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# Education Policies as a Tool of Soft Power: Alliance Française and Yunus Emre Institute

Yumuşak Güç Aracı Olarak Eğitim Politikaları: Alliance Française ve Yunus Emre Enstitüsü

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## Abstract

The cultural diplomacy is an application of public diplomacy. It is used as an effective tool of soft power. A developing state depends on various political and economic factors, but also on public diplomacy; namely cultural diplomacy that state pursues in foreign policy. Considering that the education is a part of cultural diplomacy, we can suppose that education policy is an effective tool of soft power. It should be noted that there is an inevitable relationship between “education policy” and “soft power”, differing from state to state. In this context, it is important to examine the education policies of cultural institutions that state operate abroad. That is why, the present study analyzes the education policies of Alliance française and those of Yunus Emre Institute in the context of soft power. These educational institutions will be compared, and a special attention will be given to education policies that states develop in their cultural diplomacy.

**Keywords:** Education Policy, Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, Alliance française, Yunus Emre Institute, Contrastive Approach.

## Öz

Kültürel diplomasi kamu diplomasinin bir uygulama alanı olup, devletler bu diplomasi çeşidini etkili bir yumuşak güç aracı olarak kullanmaktadır. Bir devletin güçlü sayılması birtakım siyasi ve iktisadi etmenlere bağlı olmak ile birlikte, o devletin dış politikasında izlediği kültürel diplomasisi etkinlikleri başta olmak üzere kamu diplomasisi etkinliklerine doğrudan bağlı olduğunu belirtmek mümkündür. Kültürel diplomasinin bir alt başlığının eğitim başlığı olduğu düşünülür ise devletlerin eğitim politikalarını bu açıdan etkili bir yumuşak güç aracı olarak kullandığı varsayılabilir. Bu bağlamda, “eğitim politikaları” ile “yumuşak güç” kavramları arasında doğrudan bir bağlantı olduğunu öne sürmek mümkündür. Bir devlete ait olan ve o devletin sınırları dışında faaliyet gösteren kültürel diplomasiye bağlı eğitim kurumlarının incelenmesi bu açıdan oldukça önemlidir. Söz konusu çalışma, Alliance française’in eğitim politikaları ile Yunus Emre Enstitüsü’nün eğitim politikalarını yumuşak güç bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Öncelik ile sözü geçen her iki eğitim kurumu karşılaştırılarak, ardından kültürel diplomasi bağlamında Fransa ile Türkiye’nin geliştirdiği eğitim politikaları uygulamalarına dikkat çekilecektir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Eğitim Politikası, Yumuşak Güç, Kültürel Diplomasi, Alliance française, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, Karşılaştırmalı İnceleme.

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## Introduction

Introduced by Edmund Gullion in 1965, the “public diplomacy” is any diplomatic practice that aimed at acting directly not only on foreign governments, but also on foreign publics (societies). In international relations, these public attitudes grew greatly during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Second World War (1939-1945) strengthened them, giving birth to the process of intercultural communication within the framework of foreign policies (Pigman, 2010, p. 121). The purpose of public diplomacy is to engage in the intercultural interaction and to increase the national reputation through thoughts, ideologies and sociocultural values in the international arena.

As a set of sociocultural practices that create meaning for society (for example, “high culture” such as literature, art and education or “elites’ culture and popular culture” that focuses on mass entertainment), “culture” became an important part of public diplomacy (Nye, 2008, p. 96). During Cold War (1947-1991), besides military and economic sanctions, the public diplomacy was used as a national security strategy that focused on sociocultural and political resources of a nation. After the fall of bipolar system, in the period of Post-Cold War, many nations tended to use these sociocultural resources based on their foreign policy and consequently in their cultural diplomacy (Amirbek and Ydyrys, 2014, p. 514).

