrative authorities, contributing to the prevention of corruption and impunity; increase the operational effectiveness of the internal security forces; re-establish the internal security forces' hierarchical chains through a more cogent management of resources. By offering strategic advice, mentoring, training, material assistance, and material support to the National Police, Gendarmerie, and Guard and the relevant ministries, EUCAP Sahel Mali assists the Malian government's implementation of the security sector reform. Following three operational lines, the Mission carries out its mandate with a focus on enhancing the internal security forces' structural and operational capabilities as well as their ethical standards. The Mission makes a significant contribution to improving the capacity of the internal security forces in the following areas: crisis management, border management, counterterrorism and fight against organized crime, human resources and logistics management, rule of law and fight against impunity. The Mission also promotes human rights,

gender equality, and the accountability of the internal security forces, as well as the cooperation between the internal security forces and the civil society (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-sahel-mali/about-eucap-sahel-mali_en?s=331).

Facilitate the deployment of internal security forces in southern Mali, with a focus on the National Police, and in central Mali (if circumstances permit); and support the redeployment of civil administrative authorities in central Mali based on good governance principles. The mission to build capacity for the European Union in Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) was tasked with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Mali's security institutions in general as well as the security sector's overall reform. By adopting a more bottom-up approach to designing, planning, monitoring, and evaluating interventions, EU could be more effective, particularly at the operational level. By collaborating with local civil society in its efforts to reform the security sector, for example, and by providing platforms for more civilian oversight and feedback mechanisms, the EU will need to find ways to better integrate its interventions into local realities. The EU won't be able to better address the "intangible aspects" of security sector reform until it has placed a stronger emphasis on the inclusivity and local ownership aspects of civil and military action (Vogelaar, 2018:21).

The EU's involvement in Mali was consistent with its larger dedication to fostering stability, growth, and peace in Africa. Overall, EU missions in Mali supported efforts to create strong, dependable security institutions in order to promote peace, security, and development in the nation. In addition to addressing the root causes of conflict and instability in the area, they sought to strengthen the capability of the Malian Armed Forces.

6.2. EUTM Somalia

Because the situation in Somalia was deemed to be too dangerous, EUTM Somalia was established on 15 February 2010 and deployed to Uganda on 7 April 2010. Since its launch in April 2010, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia's (EUTM-S) mandate has undergone seven extensions, each reflecting the local environment. The Mission initially held training in Uganda due to the political and security situation in Somalia at the time. The mission of the EUTM in Somalia is to support and train Somali security forces in their efforts to strengthen safety and stability in the nation. The Somali National Armed Forces' command structures, specialized units, and support systems were all given special attention as the organization's capacity and professionalism were emphasized. The mission aimed to aid in the establishment of a competent and responsible security sector in Somalia (<https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/#>).

The military foundation of the European Union's (EU) efforts to assist in the country's stabilization is provided by the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia). When EUTM Somalia was first established in

2010, its initial mission was to provide tactical training support to the newly reconstituted Somali National Army (SNA) serving the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During the third mandate renewal of the mission, strategic advising was added in 2013. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and international partners adopted the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) strategy in 2017 as a component of a security agreement. EUTM Somalia is now a part of this strategy. Increasing the "competence, effectiveness, credibility, and accountability of the Somali defense sector to enable Somali authorities to gradually take over security responsibilities" is one of EUTM Somalia's goals. By providing training and strategic counsel, the mission hopes to accomplish these objectives. Since 2016, training infantry companies, ideally multi-clan and integrated, has been a part of this. It also includes customized training and capacity-building initiatives to support the delivery of a sustainable Somali-owned training system. Drafting foundational documents and policies and promoting civilian oversight of the SNA are both parts of the strategic mentoring and advice provided to SNA general staff and Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel (Williams and Ali, 2020: 1). By offering training, guidance, and mentoring, EUTM Somalia seeks to strengthen the federal defense organizations in Somalia. EUTM Somalia makes sure that its operations are tailored to the needs of the Somali defense establishments and are coordinated with other international allies. EUTM Somalia focuses on enhancing the capability, efficacy, credibility, and accountability of the Somali defense sector to enable Somali authorities to gradually assume security responsibilities. The Somali National Army will need policies, procedures, knowledge, and experience to manage their own force generation, and EUTM Somalia's determination to support the development of a long-lasting Somali-owned training system will be crucial to this (Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:3). EUTM Somalia, in collaboration with EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and the European Union Capacity Building Mission to Somalia, plays a crucial role in assisting the growth of effective and accountable Somali institutions that serve the Somali people. Additionally, EUTM Somalia continues to provide tactical training and supports the growth of the Ministry of Defense. In addition to light infantry, engineering, and specialized training, development increasingly places a focus on Train the Trainer programs and mentoring that will give the Somali National Army the capacity to oversee their own training (Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:3).

