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
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OTTOMAN - AMERICAN TRADE DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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Although trade formed the basis of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States during the nineteenth century, it has received little attention from either Turkish or American scholars. Indeed, prior to the First World War American-Ottoman relations were virtually ignored by American historians. What literature that does exist on the topic is either in the form of memoirs on educational and evangelistic efforts or travel and exploration accounts in the Levant. Works in the former category dealt with the activities of missionary societies and emphasized how largely the Near Eastern field was an American monopoly. Books in the latter group informed readers on «exotic and bizarre customs» in «strange lands and far places.»¹

1 Several works which are historical treatments of missionary efforts in the Ottoman Empire and missionary memoirs deserve attention. Rufus Anderson, *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1872) provides a detailed narrative, written by the foreign secretary of the Board. Julius Richter, *A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East* (New York & Chicago, 1910) discusses the activities of other missionary societies and shows how widely American missionaries were scattered in the Near East. Shorter histories dealing with Board's work in the Ottoman Empire are Joseph Tracy, *History of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (New York, 1842), and *The Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston, 1861). Brief biographical sketches of Fisk and Parsons, first American missionaries to arrive in the Ottoman Empire, are found in Lucius E. Smith, ed., *Heroes and Martyrs of the Modern Missionary Enterprise: A Record of Their Lives and Labors* (Chicago, 1853). William Goodell, *The Old and the New; or, the Change*

A few works that appeared in the early decades of the twentieth century again dealt in general terms with American cultural interests in the Ottoman domains. Some, however, attempted to shed light on social and political institutions of the Empire, often not living up to either their titles or subtitles. None of the published works dealt with economic relations between the two countries despite the fact that American commercial activities preceded both missionary movements and philanthropic interests in the Middle East. A notable exception among these publications was Leland J. Gordon's book, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia, 1932). For a generation this work, which introduced diplomatic and cultural relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on economic ties, remained the only authoritative source.

The Turkish historians, on the other hand, almost completely ignored the Ottoman relations with the United States in the nineteenth century. A concise book by Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış, 1800-1959* [A Brief Look Into Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1959] (Ankara, 1959), stands alone.

In the 1950's and 1960's, as the search for new subjects of investigation increased and as interest in early American economic, cultural, and technical contributions to the Third World gained attention, a few historians focused on Ottoman and Egyptian experiences in the nineteenth century². Merle Curti and Kendall Birr,

of *Thirty Years in the East* (New York, 1853), and two works by Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York, 1878) and *My Life and Times* (Boston & Chicago, 1893) are good examples of memoirs written by missionaries. Two books by John L. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and the Holy Land* (New York, 1837) and *Incidents of Travel in Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Poland* (New York, 1838), and W. M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book* (New York, 1859) with Adolphus Slade, *Record of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc.* (Philadelphia, 1833) will provide the reader with accounts of early American travelers in the Ottoman Empire.

2 For the development of scholarly interest and literature on the Middle East, see John A. DeNovo, «Researching American Relations with the Middle East: The State of the Art, 1970», (unpublished paper-final revision) delivered on 17 June 1969 at the National Archives Conference on the Archives of United States Foreign Relations.

Prelude to Point Four : American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838-1938 (Madison, 1954), Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad : A History* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1963), H. C. Wolf, *The Blue and the Gray on the Nile* (Chicago, 1961), John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis, 1963), and David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East : The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) contributed substantially to the understanding of the American position in general and her economic interests in particular in the Middle East during the nineteenth century. Finally, James A. Field Jr., in his *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton, 1969) and «Trade, Skills, and Sympathy : The First Century and a Half of Commerce in the Near East,» *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 401 (1972), 1-14, has done much to record and analyze the activities of Americans in the Mediterranean region and in the Ottoman Empire during this period.

While American historians dealt with American economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, even the economic historians have tended to skip lightly over questions of trade and shipping³. It is true that American trade with the Ottomans was no where as important as the British, French, or German trade with that Empire. Nevertheless, this trade had some unique characteristics and had a definite impact on Ottoman production of certain commodities.

This article surveys the Ottoman-American trade during the nineteenth century⁴ and attempts to supplement in fuller detail the

3 Only Gordon's and Field's studies deal sufficiently with these areas. Compare with DeNovo, 3-26; and Arnold H. Taylor, *American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939* (Durham, N.C., 1969), Chapt. I. An excellent work by an Israeli scholar, Z.Y. Hershlag, *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East* (Leiden, 1964), also deals with American interests in that region during the last decades of the Ottoman period (see Book I, Part II, Chapter 5).

4 The sources which provide statistics on the Ottoman trade in the nineteenth century are varied and values are expressed in several different currencies. Conversion of these into a common monetary unit during an entire period is at least extremely difficult if not impossible. Therefore, here values and prices are expressed in the same monetary units as cited by the sources.

preliminary sketches provided in earlier histories. Although much of the American archival material which contributed to this study have been used earlier, data based on Ottoman and British documents used here will provide a more complete and balanced view.

The intent of this work is to provide the reader with an insight into the beginnings of relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. After the discussion of the nature and composition of the early trade, the Treaty of 1830, which officially established commercial and diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, will be examined. Since this treaty had an immediate impact on the volume of trade, it will receive special attention, as will the Treaty of 1862. An attempt will be made to identify changing trade and shipping patterns during the second half of the century, and periodically, trade between the two countries will be compared with their total trade and their trade with other nations. The origins of the European-American competition in the Ottoman markets and the roles played by the United States consuls there to promote the trade will also be discussed.

Early Trade :

American trade in the Levant started soon after the American Revolution when the Acts of Trade and Navigation which forbade direct trade by the Colonies were abolished. As early as 1785 a Boston merchant had advertised that he had «a few casks of Smyrna raisins for sale»⁵. Although early records are scanty, there is evidence that an American ship had visited İstanbul by 1786. The British consul at İzmir reported in 1803 the arrival of the first American ship with a cargo from Bengal in 1797 and stated that «since that time several vessels had arrived from the United States»⁶. In

In order to furnish the reader with a basis for comparison, tables are arranged in the same currency or percentages are provided for increases or decreases. Attention has also been paid, whenever necessary, to price changes which meaningfully affected the total value of trade.

⁵ Gordon, 41.

⁶ U.S., The Department of State, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Smyrna* (Washington, D.C., The National Archives and Records, General Services Administration, 1958,) from the British Consul Francis Werry to Rufus

view of the 1786 arrangement whereby an American ship could procure special passes at Gibraltar which allowed it to sail under British protection and flag in the Mediterranean⁷, it is very likely that some other American vessels visited Ottoman ports earlier but were considered to be British ships. In 1790 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson reported to Congress that American commerce in the Mediterranean had not resumed since 1783. By the turn of the century, however, this trade had been restored and President Jefferson nominated William Steward to be consul in İzmir in mid-1802⁸. Steward arrived in İzmir in late 1802, but his credentials were not recognized by the Ottoman government. Before his departure in November 1803, he sent a report to the Secretary of State James Madison on the trading possibilities in that region and said :

Our trade with the East and West Indies and South America will always afford us the means of supplying Turkey with the principal articles of its consumption. The most important importations to Smyrna are East and West India sugars, Mocha, Java and West India coffee, indigoes of all sorts, pepper, pimento, cloves . . . Since the Smyrna merchant purchases these articles in Europe . . . it is evident how much greater would be the benefit of the Americans in shipping them direct to Smyrna . . . Smyrna is supplied with rice from Egypt, and when the crops fail there, from Lombardy and Piedmont. In this case Carolina rice would answer. Cod fish would also answer, provided it would arrive in the month of October, which is the beginning of the lent of the Greeks . . .