Defined by Milton C. Cummings, the “cultural diplomacy” is the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture, with the aim of fostering a mutual understanding”. The transmission of this cultural discourse abroad, includes the cultural and sociopolitical values of nation (Chakraborty, 2013, p. 30). The goal of cultural diplomacy is to present a sociocultural model to foreign the societies and to raise an awareness of cultural values in the foreign policy practices (Cull, 2009, p. 33). So, it is indispensable for a state to create its own positive perception or an attractive image in the international arena (Kalin, 2012, p. 150) and the favorable conditions for its long-term socioeconomic development (Nye, 2009, p. 7).

The cultural diplomacy is a domain of diplomacy which is related to the establishment, development and maintenance of relations with foreign states through culture, art and education. It is an external projection, involving the interaction and progress of institutions, value systems and culture of states (Ivey and Cleggett, 2008, p. 2). The cultural diplomacy practices of a state should (1) communicate some aspect of values, such as cultural diversity, merit-based society and individual freedom of thought, (2) offer the cultural exchange and mutual respect, (3) form part of a long-term relationship between states, (4) influence positively the perception of citizens of other states (Schneider, 2003, p. 3).

In this respect, the cultural diplomacy must be understood as a source of soft power (Lord, 2005, p. 68). Introduced by Joseph Samuel Nye, the power called “soft power”, contrary to the power called “hard power”, is the ability to influence the behavior of other nations and to achieve the desired results through attraction, without pressure or coercion (Nye, 1990, p. 153). Although the soft power was not defined yet, it was used alongside hard power (so as the power called “smart power”) in the Cold War between USA and Russia. The end of Cold War and so the superiority of USA was due to this tool of soft power. During the period, cultural diplomacy became a kind of propaganda used by the bipolar world against each other.

In other words, to use soft power in the international arena, an attractive image must be created through foreign policies, based on national institutions, sociocultural and sociopolitical values (Nye, 2004, p. 121). The soft power is an effective tool to achieve the desired results in foreign policies (Nye, 2004, p. 129). It depends largely on sociocultural and on sociopolitical values that state pursues in its foreign policy, such as education, science, art, media etc. (Demir, 2012, p. 60). As an integral part of cultural diplomacy, the education policy comes to be one of the most effective soft power tools (Amirbek and Ydyrys, 2014, p. 515). In this way, international relations are structured according to the educational aims which include educational institutions, scholarships, exchange programs, internships, seminars, conferences, etc. (Nye, 2004, p. 108).

Many developing states not only adopt an innovative political and economic model, but also pay a special attention to the modernization and internationalization of their educational system as a result of soft power in the international arena (Nye, 2008, p. 94). That is why, the present study analyzes the integral part of cultural diplomacy, namely education policies of Alliance française and Yunus Emre Institute in the context of soft power. The cultural institutions mentioned above, are described and are compared according to their educational policies and to their cultural diplomacy practices which vary considerably from state to state.

### 1.1. Problematic of Education Policies as a Soft Power

It is important to understand the context in which the public/ cultural diplomacy operates (Lord, 2005, p. 62). It should be noted that there is an inevitable relationship between education policy and soft power, differing from state to state. Considering that cultural diplomacy depends on its context, it should be emphasized that the soft power rests primarily on three resources, such as (1) its culture “in places where is attractive to others”, (2) its political values “when it lives up to them at home and abroad” and (3) its foreign policies “when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority” (Nye, 2005, p. 12). Below, a figure illustrates this relationship:




Figure 1. Power.

From Nye, J. S. (2005). Soft power and higher education. *Educause: Forum for the future of Higher Education*, <https://library.educase.edu/-/media/files/library/2005/1/ffp0502s-pdf.pdf>, p.12.

It is observed that the soft power is evaluated in terms of (1) “sociocultural values”, (2) “political values” and (3) “foreign policies”. In this sense, the education policy is considered as an important step in the development of a state. Because it includes political principles, decisions and steps (2) that are applied in order to educate individuals with social patterns (1) and to provide individuals with desired mental and cultural characteristics and to nurture a society in accordance with educational culture accepted (3) in the institutions (Eren, 2018, p. 226). As a result of soft power, the education policy helps the exposure of national education to outside, through agenda setting, attraction, co-opt rather than force, coercion or inducement (Amirbek and Ydyrys, 2014, p. 515).