In the process of creating a peaceful Somalia, the EU supports the Somali institutions. In order to improve the living conditions of the population, including in the areas of security and the provision of essential services, it continues to cooperate with the federal government of Somalia. The EU backs the tenets outlined in the Djibouti Peace Agreement, such as the pursuit of an inclusive process in Somalia and a spirit of reconciliation. The Mission assists in the execution of EU programs, supports its sister missions

EUCAP - Somalia and EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) - Operation ATALANTA, and maintains close ties with local EU representations. There are a number of international partners, including EUTM Somalia, who are actively involved in the development of Somalia's security sector. As always, the complies with the directives of the EU Delegation to the Federal Republic of Somalia. Politically, EUTM Somalia was meant to help the EU and AU work together more effectively. Since 2010, the EUTM has trained nearly 7000 SNA personnel in Somalia (Baudais et. al., 2022:3).

EUTM Somalia's activities are as follows: Training, advice, international coordination, civil-military cooperation and Equipment provision. Despite having a limited operational impact, EUTM Somalia has had a positive political impact on Somalia's conflict dynamics. The EU's relationship with the Somali government and the AU has also benefited politically from EUTM Somalia. Through the use of a component to increase military capability. However, the EU's overall impact has frequently been diminished by a lack of effective strategic coordination among the various elements of its activities in Somalia. Although the strategic advice function of EUTM Somalia has been helpful in the development of the Somali MOD and SNA, Somalia's fractured political environment has prevented direct connections between advisory activities and a shared strategic vision for the armed forces and the structure of the country's security. Personnel on brief tours of duty have frequently performed the advisory roles for the mission. Operationally speaking, the mission's influence on Somalia's conflict dynamics has been minimal. Significant evidence of a direct connection between EUTM Somalia training and operational deployment of functional Somali units in offensive and stabilization operations was not available until the start of Operation Badbaado in 2019 (Williams and Ali, 2020: 18; Baudais et. al., 2022:3).

This modest impact is explained by a number of factors. First, in a situation where Somalia's security sector politics did not favor the development of a professional set of national security forces, EUTM Somalia was tasked with carrying out a largely technical and tactical agenda. Second, compared to other international security assistance programs, EUTM Somalia lacked the authority and resources to equip and pay its trainees, which diminished the mission's political impact and the potential effectiveness of its trainees. It is significant that under the new European Peace Facility, the EU's position on outfitting trained SNA units could change. Thirdly, because EUTM Somalia lacked the ability to provide field mentoring, the mission essentially operated a subpar "train and release" program. Military units must first receive field mentoring before they can perform offensive operations. All EU member states would need to approve the addition of this task to the mission's mandate in addition to a significant expansion and reconfiguration of the mission's role in Somalia. For this mentoring to take place outside of Mogadishu in the regions of Somalia, EU member states would have to be prepared to bear higher

costs and increased personnel risk (Williams and Ali, 2020: 19). As SNA trainees received training in international humanitarian law, human rights law, and the prevention of sexual violence, EUTM Somalia's courses may have had a minor, indirect positive impact on the protection of civilians, the environment for human rights, and preventing conflict-related sexual violence (Baudais et. al., 2022:3).