Among the productions of Turkey and Egypt, there are many that would answer well for the internal consumption of the United States, or for their foreign expeditions, Red Tokat copper, opium, and Russian iron bars might be shipped to India . . . The fruits of Smyrna

King (Minister Plenipotentiary in London), 2 May 1803. Hereafter consular letters from Smyrna (İzmir), Erzurum, etc. will be cited as *Consular Letters*, Smyrna; *Consular Letters*, Erzurum, etc.

7. Walter L. Wright, «American Relations with Turkey to 1831» (Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1928), 8.

8. *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Steward to Secretary of State James Madison, 28 October 1802. On this also see Kurat, 8.

are well known in the United States, particularly the figs and raisins⁹.

He further emphasized the potential for American trade in the Aegean region and recommended a treaty with the Ottoman government, stating that only three American ships had arrived in İzmir in the two years preceding his arrival. Before his departure Steward appointed Robert Wilkinson, a British resident, who was already the Swedish and Danish Consul-General, as pro-consul¹⁰.

Meanwhile, the first peace-time naval squadron had been dispatched to the Mediterranean in 1801 with instructions to protect American commerce against the Barbary pirates and to sail along the Egyptian and Syrian coasts as far as İzmir, unless the actions of the Dey of Tripoli, against whom the squadron was primarily directed, warranted closer observation. The four-ship squadron under the command of Commodore Richard Dale remained in the Mediterranean from July 1801 until March 1802, but Dale did not proceed further eastward than Malta due to the declaration of war on the United States by Algiers¹¹.

Although American trade with the Ottoman Empire began to increase after 1800-ships calling mainly at İzmir and occasionally at ports in Syria, Aegean Archipelago, and Alexandria-it did not warrant a separate listing in the Treasury Department records until 1803. It was only after the successful American action against Tripoli which ended in February 1805 and during the Napoleonic wars, which offered opportunities to neutral American vessels, that United States shipping activities increased in the eastern Mediterranean. From İzmir Wilkinson reported that the number of ships which called there increased from six in 1805 to four in the

9 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Steward to Secretary of State James Madison, 25 April 1803.

10 Wilkinson was an agent of the British Levant Company. He served as the pro-consul of the United States in İzmir until his death in 1822 and his duties mainly consisted of filling out the manifests of visiting American ships and caring for disabled seamen.

11 U.S., The Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. II, 359-60. On the activities of Commodore Richard Dale, see Charles O. Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883* (Baltimore, 1912), 58-62.

first half of 1806. In March of 1805, for instance, the brig *Pennsylvania* of Philadelphia, under its master Hugh McPherson, sailed from İzmir to Battavia with 8,200 Spanish dollars and forty-nine chests of opium, with one extra chest for the master's private speculation. In November of the same year, the brig *Entan* of Baltimore with its master Christopher L. Gannt arrived at İzmir with 280 barrels of loaf sugar, 539 bags of coffee, and 211 bags of pepper and then sailed to Canton with 46 chests and 51 boxes of opium, with two boxes consigned to the master of the ship. A few weeks later, the brig *Spartan* of Baltimore sailed from İzmir for Trieste and its home port with four cases, six chests, and two boxes of opium while the schooner *Hazard* set out for home, Philadelphia, via Leghorn carrying three cases of opium, 150 sacks of madder root, eighteen barrels of quicksilver, and 28,000 Spanish dollars. In the following year, the brigs *Glory* and *Globe* of Philadelphia, *Phoebe* of Baltimore, and *Acorn* and *Joseph* of Boston sailed out from İzmir with figs, raisins, raw wool, gum arabic, opium, and a few carpets after unloading their cargos of coffee, sugar, pepper, candles, rum, and some cotton cloth¹².

Within less than a decade American trade in the Ottoman Empire had established a pattern, a part of which, mainly American imports, would continue for the rest of the century. American ships brought in mostly colonial goods and took out certain agricultural produce, among which figs, raisins, and opium were prominent. Opium quickly became the most important item due in part to the activities of J. & T.H. Perkins Company of Boston, which specialized in the carrying of opium from İzmir to Canton. It provided the American merchants with a commodity which would eventually replace payment of specie, usually silver Spanish dollars, in return for their tea and silk imports from China. This, combined with the policies of the East India Company which forbade their company ships from carrying and restricted the navigation of private British ships between Europe and China, expedited the American trade in

12 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Wilkinson to Secretary of State James Madison, 15 January 1806; 29 April and 26 June 1806. On inward and outward cargos, also see U.S., Twenty-Fifth Congress, Third Session, *Senate Document No. 200* (Washington, D.C., 1839), 83-5.

Turkish opium. Soon Americans would monopolize the trade of this produce in China¹³.

During the early years Turkish opium was generally shipped to China by American vessels directly. After 1810, however, the opium was shipped either directly to American ports and then transshipped to China after the portion for the American market was unloaded, or it was transferred at Mediterranean ports or at sea near Gibraltar to ships specially fitted for China trade. In 1823, for instance, of 18 American ships which sailed from İzmir, four transhipped cargos, including 256 cases of opium, at Malta and Leghorn. Several of the 17 American ships which had cleared İzmir in 1824 stopped at Gibraltar and Malta to transfer some merchandise and 1,651 cases of opium to China bound ships¹⁴.

In order that the American ships and merchants might conduct their businesses conveniently, the United States government in 1808 again tried to establish a consulate in İzmir, and sent a Mr. Sloan of Baltimore to the Ottoman port. Sloan's attempts to receive recognition from the Porte were unsuccessful, and he too had to leave the affairs of Americans in Wilkinson's hands¹⁵. Consequently, during the first decade of the century Americans conducted their in the Ottoman Empire under the protection of the British consuls, or agents of the Levant Company, and frequently under the British colors. The payment of a fee to the consuls, amounting to slightly more than one-fourth of one percent on the value of goods, entitled the American merchants to the tariff of three percent applicable to British goods. Through this arrangement American merchants were

13 For an extensive discussion of American-Ottoman opium trade in the nineteenth century, see my forth coming article «The Nineteenth Century Golden Triangle: Chinese Consumption, Ottoman Production-The American Connection.»

14 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State, 19 May and 24 July 1824. In these two years, American ships brought to İzmir such items as coffee, sugar, tea, pepper, nankeen, Waltham cotton, rum, wine, dyewood, and china ware. In addition to opium, they took out carpets, rose oil, figs, raisins, old copper, some wool, and soap.