It would not be wrong to say that the education policy is an effective tool of soft power to promote national interests in the international area (Nye, 2004, p. 24). In this perspective, the diffusion of language and culture abroad is not only in the scope of education policy (Chaubet, 2004, p. 774), but also it is a significant element of cultural diplomacy practice (Pells, 1997, p. 31). According to the problematic of education policy as soft power, it is necessary to describe and to compare cultural institutions such as Alliance française (1883) in France, British Council (1934) in United Kingdom, Goethe Institute (1951) in Germany, Cervantes Institute (1991) in Spain, Confucius Institute (2004) in China, Yunus Emre Institute (2009) in Turkey, etc.

## **1.2. Contrastive Approach as Method: Education Policies in the Cultural Institutions**

This study is a qualitative research in which a relational model is applied: In order to reveal the cause-effect relationship between “education policy” and “soft power”, these concepts are examined in the same problematic. On the other hand, a causal/contrastive analysis model is applied in this study (namely the comparison of education policy in different cultural institutions). Introduced in the 1960’s in the United States, it should be emphasized that “contrastive approach” consists to describe and to compare different organizations (“cultural institutions” in this study), to identify structural differences/ similarities (in term of “education policy” in this study) and to deduce influence between these organizations (Besse and all, 1991, p. 201). Therefore, in this study, it is aimed to compare the differences/ similarities between cultural institutions, particularly Alliance française and Yunus Emre Institute within the framework of cultural diplomacy. These cultural institutions reflect both the cause-effect relationship between “education policy” and “soft power” in the context of France and Turkey.

It should be mentioned that the priorities given to cultural codes change completely its cultural diplomacy practices (Kalin, 2011, p. 5). The choice of Alliance française stems from the fact that the cultural diplomacy is traditionally considered to be a French specificity (Gazeau-Secret, 2013, p. 104). After Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), France was the first state that realized the importance of cultural diplomacy and that established the first cultural institution to correct France’s image that began to decline and to promote French culture to the world. As for Yunus Emre Institute, the number of these institutions increases according to the importance attached to cultural diplomacy in Turkey. This state realized the importance of cultural diplomacy much later than many states and thus Turkey’s soft power is different from many states (from Balkans and Middle East to Central Asia) in its form and in its content (Kalin, 2011, p. 10).

From the first cultural institution in France [Alliance française, 1883] to the one of latest cultural institution in Turkey [Yunus Emre Institute, 2018], each one of them is a key part of soft power in these states. They bear the traces of sociocultural values (educational culture accepted in the state and cultural characteristics), political values (political principles, decisions and steps) and foreign policies of a context (form of exposure of a national education to outside). In this study, the description of sociocultural values in foreign policy practices will lead to the result that education policy is used as a tool of soft power differently according to state’s cultural diplomacy practices. What is the situation of cultural diplomacy practices in France and in Turkey?

## **1.3. Cultural Diplomacy in France: Alliance française as a tool of Soft Power**

It should be remembered that the cause-effect relationship between education policy and soft power rests on comparison of cultural institutions. With the intention to describe cultural diplomacy in France, it should be highlighted that the origin of cultural diplomacy is French Revolution (1789). The cultural diplomacy practices of France are based on nationalism, because this state aimed to spread its own revolutionary ideology (values such as freedom, equality and fraternity) as a cultural model to other states. From the 18<sup>th</sup> century and particularly in the period of Post-Second World War, the promotion of French language and French culture abroad was an effective tool of soft power to enhance the national reputation of France through its ideologies and its sociocultural values.

In this perspective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established “General Directorate of Cultural Affairs” in 1945 and then called “Ministry of Culture” in 1959 in France. With the rise of technical, academic, cultural and economic interest, this one became respectively “General Directorate of Cultural, Scientific and Technical Affairs” in 1969, “General Directorate of International Cooperation and Development” in 1999 and “General Directorate of Globalization, Development and Partnership” in 2009 [France Diplomatie, 2001]. Nowadays, France accords greater importance to the cultural diplomacy practices as an integral part of its foreign policy

(including also France Medias Monde, France 24, French International Radio, etc.). These practices contribute directly to France's political and economic power in the international area [Legifrance, 2020].