The development of military units capable of offensive operations was found to require field mentoring. All EU member states would need to agree to add this task to the mission's mandate, and the mission's responsibilities in Somalia would need to be significantly expanded. EU member states would need to be willing to shoulder higher costs and greater risk to their personnel for such mentoring to take place outside of Mogadishu in Somalia's regions.

6.3. EUTM RCA

The Central African Republic, which has experienced ongoing conflict and security issues, was launched with the intention of helping to stabilize the country. While instability persists as a result of the presence of the Seleka alliance of armed groups and of anti-balaka (anti-machete) self-defense armed groups, EUTM RCA is assisting the CAR authorities in re-establishing the CAR Armed Forces (Forces Armées Centrafricaines, FACA). Its duties include aiding in DSR and supporting the creation of a "modernized, effective, and democratically accountable" FACA (Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:5).

The military element of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (EU CSDP) in the Central African Republic is called the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA). The EUTM RCA was established in 2016 to replace the EU Force RCA (2014-15) and the EU Military Advisory Mission RCA (2015-16). EUTM RCA is a non-executive military training mission that offers advisory support to the Central African Republic (CAR) government (EEAS 00990/6/14 REV 6, 17107/14, 19 Dec. 2014, para. 14). The mission's objectives include supporting the CAR's defense sector reform (DSR) initiative and the creation of a modernized, effective, and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA) (Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 of 19 Apr. 2016). It works in three areas: (a) strategic counsel to the president's cabinet and the CAR Ministry of Defense; (b) education for the specialists and commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the FACA; and (c) operational training for the FACA. The force commander of EUTM RCA serves as the CAR president's personal security advisor. The EU advisory mission (EUAM RCA), the civil counterpart of EUTM RCA, was established in December 2019 by the European Council to support the reform of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which includes the police and gendarmerie. The EUAM RCA started operating on August 9, 2020. (Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 of 9 Dec. 2019). The mission's goals of strategic advice, education, and operational training have not changed as a result of the

EUTM RCA's second mandate renewal in July 2020 (Hickendorff, & Acko, 2021:1).

The EU Foreign Affairs Ministers Council authorized a Task Force in the Central African Republic on January 20, 2014, under the direction of the EU. Resolution 2134 (2014) of the United Nations Security Council served as the legal foundation for the establishment of the European Union Force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR-RCA). As part of the global effort to safeguard the populations most at risk and to establish the necessary framework for delivering humanitarian aid, EUFOR RCA helped to establish a safe and secure environment in the Bangui region. After a protracted period of unrest, the Central African Republic (CAR) experienced its highest level of unrest in 2013, which led to the state's almost complete collapse. A very complex situation necessitated an immediate response from the international community due to the inefficiency of state institutions and the return to a subsistence economy brought on by internal conflict. The EU Foreign Affairs Ministers Council approved a Task Force in the Central African Republic on January 20, 2014. Resolution 2134 (2014) of the United Nations Security Council served as the legal foundation for the establishment of the European Union Force in the Central African Republic (EU-FOR-RCA). As part of the global effort to safeguard the populations most at risk and to establish the necessary framework for delivering humanitarian aid, EUFOR RCA helped to establish a safe and secure environment in the Bangui region. The letter inviting the European Union to send a military mission for consultation was sent by the interim head of state of the Central African Republic on January 16, 2015. On March 16, 2015, the Central African Defense Sector Reform (DSR) process was supported by the establishment of the European Union Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) in the country (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-rca/eutm-rca-european-training-mission-central-african-republic-military-mission_en?s=334).