15 L. Lucile Morse, «Relations Between the United States and the Ottoman Empire» (Ph. D. dissertation, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 1924), 31; and Paullin, 124.

in fact aided in their commercial transactions by their British rivals. Such a relationship had several advantages for the British. It did not necessitate a separate trade agreement between the United States and the Ottomans, whereby American merchants could possibly secure more favorable terms. This would naturally undermine the British advantage in the sale of colonial goods. Moreover, this scheme provided His Majesty's consuls with a tidy income, a sum of \$65,000 for the period between 1799 and 1811¹⁶.

The arrangement continued rather smoothly until 1810, although American vessels found, during the Ottoman-British conflict of 1807-1808, that they could trade in Ottoman ports other than İstanbul under their own flags. In December 1809, the United States ships *America* and *Calumet* passed through the restricted Dardanelles under American colors. The Ottoman government, incensed by this, retaliated by imposing a tariff of six percent on all American trade effective immediately. Soon after, the British, concerned about their relations with the Porte, refused protection to American ships and denied the use of the Union Jack and its three percent tariff.

Although a few Americans were trading in İzmir on their own earlier, the establishment of the first trading house there in 1811 also lessened the willingness of the British to assist American merchants in their trade with the Ottomans. The new American firm, a branch of Woodmans and Offley of Philadelphia, at once began competing for the profits of the Levant Company. In fact, in early 1811, as the American brig *Expectation* arrived at İzmir from Liverpool with some colonial goods, instructions from the head office had already reached the agents of the Levant Company to the effect that they should not extend protection to the United States merchants¹⁷.

David Offley, a Philadelphia merchant who arrived in İzmir in August 1811 as the resident representative of Woodmans and Offley,

16 *Senate Document No. 200*, 87, David Offley to John Q. Adams, 24 January 1823; and Samuel Eliot Morison, «Forcing the Dardanelles in 1810», *New England Quarterly* 1/2 (April 1928), 213-14.

17 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Wilkinson to Secretary of State, 20 May 1811.

was firmly convinced that the British Levant Company agents were responsible for the increased duties on American trade. Even prior to the British-American War of 1812, the British through their connections with the local Ottoman officials were able to create hardships for the Americans in İzmir. Offley, moved by patriotic and commercial considerations, lodged a number of unsuccessful protests against the British at the governor's office. For Offley there was only one thing to do, to take the matter up with the Ottoman officials in İstanbul. His appeals there went unheeded until «he threatened to intercept Sultan Mahmud himself on his way to Friday Mosque, taking advantage of the traditional Ottoman right of redress in public»¹⁸. This immediately enabled him to make personal arrangement with the Porte whereby all American imports and exports would be subject to the Austrian tariff of two percent, plus a surcharge of fifteen percent on this amount¹⁹. In 1816 the new French tariff of three percent was substituted, with Offley's consent. At the same time, he was able to secure the «protection» of the Sultan, an arrangement which facilitated his business with Ottoman officials. The increasing American trade was conducted on this basis until a treaty was negotiated in 1830.

Offley strengthened also his personal status when, on the occasion of the deposition of the governor of İzmir in 1816, he met the new *Kaptan Paşa* (Admiral of the Navy) Husrev. The influential Ottoman admiral soon became his friend and obtained for him recognition as the «consul of the Americans». Offley's position, although unofficial as far as the İstanbul government was concerned, was partially confirmed after Wilkinson's death by the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in mid-1823; he was appointed the «Consular Commercial Agent» for İzmir. It was only in 1832 that David Offley received a presidential appointment as the United States consul at İzmir²⁰. Enthusiastic and aggressive, Offley did not

18 Finnie, 27.

19 *Senate Document No. 200*, 128-129, Offley to Livingston, 14 January 1832; Morison, «Forcing the Dardanelles», 216-224; and Wright, 57-62.

20 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, 26 September 1823; and Finnie, 28-29.

wait for the treaty to appoint Gaspar William Glavany as an agent to handle American commercial affairs in İstanbul²¹.

Even though the United States had no official relations with the Ottoman Empire until 1830, American trade and shipping in the Ottoman domains steadily increased. It was only for a brief period during the War of 1812 that the British ships in the Aegean curtailed American activity. Also, from 1816, American presence in İzmir became more visible. In that year J. & T. H. Perkins, and in 1821 Langdon and Co., both of Boston, opened branches in İzmir, mainly to deal in opium. A few years later Styth & Co. of Baltimore also established a branch²². The increase in the number of American commercial houses in İzmir was clearly reflected in the increased shipping activity and volume of trade. In 1823, for example, 18 American ships called at İzmir; in 1824, the number of ships arriving at the same port totaled 20; and in 1825, this number increased to 22²³. A glance at the manifests of the 28 American ships that arrived in İzmir in 1828 indicates that as earlier most of the inward cargo consisted of coffee, sugar, tea, rum, pepper, and candles. In return the vessels carried out opium, boxwood, sheep's wool, rose oil, figs, raisins, old copper, olive oil, and carpets²⁴. The total American imports from the Ottoman Empire for this year added up to \$498,533 compared with her exports of \$202,941. Opium, with \$308,738, and

21 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 22 April 1828.

22 Finnie, 30.

23 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State John Q. Adams, 24 July 1824; Senate Document No. 200, 91-2; and *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 4 January 1826.

24 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 22 March 1829. New England rum occupied a prominent position in Ottoman imports from the United States. «In the first half of 1830, for example, twelve million gallons of it [would be] shipped to Turkey, mainly for transshipment to Russia and Persia via the Black Sea. The legation staff at Constantinople helpfully [would point] out to American merchants that the cheapest grade was preferred. 'Scarcely an American vessel', the legation reported, 'arrives at Smyrna from the United States that does not bring from 50 to 100 casks, much of which finds its way into Persia and the neighboring countries'. In fact, rum was the only American manufacture to be seen in the well-stocked bazaars of Tiflis...» Finnie, 31.

raisins and figs, with \$47,477, made up the bulk of the American imports²⁵.

Almost the entire American trade with the Ottoman Empire was centered in İzmir. Occasionally a few vessels called at Selanik to unload coffee and sugar. In early 1828, however, the Ottoman government, «out of friendly considerations», permitted American vessels to pass through the Dardanelles and call at İstanbul; in April of that year the brig *Delos* of Boston arrived at the capital with colonial goods²⁶. Hence, with the opening of İstanbul to United States vessels, new opportunities for trade arose for the American merchants. By late 1828, three American ships had proceeded to İstanbul after unloading some of their cargos at İzmir. In 1829, of the 23 vessels that arrived in İzmir, five continued on to İstanbul. American-Ottoman trade for this year suffered because of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29 and totaled only \$368,221²⁷. The Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) signed at the end of the war stipulated that vessels of all nations not at war with the Porte would be allowed to sail in the Black Sea under the same terms and conditions as the Russian vessels. This augmented the interest of American

25 U.S., The Department of Treasury, *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1829): 167. (Hereafter cited as *Commerce and Navigation Reports*.)

26 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 22 April 1828.