As can be seen nowadays, the cultural diplomacy of France is carried out through educational institutions such as Alliance française [Alliance Française, 1883] French Education Agency (AEFE, 1990), Campus France (CF, 2010) and Institut français (IF, 2011) under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. France was the first state that realize the importance of cultural diplomacy practices and strengthen them with a particular focus on education policies of France. Alliance française, whose existence over a hundred years (137 years) attests to the national reputation of France (Chaubet, 2004, p. 763), plays traditionally an increasingly important role in the context of sociocultural history of international relations. The purpose of French cultural diplomacy is to increase a recognition of French language and of Francophone cultures and to foster the sociocultural diversity in the international area [France Diplomatie, 2001].

Within the framework of French cultural diplomacy, Alliance française is engaged as an important cultural institution in the context of international relations of France. Established in 1883 by a French group including especially Louis Pasteur, Jules Vernes, Ernest Renan and Armand Colin, the mission and the vision of Alliance française are to develop French language teaching, to foster the promotion and the propagation of French and Francophone cultures, to contribute to the internalization and the modernization of a state, to improve the sociocultural diversity and to make this cultural institution, an innovative and united network that gathered around Alliance française label [Alliance française, 2020]. Its goals are announced as follows:

- to support the development of an exceptional network that defends French language, Francophone cultures and cultural exchange in the world, but also innovative projects that allow network modernization and that make them more competitive;
- to improve the cultural exchange between French and Francophones around the world and to promote international cooperation and network;
- to associate the values like freedom, equality, fraternity, diversity, tolerance and interculturality to this centenary institution (Chaubet, 2004, p. 765).

Alliance française is an effective tool of soft power in the context of France and a cultural model to other states. It rests on the sociocultural values of French Revolution ("promotion of national language and of Francophone cultures"), on sociopolitical values of French revolutionary ideology ("cultural exchange with the values like freedom, equality, fraternity, interculturality, etc. abroad") and foreign policy practices of France ("international cooperation and network"). Since 1883, Alliance française as the first cultural institution in France, has in 131 countries, 837 cultural institutions overall (so "cultural centers") in the international area [Alliance française, 2020]:

- in Africa: in Madagascar (29), in Nigeria (10), in Mauritius (6), in Kenya (4), in Ghana (4), in Comoros (3), in Ethiopia (2), in Botswana (1), in Eritrea (1), in Lesotho (1), in Mozambique (1), in Namibia (1), in Swaziland (1), in Tanzania (1), in Uganda (1), in Zambia (1) and in Zimbabwe (1);
- in America: in the United States (110), in Argentina (72), in Brazil (39), in Mexico (38), in Colombia (20), in Canada (13), in Peru (12), in Venezuela (12), in Chile (6), in Ecuador (5), in Haiti (5), in Bolivia (5), in Dominican Republic (4), in Costa Rica (3), in Cuba (3), in Nicaragua (3), in Honduras (2), in Bermuda (1), in Grenada (1), in Guatemala (1), in Jamaica (1), in Panama (1), in Paraguay (1), in Puerto Rico (1), in Saint Lucia (1) and in Uruguay (1);
- in Asia and in Oceania: in Australia (31), in India (24), in China (15), in South Korea (7), in Indonesia (4), in Pakistan (4), in Hong Kong (3), in Malaysia (3), in New Zealand (3), in Bangladesh (2), in Kazakhstan (2), in Taiwan (2), in Kyrgyzstan (1), in Cambodia (1), in Maldives (1), in Mongolia (1), in Nepal (1), in Philippines (1), in Singapore (1), in Sri Lanka (1), in Thailand (1), in Uzbekistan (1) and in Vietnam (1);

- in Europe: in Sweden (17), in United Kingdom (11), in Spain (12), in Ireland (6), in Croatia (5), in Hungary (5), in Albania (4), in Romania (4), in Armenia (1), in Belgium (1), in Iceland (1), in Malta (1), in Moldova (1), in Monaco (1) and in Turkey (1).