The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and other international support missions work closely with EUTM-RCA to reform the Central African Republic's defense sector as part of a larger security sector reform. The mission works to support the Central African government and is involved in three areas: operational training, strategic advice, and education. Since the start of its mandate, EUTM-RCA has trained about 6,000 members of the Central African Armed Forces through the delivery of specialized education, quick impact courses, and career-related training. The mission supports the political and military authorities by offering strategic advice, both in deployment planning and in the drafting of significant documents (National Defense Plan, Military Planning Law, Recruitment Plan, Internal Security Forces Planning Law, Law on the Status of the Internal Security Forces, etc.) (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-rca/eutm-rca-european-training-mission-central-african-republic-military-mission_en?s=334).

[mission_en?s=334](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eutm-rca/eutm-rca-european-training-mission-central-african-republic-military-mission_en?s=334)).

The main initiatives of EUTM RCA are operational training, education, and strategic advice. The main responsibility of EUTM RCA has been to provide advice to national political and military authorities on the conception, proposal, and validation of key DSR documents, such as the DSR strategy, the NDP, and the military programming law (2019-23), as well as on policies pertaining to military justice, such as the Military Justice Code (Code de Justice Militaire, 2017) and the Law on the General Statute of the Military (Loi sur le Statut General des Militaires, promulgated in July 2020). On a variety of security-related matters, including the securing of the 2020 presidential elections, the force commander has been advising the president. (Hickendorff, & Acko, 2021:8). The ultimate objective of supporting the setup and deployment of a well-trained FACA is to contribute to peace and security for the populace, even though EUTM RCA is not mandated to directly intervene in stabilization, conflict prevention, or the protection of civilians. The FACA, however, does not yet possess the necessary components of an operational garrison army, such as accountability and an operational command-and-control system.

The importance of EUTM RCA's efforts to build military capacity was generally acknowledged. In the four years that the mission has been operational, its staff has consistently worked to carry out its mandate to provide advice, education, and training to the CAR authorities, particularly for their armed forces. Although the actual number of trainees may be lower due to enrollment in multiple courses, the mission has so far trained and educated close to 7000 FACA members (Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:5). EUTM RCA has also been successful in assisting the Ministry of Defense with the re-establishment of the FACA's HR system, the streamlining of its retirement process, as well as with the drafting of more comprehensive structural reform policies. On the overall transformation of the FACA, however, there hasn't been much real progress to date. It still has a long way to go before it can be considered a democratically accountable, inclusive, well-functioning, and effective armed force that can handle security issues on its own. A sustainable operationalization of an effective army is a long-term project, so it is debatable that this could be expected to happen in just four years. The fact that it depends on national ownership of DSR, which is primarily a political process rather than a technical one, and that the CAR Government's limited political engagement cannot be resolved with technical solutions alone are additional challenges that EUTM RCA must overcome (Hickendorff, & Acko, 2021:18-19).

Numerous difficulties are connected to the slow progress that has been made. Policies for structural defense reform are only partially implemented, and there are no systems in place to monitor trainee behavior and performance after training. Poor communication and coordination between EUTM RCA, the CAR Government, and MINUSCA; EUTM RCA's inability to support the FACA's logistical

capabilities with equipment and Inadequate engagement of local stakeholder groups in mission activities (Hickendorff, & Acko, 2021:19-20).

Soldiers have frequently been dispatched into combat after completing their training to aid in the stabilization of the nation. EUTM RCA has had a difficult time objectively evaluating the implementation of its human rights policies and other impacts due to the current lack of monitoring systems. With regard to the overall transformation of the FACA, there hasn't been much noticeable progress to date. The mission has been successful in assisting the MOD with the re-establishment of a human resources system, the streamlining of the retirement process, and the drafting of more comprehensive policies on structural reform. Many of these documents and policies, though, are yet to be put into practice.

In order to address security issues outside of Bangui without the assistance of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), the FACA must still make significant progress toward becoming an inclusive, effective, well-functioning, and democratically accountable armed force. Furthermore, the FACA continues to pose a potential threat to stability through the exploitation of soldiers for regionally or politically polarized agendas, violations of human rights, defections to armed groups, and even the potential for a military coup. However, it could be argued that such a drastic change could not have been anticipated in only four years, and EUTM RCA has had to overcome numerous challenges that were largely out of its control. On November 30, the EU Political and Security Committee made the decision to halt EUTM RCA's educational and training initiatives. However, the mission still offers the CAR MOD and the FACA strategic guidance (Van der Lijn et. al., 2022:6).