27 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1830): 193. Exports and imports from İzmir presented this picture:

<u>American Exports</u>	<u>American Imports</u>
1,741 cases opium	13,218 bags coffee
1,580 <i>kintals</i> boxwood	1,448 hds. rum
12,000 metticals* rose oil	182 bags pepper
2,739 cases raisins	
76,455 drums figs	
26,150 <i>okkas</i> * old copper	
13,582 kilos salt	
1,325 drums Sultana raisins	

*(one mettical = 4.64 grams; one *okka* = 1.28 kilograms)

See *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Martin Van Buren, 4 February 1830.

merchants and government in entering into a formal relationship with the Ottoman government²⁸.

Steadily, Ottoman-American trade during the first three decades of the century increased and continued to follow a discernable pattern. In return for mostly colonial goods, American merchants bought mainly agricultural produce, most importantly opium, figs, and raisins. Imports of figs and raisins, for instance, increased from \$19,860 in 1821 to \$74,615 in 1830; and opium made up a major portion of American imports, until by the early 1820's most of the produce was being purchased by American merchants²⁹. Sugar, coffee, tea, and pepper remained staple items carried by the United States ships; but in the early 1820's, rum, china, and some cotton cloth also composed considerable portions of their inward cargos. An examination of the United States consular reports and commerce and navigation statistics reveal that American ships entering İzmir in the early 1800's were mostly registered at Philadelphia and Baltimore³⁰. By the early 1820's, however, the majority came from Boston and smaller New England ports such as Salem, Duxbury, and Gloucester. Out of 22 ships that called at İzmir in 1825, 14 belonged to Boston merchants and carried out most of the 403 cases of opium, the total export of the port for that year³¹. In 1827, 11 out of the total of 18 ships that entered İzmir were from Boston. With four other ships from Duxbury, they took out most of the 805 cases of opium exported³². The dominance of New England ships continued in 1828 and 1829. Of the total 51 ships that entered the port in these two years, 28 were registered at Boston and 5 were owned by Salem merchants. The total opium exports

28 *Senate Document No. 200*, 105, Offley to Van Buren 4 February 1830.

29 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1831): 204 and 209.

30 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Wilkinson to Secretary of State James Madison, 15 January 1806; and *Senate Document No. 200*, 83-5.

31 Major items carried by the United States ships were 22,933 drums and 5,960 cases of figs, 3,749 cases of raisins, 34,000 metricals of rose oil, 144 bales of gall, etc. *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 4 January 1826.

32 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 4 January 1827.

of 2,297 cases were carried almost entirely by the vessels *Cherub*, *Danube*, *Emerald*, *Sultana*, *Nile*, and *Exact*, all out of Boston and Salem³³. Consequently, the American base of Ottoman trade shifted from Philadelphia and Baltimore in the first decade of the century to Boston by the 1820's. Considering the fact that rum, a major American export item was handled by New England merchants, and opium trade to China was nearly monopolized by Boston based firms, this change is not surprising³⁴.

David Offley's report to Secretary of State Van Buren for 1830 attests to the above picture. Of the 32 ships that arrived in İzmir in that year, 14 were registered in Boston; the rest were from New York (5), Duxbury (4), Baltimore (3), Kingston (2), and one each from Plymouth, Salem, Marblehead, and New Haven. Their cargos, among coffee sugar, tea, indigo, and spices, included 1,078 hogsheads of rum, 965 bales of domestic goods, 50 barrels of flour, and 70 bales of manufactured tobacco. Their return cargos included 782 cases of opium, 11,706 casks and 2,335 drums of raisins, 121,460 drums of figs, with other regular export items of İzmir such as wool, rose oil, old copper, and carpets³⁵. The total American-Ottoman trade for that year amounted to \$830,732 with imports nearly equalling exports and the entire volume was carried on American ships³⁶.

In İzmir the Philadelphian, David Offley, was the most prominent member of the American merchant community, and his patriotism indeed had paid off. «All but twenty-four of the seventy-eight American vessels that called at Smyrna during the years 1811-1820 carried cargos consigned to the Woodmans and Offley firm»³⁷.

33 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Henry Clay, 22 March 1829; and Offley to Secretary of State Van Buren, 4 February 1830.

34 On these points, see Field, 114; Morison, 208-225, and his *The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860* (Boston & New York, 1921), chapters XVII (China and the East Indies) and XVIII (Mediterranean and Baltic), 273-199; and Timothy Pitkin, *Statistical View of Commerce of the United States America* (New Haven, 1835).

35 Report from David Offley to Secretary of State Martin Van Buren, 18 January 1831, in *Senate Document No. 200*, 112-18.

36 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1831): 204.

37 Finnie, 29.

With his semi-official position, he provided leadership to other American traders, at times representing Boston firms in certain transactions. On the other side of the Atlantic, in 1830, two more Boston firms were added to the increasing number of merchant-shipowners trading with the Ottomans. The Marquis Nicholas Reggio, of a Genoese family which lived in İzmir for many years, and Joseph Iasagi, an Armenian born in İzmir, moved to Boston and participated especially in fig and raisin trade³⁸. Also in the same year the Canton branch of the J. & T.H. Perkins Company was dissolved, but their business there was taken over by the Boston-based Russell & Company. Thus, Boston merchants controlled most of the American-Ottoman trade in the United States.

The Treaty of 1830 :

When the United States Congress commissioned Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams on 7 May 1784 to make treaties of commerce and amity with a number of nations, the Ottoman Empire was included on the list³⁹. The main reason for seeking a treaty with the Porte was the seizure of American merchantmen in 1785 by Algerian pirates who were considered to be under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan. The following year, the Tripolitan Ambassador informed Adams that his country considered itself at war with the United States and that in order to navigate the Mediterranean treaties would have to be concluded with Tripoli, Algiers, Morocco, and the Ottoman Porte⁴⁰. Eventually, Adams and Jefferson concluded that it was not necessary to negotiate a treaty with the Ottoman Empire prior to making treaties with the various Barbary states; and treaties with Morocco (1786), Algiers (1796), Tripoli (1796-97), and Tunis

38 Morison, *Maritime History*, 292.

39 Carlton Savage, ed., *Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1934), Vol. I, 157-160. See also William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, *The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development and Functions* (Washington, D.C., 1961), 22-3.

40 *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America From the Treaty of Peace to the Adoption of the Present Constitution*, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.), Vol. IV, 490, John Adams to John Jay, 17 February 1786.

(1797-99) were concluded⁴¹. Adams and Jefferson suggested the opening of negotiations with the Ottomans, but the Congress did not pursue the question.

The prudence of a commercial treaty was also raised by Rufus King, the American Minister in London (1796-1843). He was in touch with the Ottoman Ambassador to London and believed that with the help of Britain and Russia a favorable treaty could be negotiated⁴². President Adams nominated William Loughton Smith, the American Minister in Lisbon, to negotiate a treaty with the Porte and the Senate gave its approval on 11 February 1799⁴³. When Adams appointed William Vans Murray on February 18 to negotiate a treaty with France, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering concluded that the Smith mission had no possibility of success and, on May 6, recommended that the President suspend it in order not to offend France. No order or instruction was ever issued to Smith⁴⁴.