As can be seen in the list above, France pays a special attention to Alliance française as a crucial result of its soft power in the world. After Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the propagation of cultural institution started in France for the purpose of correcting its image that began to decline in the world. France tried to create an attractive image of its sociocultural values related to French Revolution, by the promotion of French language as a world language and Francophone culture as a world culture abroad. From Africa (34) to America (34), from Asia (31) to Oceania and also in Europe (32), France seeks to enhance its national reputation with a greater number of Alliance française in all over the world. The cultural diplomacy has a particularly important role for France: Alliance française is established largely in Africa in the sense that each one of them bears historically the traces of France colonization in the African territories (Roselli, 1996, p. 74).

#### **1.4. Cultural Diplomacy in Turkey: Yunus Emre Institute as a tool of Soft Power**

From the declaration of Republic of Turkey (1923) to the 1990's, the state played a reduced role in its foreign policy due to its introversive and its protective foreign policy approach in international relations. The states such as United Kingdom, Germany and United States tried to establish international relations with Turkey, but their cultural diplomacy practices were too limited throughout the Cold War (1947-1991). That is why, Turkey realized the importance of cultural diplomacy much later than many states. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Balkans states declared their independence and Turkey began to establish international relations with them in the period of Post-Cold War. Turkish foreign policy became more and more active in the cooperation with Central Asian and Balkans states (Kalin, 2011, p. 10).

At this point, the number of public diplomacy institutions increases according to the importance attached to Turkish foreign policy. The public diplomacy practices of Turkey developed largely with the foundation of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency [TİKA, 1992], Turkey Radio and Television Corporation [TRT], 1964 and 1968), Yunus Emre Institute (2009), Public Diplomacy Coordination (2010), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities [YTB, 2010] and Cultural Diplomacy Academy (2016). The priorities given to TİKA and TRT in Turkish foreign policy affect the orientation of cultural diplomacy practices in Turkey. They are different from France in the sense that Turkey's soft power does not focus directly on education policies.

However, Yunus Emre Institute is engaged as the major cultural institution in the context of international relations in Turkey. It is certainly a key part of state's soft power. Established in 2009 as a public foundation attached to the Ministry of Culture, the mission and vision of Yunus Emre Institute are to increase the recognition, credibility and reputation of Turkey and particularly, the number of people friendly to this state in international area [Yunus Emre Institute, 2020a]. The goals of Yunus Emre Institute are described as follows (Law dated 05.05.2007 and numbered 5653):

- to promote Turkey's cultural heritage, language, history, culture and art, to improve the friendship between Turkey and other states, but also to increase the sociocultural exchange with the foundation of this cultural institution abroad;
- to provide an education or a certified program abroad; to conduct researches, activities or co-projects with universities and non-governmental organizations abroad, to publish in the written and visual media, but also to give a financial support to academic research in this field;
- to cooperate with the associations established in the fields of culture, arts and education, to organize the competitions and to give awards in regard to the promotion of Turkish language, Turkish culture and Turkish art (Resmi Gazete, 2007).

Such as an effective tool of soft power in Turkish context, Yunus Emre Institute rests primarily on its sociocultural values (“promotion of Turkish language, history, culture and art”), on its political values (“sociopolitical exchange with foundation of this cultural institution abroad”) and on its foreign policies (international relations or “friendship between Turkey and other states”). Since 2009, Yunus Emre Institute extends its cultural diplomacy practices particularly in Balkans and has 58 cultural institutions in the international area (58 “cultural centers” in 48 countries and 60 cities overall):