There must be some recommendations made to EUTM RCA to address the issues raised above. Pay special attention to the mission's structural DSR efforts and the CAR Government's ownership and leadership; Create monitoring systems for FACA soldiers who have received training; Boost communication between international SSR partners. Think about providing the FACA with non-lethal support but hold off on providing lethal equipment until the necessary circumstances are met; Spend money on strategic communication and neighborhood stakeholder engagement (Hickendorff, & Acko, 2021:20-22).

7. Conclusion

The European Union is being asked more and more to address crises both inside and outside the organization. People are under pressure to work together across functional and geographic borders because of the numerous crises that exist today, which range from terrorism to financial crises, natural disasters to international conflict. The EU's rise as a worldwide crisis management organization has created a definite demand for EU crisis management missions. The EU is appealing due in part to its strong political legitimacy,

perceived neutrality, and economic resiliency. It is essential to remember that the underlying values of the EU are largely international and universal, and every country that is a member of the UN has sworn to uphold these values, which are outlined in the UN Charter and political will is necessary for pronouncements and strategies to be put into action.

Peacekeeping missions are essential for the EU in different parts of the world and in Africa to protect civilians, provide security in conflict-affected areas, and aid in the consolidation of peace and stability. The EU has taken part in several peacekeeping missions in Africa that intended to establish a secure setting for the delivery of humanitarian aid, the defense of civilians, and the support of United Nations Missions there. The EU's commitment to fostering regional security, stability, and prosperity is largely reflected in its participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The EU and Africa have been collaborating more on security issues in recent years, which reflects the EU's growing institutional and military capacity and preparedness to act in African crisis situations. This trend is reflected in the European Security Strategy, which mandates that the EU create a strategic culture that encourages early, prompt, and, where necessary, forceful engagement. Since the ESDP was established in 1999, the EU has constantly anchored its African strategy on the idea of African ownership by developing a common vocabulary that appears as follows in most of its publications referring to African security issues. The EU's security strategy in Africa is extensive and makes use of several instruments, including legislative frameworks, diplomatic ties, and mediation. The EU aspires to improve relations with African countries in a variety of sectors, including trade, collaboration, and peace and security. Conflict resolution efforts of the EU in Africa are meant to enhance regional security and peace. While being sensitive to an evolving African peace and security system, the EU's peacekeeping strategy is influenced by the interests of European Member States or EU institutions to deploy and maintain peacekeepers. For the EU to perform its duties as a mediator and contributor to peacekeeping, the UN must identify pertinent areas in which the EU may apply its complementary competencies. The EU has frequently reaffirmed its dedication to conflict resolution tactics that target the root causes of instability.

European Union will carry out the actions outlined in this strategy with Africa between 2005 and 2015 in order to support African efforts to forge such a future. The entire EU adheres to it with regard to the entire continent of Africa. It takes into account regional and national needs as well as the national strategies of African nations. Its main goals are to help Africa achieve the Millennium Development Goals as well as the continent's goals for sustainable development, security, and good governance. Africa is both the sister continent and its closest neighbor, so the European Union accords it a high priority. Geographically, economically, and culturally, Africa and Europe are interconnected. Our shared past, current location, and common interests bind us together. Two complementary frameworks that form the

basis of ties between the EU and Africa are the Africa-EU Partnership and the new Partnership Agreement with the Organization of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS). The Africa-EU Partnership serves as the official political conduit for relations between the EU and Africa.