While the Adams administration was trying to decide whether to pursue with the Smith mission, events favorable for the success of such an undertaking were occurring in Istanbul. The *U.S.S. George Washington*, commanded by Captain William Bainbridge, was the first American ship of war to enter the Mediterranean. When the ship visited Tripoli, it was commandeered by the Dey of Algeria and forced to take his tribute and presents to the Ottoman Sultan⁴⁵. Arriving in Istanbul on 9 November 1800, Bainbridge was met by a messenger from the Ottoman government bearing a lamb as an emblem of peace and flowers as a sign of welcome⁴⁶. An English

41 For the text of these treaties, see David Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1933), Vol. II, 185-227, 275-317, and 349-426.

42 Charles R. King, ed., *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, 6 vols. (New York, 1894-1900), Vol. II, 463, King to Secretary of State Pickering. Also see Field, 115.

43 *Senate Executive Journal*, Vol. I, 311-12. The Jefferson group opposed the mission since it was viewed by them as an open affront to France, which was then at war with England, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.

44 Gordon, 8.

45 For an account of this episode, see Thomas Harris, *The Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge* (Philadelphia, 1837), 43-61.

46 *Ibid.*, 47.

traveler in the city at the time recorded the confusion raised by the first appearance of the American flag in İstanbul :

The arrival of an American frigate, for the first time, at Constantinople, caused considerable sensation, not only among the Turks, but also throughout the whole diplomatic corps stationed at Pera [the foreign quarters in the city] . . . When she came to an anchor, and a message went to the Porte that an American frigate was in the harbour, the Turks were altogether unable to comprehend where the country was situated and whose flag they were to salute. A great deal of time was therefore lost in settling this important point and in considering how to receive the stranger. In the meantime we went on board to visit the captain; and we were sitting with him in his cabin, when a messenger came from the Turkish government to ask whether America were not otherwise called the New World; and being answered in the affirmative, assured the captain that he was welcome, and would be treated with the utmost cordiality and respect⁴⁷.

Prior to his departure on 30 December 1800, Bainbridge discussed with *Kaptan Paşa* a treaty of commerce and amity between their respective governments. The Ottoman admiral was gratified to learn that Smith had been appointed to negotiate a treaty with the Porte and gave Bainbridge, for transmission to Smith, a letter which would protect the Ambassador while traveling in the Ottoman domains⁴⁸. Bainbridge, in a language becoming to a sea captain, reported his conversation with *Kaptan Paşa* as follows : «I have entered the channel and find it clear of difficulties; but not having orders, cannot proceed»⁴⁹. His probings were not subsequently pursued. Throughout the next few years, a number of American merchants, captains, and consuls in other European ports urged the Washington government to enter into treaty negotiations with the Ottomans⁵⁰. The United States, however, did not undertake ne-

47 Edward Daniel Clark, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa: Part the Second; Greece, Egypt and the Holy Land* (New York, 1814), 36.

48 Harris, 48-49.

49 James Barnes, ed., *The Life of William Bainbridge, Esq. of the United States Navy by H.A.S. Dearborn, 1816* (Princeton, 1931), 23.

50 Field, 118-19.

gotiations of a commercial treaty with the Empire until Secretary of State John Quincy Adams sent an executive agent to İstanbul two decades later.

Official contacts started in 1820, when Adams sent a New York lawyer, Luther Bradish, as a secret negotiator. As far as Washington was concerned, secrecy was a necessity owing to the intrigues of European ambassadors in İstanbul who had repeatedly undermined direct American approaches to high ranking officials in the Ottoman government⁵¹. A petition was submitted to the Ottoman Sultan by an American asking permission to have the negotiator accepted by the Porte when he arrived from the United States.⁵² Bainbridge, with whom Bradish sailed to İzmir, may have been instructed to sound out the Porte on the possibility of a treaty, but he was unable to proceed further than İzmir. Bradish, dismayed to discover that news of his mission had preceded him, attempted to correct the situation. Following conversations with the *Reis ül-küttap* (chief of scribes and foreign minister) and others, he reported that secret and direct negotiations would be the best avenue to an agreement, and he estimated the cost of such a treaty to be about \$50,000⁵³. At the capital some Ottoman officials as well as the

51 U.S., Congress, House, 22nd Congress, First Session, *House Document No. 250* (Washington, D.C.), 3; Paullin, 132-133; and Henry Merritt Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, 1929), 321-322. On the secrecy of the mission, also see Gordon, 9.

52 Başvekâlet Arşivleri [Prime Ministry Archives] (hereafter cited as BVA), *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 41183C/1 (1820). The petition does not bear a signature. It is likely, however, that it was written by David Offley of İzmir.

53 *House Document No. 250*, 4-12, Bradish to Adams, 20 December 1820. The \$50,000 appropriation was for the expenses of the mission as well as for gifts to the members of the Ottoman negotiating team. This, however, should not simply be seen, as done by many writers, as bribes to Ottoman officials. Exchange of gifts was an important aspect of negotiations for the Ottoman Empire as it was for some European nations. In fact, after the treaty was signed and when the American representative mentioned that he liked four horses valued at 10,000 *kuruş*, Mahmut II, the Ottoman Sultan, gave them as present to the representative. BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47489 (1831).

54 BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47507F (1820); No. 47510 (1820). While in İstanbul, Luther Bradish wanted to familiarize himself with the Empire and asked the Sultan's permission to visit some major cities. See BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47507D (1820).

Russian legation viewed the treaty as desirable. Russian interest laid in the fact that American entry into the Black Sea would present serious competition to the British. There is some evidence, however, that the Sultan saw little advantage in entering negotiations with the Americans at that time⁵⁴. In any event, the Greek insurrection in 1821 aroused a strong anti-Ottoman sentiment in the United States which made the negotiations unpopular. Despite this situation, Adams, in the years immediately following the Greek revolution, made several attempts to start negotiations. His efforts, however, were hindered by his powerful Secretary of State and a partisan of the Greek cause, Henry Clay⁵⁵.

The destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino on 20 October 1827 by the combined Allied powers raised the Porte's interest in a treaty, a commercial as well as an offensive-defensive alliance, with the United States. Husrev Paşa, still the Admiral of the Navy, informed his friend Offley of the opportune moment. Offley forwarded this note to Clay. In Clay's absence, President Adams drafted instructions on 21 July 1828 for Offley and Commodore William Crane of the Mediterranean squadron to negotiate a commercial treaty on the basis of the most-favored-nation status and on the right of admission to and navigation upon the Black Sea⁵⁶. They were indeed the first representatives duly commissioned and instructed to conduct negotiations with the Porte.