- in Balkans: in Bosnia Herzegovina (2009, 2011 and 2014), in Albania (2009, 2011 and 2012), in Macedonia (2010), in Romania (2011), in Serbia (2015), in Kosovo (2011 and 2012), in Montenegro (2014), in Gagauzia (2015) and in Croatia (2015);
- in Asia: in Kazakhstan (2010), in Tatarstan (2012), in Georgia (2012), in Azerbaijan (2013), in Yemen (2013), in Pakistan (2016) and in Russia (2017);
- in Middle East: in Jordan (2012), in Lebanon (2012), in Iran (2012), in Cyprus (2014), in Qatar (2015) and in Bahrain (2018);
- in Europe: in Belgium (2010), in United Kingdom (2010), in Germany (2011 and 2014), France (2012), in Netherlands (2012), in Poland (2013), in Italy (2014), in Hungary (2013), in Austria (2014), in Ukraine (2017), in Spain (2018) and in Ireland (2019);
- in Africa: in Egypt (2010), in Morocco (2013), in Algeria (2014), in Sudan (2015), in Somali (2016), in Tunisia (2017) and in Senegal (2017);
- in Far East: in Japan (2011), in Malaysia (2015), in Australia (2018) and in South Korea (2019);
- and in America: in the United States (2016) and in the United Mexican States (2018).

From Balkans (%26) to Asia (%15), from Europe (%14) to Africa (%14), from Middle East (%14) to Far East (%14) and recently in America (%3), Turkey tried/ tries to engage in the intercultural interaction with its own cultural diplomacy practices, to reconnect them with Ottoman traditions (Polo and Üstel, 2014, p. 29) and to enhance its historical/ national reputation through an increasingly number of Yunus Emre Institute (in all over the world and especially in the old Ottoman territories). Nowadays, this cultural institution increases according to the importance attached to Turkish foreign policy that is activated with the cooperation in Balkans states and Central Asia.

With the slogan of “the world knows Turkey better”, Turkey aims to increase the number of Yunus Emre Institute from 58 to 100, on the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Republic of Turkey in 2023 [Yunus Emre Institute, 2020b]. The state seeks to create an attractive image of its sociocultural values by promotion of Turkish language as a world language and Turkish culture as a world culture in the international arena. In this respect, Yunus Emre Institute is an important cultural institution in which the promotion of Turkish language (so Turkish culture) is favored as a tool of soft power around the world. As in the case of Turkish Maarif Foundation, Yunus Emre Institute does not only focus on Turkish language teaching abroad: it is the particularity of Yunus Emre Institute’s education policies.

### **1.5. Education Policies in Cultural Institutions: Alliance française and Yunus Emre Institute**

The education policies of Alliance française rest on several French teaching programs such as “Online Learning Platform of My Alliance” (2017), “Portrait of Alliance française” (2017), “Common Website for all of Alliance française” (2018) and “Annual Questionnaire of Alliance française” (2018). There are also educational projects like “Data Booklet” (2018), “Webinar on the New European Data Protection Regulation” (2018) and “Data Journal” (2019). As for Yunus Emre Institute, its education policies focus on Turkish teaching programs like “Turkish Courses for Foreigners” (2009), “My Preference is Turkish” (2010), “Turkish Certification Program”, “Distance Turkish Learning” and “Summer School of Turkish Teaching”. The aim of two cultural institutions is to promote first of all, French (Alliance française) or Turkish (Yunus Emre Institute) language abroad. Their education policies bear certainly traces of sociocultural values France (Alliance



française) or Turkey (Yunus Emre Institute), in the sense that they are supported largely by many sociocultural activities:

- in Alliance française: “Alliance française at the theater”, “France Inter” (2018), “France Musique”, “France Culture”, “Cycle of Literary Meetings of Foundation” (2016), “Celebrated Francophonie Day with the Dictionary Meeting”, “House of Cultural World”, “International Competition of Photo”, “Partnership with French Press Agency” and “Week of French Language and Francophonie” [Fondation Alliance française, 2018];
- in Yunus Emre Institute: “Protection and the Promotion of Turkish Cultural Heritage in the World”, “All of Branches of Art”, “Support of Promotion and Production in Virtual Field of Turkish Culture”, “Turkish Food Culture and Cuisine”, “Mobility of Turkish Artists all around the World”, “Turkish Cinema Summer School” and “Turkish Movies Week”.