The AU-EU Summit Declaration was a joint statement made by the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) in 2017 at their summit meetings outlining their shared priorities, commitments, and objectives. Despite the absence of specific references to the AU-EU Summit Declaration, it is still possible to provide a broad overview based on a deeper comprehension of the AU-EU partnership. The AU-EU Summit Declaration serves as a guide for collaboration between the two regional organizations to address various issues of shared interest. The document acknowledges that the EU and Africa face comparable security threats. New regional and international security concerns, particularly the escalating transnational crime and terrorist threats, are posing a threat to the stability of our two continents. Given the complexity of these threats and the need to address their root causes, we concur that a framework document should be created as soon as possible to give our partnership on peace and security a more stable and structured foundation. In this regard, we acknowledge the need to improve ties between the AU and EU. It also acknowledges the successful deployment of African peace support operations and EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions. The ongoing AU reform initiatives and measures to ensure predictable and sustainable financing will strengthen this process. Reiterate the importance of supporting AU peace operations that the UN Security Council has mandated, as well as the decision to contribute to the Peace Fund and the possibility of using UN assessed contributions for those operations. The EU recognizes and emphasizes how important it is for the EU to keep supporting African efforts for stability and security as well as the contribution of regional organizations in Africa. In line with the goals of the AU and UN, the EU will support young people and women taking an active part in conflict management, prevention, and mediation. Investing in people through education, science, technology, and skill development; bolstering resilience, peace, security, and governance; migration and mobility; and mobilizing investments for African structural sustainable transformation will be the strategic priorities for the period leading up to the next Summit.

The EU's Security Strategy (ESS) is a flexible framework that guides the EU's approach to security and defense. It addresses both internal and external threats and strongly emphasizes cooperation and autonomy. The European Union's security strategy has evolved over time with the aid of a number of strategic documents. These comprise the Global Strategy of 2016, the Security Strategy of 2003, and the Strategic Compass (SC) of 2022. It correctly draws a link between internal and external security and assumes that stability on the global stage is necessary for internal security. As a result, it plans for larger-scale external actions to ensure

the Union's internal security. The issue of whether its records will result in concrete and quantifiable activities is still up in the air because it solely depends on the member countries' will. Furthermore, a change in mindset is required to approach the Union's function as the world's protector of order. The European Union Global Strategy presented a second chance in 2016. The 2003 Strategy's misguided lesson is taken into consideration as a more cautious attempt is made to lay a security foundation for the Union. As the document's title suggests, achieving security requires a global strategy rather than relying solely on oneself. The Strategic Compass seeks to create a framework for controlling and enhancing EU security and defense capabilities. In recognition of the fact that threats to the EU can be military, hybrid, or non-military in nature, the document emphasizes the need for an all-encompassing and integrated approach to security. It places a lot of emphasis on issues like strategic autonomy, capability development, crisis management, and resilience. In order to strengthen the EU's position as a significant player in global security and defense, the Strategic Compass also emphasizes the importance of cooperation and partnerships, both within the EU and with other international actors. Global security is discussed in The Strategic Compass from a geographic standpoint.

Africa, particularly the Sahel and West Africa, is highlighted as another neighboring continent along with the immediate east of the EU. In fact, as the unrest on the continent spreads across the Mediterranean, the EU has repeatedly identified Africa as a region of primary geostrategic importance. Numerous factors could be used to account for the EU's role. The EU and West Africa share many of the same security issues, including transnational terrorism, migration, and climate change, because of their proximity. It doesn't appear that proximity and strategy are the only factors influencing the EU's presence in West Africa. The EU's hegemonic position in West Africa and the fact that its actions don't always match its stated objectives show that other factors influence the EU's de facto role in the region. A part of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has been used to respond to specific crises and strengthen capacity for reconstruction, particularly in the context of the African Security and Peace Architecture (APSA), is the EU's efforts to prevent conflicts in Africa.