55 *House Document No. 250*, 20-21. Clay's famous speech in the House of Representatives on 20 January 1824 in support of Daniel Webster's bill to send an agent to Greece is found in Calvin Colton, ed., *The Works of Henry Clay: Comprising His Life, Correspondence and Speeches*, 10 vols. (New York & London, 1904), Vol. VI, 246-48. An important sentence of Clay's speech is also cited by Morison, «Forcing the Dardanelles», 224: «A wretched invoice of figs and opium has been spread before us to repress our sensibilities and eradicate our humanity. Ah! Sir, 'what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?'» His speech was occasioned by the refusal of four leading Boston merchants to serve on the Boston Committee for Greek Relief. A few days earlier in Boston the merchants had pointed out that a stand for Greek independence would jeopardize their business with İzmir. For Adams's efforts to negotiate a treaty in the mid-1820's, see Gordon, 9. For efforts in the Congress to support Greece and the opposition of New England and Middle States representatives to Webster and Clay, see Field, 125-26.

56 *House Document No. 250*, 63-69.

Crane remained in İzmir and Offley proceeded to the capital in December 1828 on a mission that he had many times suggested could be accomplished. The Ottoman Sultan now considered a treaty with the United States an important matter. He had received some feelers from Offley and favorable comments from the Austrian legation in İstanbul⁵⁷. Offley, however, failed because he refused to consider any proposal other than the most-favored-nation treatment of commerce. The *Reis ül-küttap* inferred that a suitable exchange for granting such status to America would be warships to replace those lost at Navarino; but Offley would not listen to such proposals. Upon his return to İzmir, Offley and Crane a joint letter dated 17 March 1829 informed the President that a commercial treaty would not be forthcoming on the basis of their instructions⁵⁸.

In Washington Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State under President Andrew Jackson, submitted the record of the negotiations to his close friend Charles Rhind, a New York merchant long interested in the Black Sea trade who described himself as «one of the oldest merchants trading to the Levant»⁵⁹. Rhind believed that negotiations should have been handled more delicately. At Van Buren's suggestion, on 12 September 1829, President Jackson appointed Captain James Biddle, David Offley, and Charles Rhind commissioners; and Van Buren instructed them to obtain a treaty on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle for commerce in all parts of the Ottoman Empire including the Black Sea, with the understanding that the last proposal of the Porte to Offley might be accepted as second best. He suggested that Rhind do the actual negotiating while Offley and Biddle remained in İzmir. Van Buren also enjoined upon them the necessity of precluding «all ground for future misunderstanding, arising from incorrect translation from or into the language used by the Porte» and of their concluding a treaty which «should extend only to objects of commerce and navigation, and should, in no event, interfere in the neutral obliga-

57 BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayın*, No. 47488 (1828).

58 *House Document No. 250*, Supplement.

59 Field, 149.

tions of the United States»⁶⁰. In late 1829, the Ottoman Sultan was informed of the new mission and approved negotiations to be opened immediately upon the Americans' arrival⁶¹.

Rhind arrived in İstanbul alone on 8 February 1830 and at once began negotiations with the Ottoman officials. Discussions held in the following few weeks were hard, and both domestic and British intrigues were a nuisance. The British were concerned over the potential competition the Americans would present in selling colonial goods. The Russians, on the other hand, viewed American trade at their own parts in the Black Sea as a means to neutralize the dominance of the British carrying trade and supported Rhind's efforts⁶². The Sultan, although not participating in the negotiations in person, followed the outcome of discussions closely and urged agreement⁶³. Finally, on May 7, the draft of the treaty was signed by Rhind and the *Reis ül-kiittap*. The treaty granted a most-favored-nation status to American commerce and allowed American ships to sail in the Black Sea. It also included «a separate and secret article which permitted the Turks to build warships and procure ship timber in the United States with the assistance of the United States government»⁶⁴. Rhind's summary report to the President dated May 10 did not mention the existence of the secret article, which he later labelled a «perfect nullity» and inconsequential to the treaty.⁶⁵ Neither did he inform Offley and Biddle; they learned about the arrangement just prior to they were obliged to sign when *Reis Efendi* intimated that the entire treaty would be scuttled⁶⁶.

The treaty consisted of nine articles. The first three provided for most-favored-nation treatment in commerce for both countries

60 For the text of these two documents, see *House Document No. 250*, 69-74. Also see Field, 149-150, and Gordon, 10.

61 BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 41139 (1829).

62 Field, 150.

63 Some details of the negotiations may be found in BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47487 (1830).

64 Field, 150.

65 *House Document No. 250*, 95.

66 Particularly Offley's objections were strong. His position was related to the Sultan by an extensive report. See BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47490 (1830).

and for the granting of any special papers needed for travel in either country, authorized each country to appoint consuls and vice-consuls in commercial centers and guaranteed aid and protection for them, and specified that American merchants and vessels would be treated the same as other foreign merchants and vessels. Article Four and Five respectively extended American capitulatory rights and granted freedom of travel to American merchant vessels under their own flags with the proviso that the American flag would not be extended to ships of other nations and that the American representatives would not extend protection to the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Article Six enjoined warships belonging to either country to demonstrate a friendly and courteous manner toward vessels, both naval and merchant, belonging to the other. The privileges of navigation in the Black Sea, long sought after by American merchants, was granted in Article Seven, but it limited the cargos to produce and materials only from the Ottoman Empire and the United States. The last two articles stated that merchant vessels should not be commandeered by the other country for the shipment of troops, munitions, and other objects of war, that assistance and protection should be given in the event of shipwreck, and that all merchandise and effects recovered should be conveyed to the nearest consul⁶⁷.

President Jackson sent the treaty to the Senate on 9 December 1830. It was ratified in less than two months, but without the secret article, the first ever presented to that body. Commodore David Porter, appointed as chargé d'affaires of the United States legation in İstanbul on 15 April 1831, was authorized to exchange ratifications⁶⁸.

67 For the draft in Turkish, see BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayın*, No. 47508 (1830). The text in English is in Miller, III: 541-557, and Z.Y. Hershlag, Appendix 5, 292-293.

68 As regards to Commodore David Porter's appointment, «although the selection seems to have been made for personal reasons, it was, under the prevailing circumstances, a peculiarly felicitous one; for Porter, hero of the war with Tripoli and of the War of 1812, former member of the Navy Commissioners and former Commander-in-Chief of the Mexican navy, was as competent a naval adviser as could be found. As America's first naval expan-

The Ottoman government, anxious to rebuild its navy after Navarino, received the news on the rejection of the secret article with disillusionment⁶⁹. Rhind had convinced the Porte that he would be able to influence the Americans favorably on this issue; as a result the negotiations continued. It was only when Porter signed a statement to the effect that he and his successors would give their «friendly council and advice, to the Sublime Porte, as to the best manner of obtaining ships of war, wood for their construction, and timber of every description, from the United States, and to obtain all the advantages contemplated by the said separate article, without violating the Laws of the United States, or conflicting with their engagements with other nations,» that the Ottoman government was satisfied⁷⁰. On 5 October 1831, the formal exchange of ratifications took place in İstanbul, and the President proclaimed the treaty on 4 February 1832.

sionist, moreover, who as early as 1815 had suggested the opening of Japan, he was not one to be backward in furthering American influence in foreign parts.» Field, 151. On Commodore Porter, see also D.D. Porter, *Memoir of Commodore David Porter* (Albany, 1875).

69 BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47494 (1831). For the Secretary of State's letter informing the Ottoman government about the rejection of the secret article, see BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47507E (1831).