All of these cultural diplomacy practices that are mentioned above, improve the intercultural interaction and contribute certainly to the soft power of France (through Alliance française) or Turkey (through Yunus Emre Institute) in the world. Since the origin of cultural diplomacy is French Revolution, the education policies of Alliance française appeal to the revolutionary ideology of France for the promotion of French language and French culture abroad, called “Francophonie”. The notion refers to people or organizations that use French language as a mother/ second tongue, as an official/ foreign language in the international area (Organisation internationale de la francophonie). Alliance française, as a cultural institution based on key-term “Francophonie”, apply the values of French Revolution in this respect. The aim is to unify people (“equality”), to create a solidarity group (“fraternity”) and to promote cultural diversity (“liberty”) supported by Francophonie [Alliance française, 2020].

As for Yunus Emre Institute, this cultural institution is based on sociocultural values inherited from Ottoman Empire. Although it was established as a cultural institution much later than others, Yunus Emre Institute tries/ tried to carry out cultural diplomacy practices through its education policies in Turkey. It would not be wrong to say that Turkey developed its cultural diplomacy practices through foundation of Yunus Emre Institute in Balkans and in Middle East. The cultural heritage of Ottoman Empire serves as a bridge between Turkey and Balkans (and Middle East) and the cultural institution has a successful impact on this context. In this way, Yunus Emre Institute established “Cultural Diplomacy Academy” (2016) to develop Turkish foreign policy priorities and to strength its cultural diplomacy practices in Turkey.

### **Conclusion and Discussion**

“The real creation of a nation is seen in its language, because each language has a national form. However, what is the national form of a language? Does language determinate the nation? Or does nation determinate the language? The impact of nation on language and the impact of language on nation are mutual. The birth of first language ensured the separation of nations. The most important factor of a nation is its language. The significant factor of a nation is not its physical appearance such as its skull shape, its hair color, but its language. The language serves to distinguish nations from one another and vice versa. Thus, language is the appearance of a nation. The language of a nation is its soul.” (İnal, 2012, p. 101).

In the present study, the education policies of Alliance française and Yunus Emre Institute are analyzed as an integral part of cultural diplomacy, respectively in the context of France’s soft power and Turkey’s soft power. The comparison of these cultural institutions leads to the result that education policies are used as a tool of soft power differently according to the cultural diplomacy practices of France and of Turkey. Not only the priorities given to the cultural codes change completely cultural diplomacy practices in France and in Turkey, but also these different cultural practices bear traces of some sociopolitical values, respectively such as ideology of French Revolution in the context of Alliance française and such as traditional ideology of Ottomanize in the context of Yunus Emre Institute.

The repartition of these cultural institutions shows the importance that is given to foreign policy practices in different states. The promotion of a language/ culture abroad is not only in the scope of education policy, but also cultural diplomacy. For example, Alliance française is/ was established largely in Africa due to the colonization of African territories in the history of France. As for Yunus Emre Institute, it is/ was established largely in Balkans and in Middle East due to Ottoman heritage. Thus, the education policy depends on foreign policy and comes to be one of the most effective soft power tools to promote national interests in the international area. As the first educational institution in France, Alliance française is a key part of France's soft power and as the one of latest educational institution in Turkey, Yunus Emre Institute is a key part of Turkey's soft power.

These cultural institutions are established according to the priority given to cultural diplomacy practices in France and in Turkey: France was the first state that realized the importance of cultural diplomacy and that established the one of its cultural institution, while Turkey realized the importance of cultural diplomacy lastly and established its only cultural institution. Besides the educational programs there, Alliance française develops intercultural interaction with more cultural activities than in Yunus Emre Institute. Therefore, Turkey's soft power is different from France's soft power in its form (primarily in Balkans and not in Africa) and in its content (education policies are based on Ottoman heritage and not on French Revolution). In fact, "does language determinate nation? Or does nation determinate language?" The impact is mutual in the sense that there is an inevitable cause-effect relationship between education policy and soft power, differing from the cultural diplomacy practices of a state.

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