The EU continues to be Africa's top trading, development, and humanitarian aid partner. Over the past ten years, the importance of key cooperation areas has increased. These areas include governance, regional integration, energy, climate change, migration, and science and technology. The first priority area for EU-Africa cooperation is still peace and security, with the strategic goal being to ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth. This is similar to previous Action Plans. Between 2010 and 2020, the European Union (EU)

undertook a number of missions and projects in Africa with the intention of resolving conflicts, enhancing security, and fostering development cooperation. In order to advance a strategic alliance between the two sides, summits between the EU and Africa were held in 2000, 2007, 2010, 2014, and 2017 among other years. Additionally, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was implemented with the aid of EU military operations in Africa. The EU's engagement with Africa included all three of its dimensions: political, economic, and developmental. Perceptions of the EU from the outside; studies have examined how Africans view the EU from a distance, highlighting how those perceptions and accounts have evolved over time.

When addressing difficulties, like those posed by the northwestern coast of Africa, geographic factors were taken into account. The African continent was regarded as a strategic partner by the European Union, and established ties were maintained. The missions of the European Union in Africa between 2010 and 2020 exhibited the following traits: establishing a strategic alliance and institutionalizing cooperation between the European Union and Africa. During this time, summits between the EU and Africa helped to formalize cooperation. With a focus on the significance of pan-African regionalization, Europe sought to exercise normative influence and apply European standards throughout Africa. The EU missions in Africa pursued both traditional political objectives and new development goals.

The European Union has a great opportunity to assist with and find solutions to issues that exist outside of its borders. The EU has the capacity, expertise, and resources to promote conflict resolution but to realize this potential truly there is a need of support and political desire of participating countries to work together and provide funding for long-term, extensive military operations, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention activities. Because of the EU's growing institutional and military capacity and readiness to intervene in African crisis zones, there has been an increase in security cooperation between the EU and Africa in recent years. This trend is reflected in the European Security Strategy, which mandates that the EU create a strategic culture that supports early, prompt, and robust engagement when necessary. The EU has consistently based its African strategy since the creation of the ESDP in 1999 on the idea of African ownership by developing a standard language that reads as follows in most of its publications referring to African security issues: The primary responsibility for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves. It is undeniable that several factors affect the successes and failures of the missions in Africa. Nature and complexity of the conflicts, geographical, social, and strategic dimensions, availability of resources and the member states' political will and different interests, coordination, and cooperation at the organizational level influence how the EU manages crises and resolves conflicts. But here the European Union's member states' strong political will and dedication for

Union's ideals concerning the peace and security outside the Europe are the most crucial for the success. Acquiring the success to promote peace and stability beyond its borders, it is also emphasized the importance of partnerships with other international and global organizations.

Between 2010 and 2020, the European Union (EU) undertook a number of missions and projects in Africa with the intention of resolving conflicts, enhancing security, and fostering development cooperation. EUTMs are not required to actively take part in actions taken to defuse tensions, avert conflict, or protect civilians. Their main goal is to support security sector reform (SSR), which increases the military prowess of EU partners and enables them to provide security while upholding the law, thereby promoting public safety and peace. Nevertheless, they are one of the EU's tools in its integrated strategy. In order to accomplish this, EUTMs support the development, restructuring, and deployment of well-trained armed forces and generally engage in training and providing advice on armed force reform in order to improve the efficiency and accountability of partner countries' defense sectors.

Despite challenging conditions outside of the missions' control, EUTM training and advisory efforts have improved the effectiveness of their armed forces. These improvements have been slight in the CAR and Somalia, but somewhat more pronounced in Mali. The host government and other conflict parties' lack of political will and ownership, as well as the EU's unwillingness to use its political clout to impose conditions as part of its programs, have hampered broader SSR and DSR efforts to improve accountability and governance of the defense and security sectors. Closing the EUTMs in the CAR, Mali, and Somalia could also result in the EU losing credibility. While there are many difficulties and dangers associated with supporting armed forces that commit human rights violations, including credibility loss over adherence to its own principles, this is one challenge and risk. The EU's reputation as a reliable international partner could be harmed by what is perceived as its abandonment of these nations. However, it could also increase the EU's credibility by enforcing its own conditions and potentially damage the reputations of the respective host nations by failing to do their part to foster the conditions necessary for success.

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