70 Quotation in Miller, 586-587. Rhind was undoubtedly influenced by his close friend Henry Eckford. «One of the leading shipbuilders of the day, Eckford had been largely responsible for winning the naval race on the Great Lakes in the War of 1812. For some years thereafter he had served as naval constructor; he had designed, among other vessels, the U.S.S. *Ohio*, finest of all American ships of the line, and had also done work for the navies of Latin America. After suffering reverses he had recently built the 26-ton corvette *United States*, apparently as a speculation, although rumor had it that the vessel was intended for Russia. But it is at least possible that the intended destination was Turkey: the link between New York shipbuilders and New York diplomatic agents was close, and Eckford had been one of the owners of the steamship *Robert Fulton* when the attempt was made, on information from Luther Bradish, to palm it off on the government as a present to the Turks.» Field, 152. Indeed, Rhind and Eckford arrived in İstanbul on the *United States* at the same time as Commodore Porter. The Ottomans at first thought the corvette was a gift from the United States government; later they realized the situation and bought the ship for cash. Eckford was employed at the Ottoman shipyards in İstanbul as a naval constructor until his death in November

The Ottoman-American trade agreement was the result of nearly three decades of intermittent negotiations. For the Ottomans, the major consideration was political. After 1827, it was also technical; they sought assistance in rebuilding their navy. Also, the Ottomans hoped to gain an ally in the United States against increasing European influence and pressure. American interests, on the other hand, were guided at times by political, but always by commercial aims. With the treaty of 1830 American merchants and vessels acquired the same privileges as their European counterparts; they no longer required the tutelage or the colors of Europeans to enter Ottoman ports. In addition a new region, the Black Sea, was opened to them, offering new opportunities even in Russia.

* * *

Trade Under the Treaty of 1830 :

One of Porter's first concerns was the appointment of consuls and agents throughout the Empire with a view to securing coordinated information on commercial conditions. David Offley, who had been acting as an American consul in İzmir, was officially retained there; W. B. Llewellyn, a British subject who had established a commercial house at Selanik in 1830, was appointed as a consular agent in that city; D. Bonnal and Marino de Matthey, both French, were accepted as agents at the islands of Candia and Cyprus respectively; John Gliddon, an English merchant, was appointed to the post of American consular agent at Alexandria in January 1832, and soon was promoted to consul; in İstanbul, John P. Brown was retained as an acting-consul. These appointments were followed by Porter's acceptance of some local, well-known merchants (not Ottoman subjects) as United States consular agents at important

1832. With the arrival of ship carpenters from New York, however, American activities in İstanbul docks continued. In December 1832, Commodore Porter «was able to report that Eckford's foreman, Foster Rhodes, was carrying on 'under my personal council and advice.'» Cited in Field, 167; also see 166. On Eckford's suggestions regarding building of ships and training of naval constructors, see BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayın*, No. 47497. (1831).

commercial centers such Beirut and Aleppo⁷¹. The real expansion of American consular services in the Ottoman Empire had to wait until the second half of the century. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, appointed two representatives with the rank of chargé d'affaires to Boston and New York in the early 1850's⁷².

After Porter exchanged ratifications of the treaty, several problems arose. In line with the most-favored-nation clause, American commerce continued under the French tariff, but with the additional fifteen percent still being collected. The Ottoman government wanted to make a new tariff whereas Porter requested the fifteen percent surcharge be removed. The Porte, effective 15 August 1832, ceased collecting the extra charge, and the question of the tariff was dormant for several years. Despite the restrictive language of Article VII of the treaty, which seemingly limited the United States carrying trade to American and Ottoman goods, American ships were allowed to pass through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea to secure the produce of the entire region, including that of Russia. Like the ships of other European nations, American

71 For early reports of these consuls, see *Senate Document No. 200*, especially 4-7, 13-20, 22-45, 52-57, and 59-72. This writer has located several documents in the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul (BVA), dealing with consular appointments. These documents are official approvals from the Porte upon application from the United States government and are as follows:

- a) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 4100 (1851): United States consul to Jafa.
- b) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 7995 (1858): United States consul to İskenderun (Alexandretta).
- c) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 9029 (1858): United States consular agents to Trabzon (Trebizon) and Sakız (Chios).
- d) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 9173 (1859): United States vice-consul to Damascus.
- e) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 9779 (1860): United States consul to Antep (Aintab).
- f) *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 11505 (1863): United States consul to Suez.

72 For Ottoman government's appointments to the United States, see *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 4476 (1852) for Boston, and *İrade-Hariciye*, No. 6309 (1855) for New York. The Ottoman representative to Boston presented the United States government, among other things, with a block of Turkish marble for incorporation in the Washington Monument as a symbol of permanent good relations.

vessels, too, were often obliged to get special permission⁷³. The treaty, however, did not affect the volume of American trade in the Black Sea. It was anticipated that the new agreement would generate considerable traffic with the Russian port of Odessa and the Ottoman port of Trabzon as a contemporary American treaty with Austria had done to Trieste on the Adriatic. It was true that American ships after the treaty had ice-free access to the Russian coast and potential Persian transit trade via Trabzon offered opportunities. The prevailing northerly winds and southward current, however, made passage through the Straits difficult for American sailing vessels. Delays were more serious for the United States merchant marine with its comparatively high operational cost than for its local and British competitors. In addition, the enactment of the «tariff of abominations» in the United States in 1828, which protected the Southern cotton interests, had imposed very high duty on raw wool. This made it difficult for American ships to procure return cargos from İstanbul on their way back from the Black Sea, as İstanbul along with İzmir, which always offered ample export items to the United States, were two major wool exporting ports.

The Treaty of 1830 nonetheless did affect both the volume and composition of the United States trade with the Ottoman Empire; American trade steadily increased throughout the nineteenth century, particularly at İzmir. In 1830, 32 American ships called at that port and brought mostly colonial goods : coffee (28,080 bags), sugar (1,288 cases and 2,150 bags), pepper (2,260 bags), and rum, candles, and flour. Their outward cargos included 782 cases of opium, 121,460 drums of figs, 11,706 cases and 2,355 drums of raisins, 31,400 pieces of salted hide, copper, and some wool⁷⁴. The total United States imports from all Ottoman domains was valued at \$417,392, with \$132,222 worth of opium subject to *ad valorem* duty

73 BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 47500 (1834); No. 47503 (1834); No. 47503A (1834); No. 47507C (1834); and BVA, *Esas Tasnife Dahil Olmayan Vesikalar* (Documents not in the main classifications), ADVN DVE 100/1250-6-1-III.

