Selection, Socialization and Stable Networks

Home Page
About
Submit A Journal
Submit A Conference
Submit Paper/Book
- Submit a Preprint
- Submit a Book
Contact

International Review of Economics and Management
Cilt: 13 Sayı: 1
Selection, Socialization and Stable Networks

Selection, Socialization and Stable Networks

Authors : Murat Ali Çengelci

Pages : 1-30

Doi:10.18825/iremjournal.1532799

View : 22 | Download : 14

Publication Date : 2025-07-01

Article Type : Research Paper

Abstract :When individuals make decisions or choose behaviors, they are affected by the decisions or behaviours of their friends. In turn, individuals often choose their friend based on similarities in these decisions and behaviours. Kandel (1978) provide emprical evidence that these aspects are present in friendship networks and refers them as socialization and selection, respectively. In this paper, we consider a model of friendship network which reflects both aspects. To capture socialization, we consider a network game where agents with different types choose an action on a certain behaviour to coordinate their action both with their type and actions of friends in network. Agent, then, decide their friends based on the utility of network game under unique Nash equilibrium. We show certain class of networks are pairwise stable.
Keywords : Ön Seçim, Sosyalleşme, Sosyal Ağlar Teorisi

ORIGINAL ARTICLE URL

* There may have been changes in the journal, article,conference, book, preprint etc. informations. Therefore, it would be appropriate to follow the information on the official page of the source. The information here is shared for informational purposes. IAD is not responsible for incorrect or missing information.