74 *Senate Document No. 200*, 114-18; and *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Van Buren, 18 January 1831.

at ports of entry in the United States⁷⁵. In 1832, the value of imports more than doubled, reaching \$923,629, and included \$234,473 worth of opium and \$55,973 worth of dried fruits. All imports to the United States were carried on American ships⁷⁶. The cargos of 46 American vessels that entered İzmir during that year included new produce such as domestic goods (919 bales), cigars (90,500 boxes), shirtings (155 bales), nankeens, logwood, and tar along with regular export items of rum, spices, sugar, and coffee⁷⁷. In 1833, the total American imports from the Ottoman Empire were reduced to \$786,044 as some export items were directed to the use of the Ottoman army mobilized against Mehmet Ali of Egypt. 36 American ships which called at İzmir carried most of the goods⁷⁸. American ships also called at İstanbul and Selanik taking out some tobacco, opium, wool, and wine. In 1832, 13 American ships had passed through the Dardanelles bringing mostly coffee, sugar, and manufactured tobacco to the capital; a list of foreign vessels arriving in İstanbul from the Black Sea in the same year included only one American ship⁷⁹.

In the following years only a few American ships called at other Ottoman ports. A report dated 1 January 1835 covering the first six months of American trade at Alexandria indicates that only two American brigs called at that port with cargos of rum, cigars, sugar, and furniture; they took out \$3,433 worth of beeswax, salt, and «antiquities and specimen of natural history»⁸⁰.

The Commercial Convention of 1838, to which the United States was not originally a party, gave additional impetus to Ottoman-

75 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Secretary of State Van Buren, 18 January 1831; and *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1831): 204 and 209.

76 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1832): 234.

77 *Senate Document No. 200*, 134-35.

78 Of these 36 ships, 28 belonged to Boston; 2 each were registered at Duxbury, New York, and Baltimore; and the rest belonged to ports of Plymouth and Philadelphia. It is interesting to note that three of the Boston registered brigs were named *Ottoman*, *Smyrna*, and *Nile*. *Senate Document No. 200*, 139-43.

79 *Ibid.*, 171.

80 *Ibid.*, 207-8.

American trade. By the early 1830's the Ottoman government was attempting to renegotiate the Tariff Treaty of 1820 with her biggest trading partner, Britain. It was due to lapse in 1834 and, because of a general rise in prices, the Ottoman officials were planning to raise the basis on which taxes were levied. The government was also trying to protect its handicraft industries, particularly wool cloth manufacturers who worked at looms throughout the Empire. At the same time, British merchants complained of export restrictions, the government monopoly on some produce, and of being subjected to the same taxes as Ottoman merchants when they moved their merchandise from the ports to the interior. Britain, well aware of the potential of the Ottoman Empire as a source of raw material, was waiting for an opportune moment to gain more favorable terms for her subjects' trade.

The period of negotiation was indeed a very critical one for the Porte. The Paşa of Egypt presented a serious threat not only to the authority of the central government but to the integrity of the Empire as a whole. After lengthy negotiations, the Ottoman government was compelled to submit to most of the British demands, and the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention was signed in the summer of 1838. The treaty «removed all Ottoman monopolies, allowed British merchants to purchase goods anywhere in the Empire, and imposed duties of 5 percent on imports, 12 percent on exports, and 3 percent on transit»⁸¹. The Convention set the tone for Ottoman commercial relations for the rest of the century as trade agreements, all cast from the same mold, were almost immediately signed with other foreign nations. In the following years, the Porte, knowing that it put the Ottoman trade and industry at a disadvantage, repeatedly sought to modify the Convention. It was only in 1861-62 that new treaties raising import duties to eight

81 Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914* (Chicago & London, 1966), 38. For the text of the 1838 Convention, see Great Britain, The House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. L (1838), 291-295. For an excellent discussion on the Ottoman-British negotiations and the analysis of the Convention, see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisâdî Münâsebetleri, I, (1580-1838)* [Ottoman-English Economic Relations, I, (1580-1838)], (Ankara, 1974), especially 92-125.

percent and gradually reducing export duties to one percent, were signed with European nations and the United States. Again, these treaties did not allow the Ottoman government to establish any control over the production and sale of domestic produce.

For the growing American trade in the Ottoman markets perhaps the most important aspect of the 1838 Convention was the abolition of the Ottoman government's monopoly on opium. It is true that American merchants had continued to carry opium in large amounts from İzmir to China during the previous decade when the produce was under monopoly. They were forced to bargain hard under this system, especially for the quantity they wanted to purchase, with the Ottoman official in charge at İzmir⁸². Now the American merchants could buy at the production centers in the interior, and the cultivators were in no position to bargain with them for either the price or the quantity. In 1838, for instance, American opium imports of \$64,969 made up 21.9 percent of total American imports from the Ottoman Empire. The year after the Convention opium imports, \$191,764, constituted 30.5 percent of her total imports of \$629,190. In 1841, opium, with \$205,933, occupied the top position on the list of American imports from the Empire which totaled \$614,872⁸³.

The Convention also eased export regulations on agricultural products which had not been under monopoly and this, too, had an impact on American imports, particularly in the fig and raisin trade. In 1838, American ships carried \$46,775 worth of figs and raisins from İzmir; in 1839, importation of these products increased to \$75,518. In 1846, American fig imports alone totaled \$119,170⁸⁴. By

82 In 1828, for instance, the first year of the monopoly in opium, American merchants in İzmir requested to buy 50 to 60,000 *çeki* of opium. Owing to the possibility of price increases, the Ottoman official, İhtisâb Nâzırı Ömer Lütî Bey, sold them only 27,500 *çeki* at 90 *kuruş* per *çeki*. See BVA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, No. 23988A (1828). For further information, see my «Nineteenth Century Golden Triangle.»

83 Percentages are calculated by this writer. For import figures, see *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1840-1842): 361,379, and 399.

84 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1839-40 and 1847): 342,361, and 494.

1856, fig and raisin imports reached \$213,390⁸⁵ and continued to occupy a major position in trade between the two countries throughout the century.

In the decades that followed as figs, raisins, opium, hides, and wool all contributed to the increase of American imports (see Appendix I), export statistics of the United States Treasury Department show that along with colonial goods and distilled spirits, new American products were reaching Ottoman markets. American cotton cloth found a ready market in the Empire and became popular. It could not compete with British cottons, but besides being sold in stores, it was hawked in the streets and several travelers in fact noted hearing these vendors⁸⁶. American exports also included some iron and steel manufactures, mineral oils, cheese, furniture, and naval stores. The Medford and Boston-built brigs *Istanbul* and *Sultana* occasionally brought coal for use of bakeries and homes in İzmir and İstanbul⁸⁷.

Further examination of sources reveals an essential aspect of the Ottoman trade with the United States. During the period between 1831 and 1860, in its trade with major European nations such as

85 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1857): 886.

Until 1834, fruits imported from the Ottoman Empire entered the United States free of duty. In 1842, *ad valorem* duties were imposed. Between 1843 and 1847, they were subject to specific duties. In 1848, again *ad valorem* duties were imposed and that continued until 1860. In 1860, fig and raisin imports were once again brought under specific duties and continued on this basis until the end of the century. The schedule below will give an idea about tariff rates on these products late in the nineteenth century.

Produce	United States Tariff Rates			
	1883	1890	1894	1897
Figs	2¢ 1b.	2 1/2¢ 1b.	1 1/2¢ 1b.	2¢ 1b.
Raisins	2¢ 1b.	2 1/2¢ 1b.	1 1/2¢ 1b.	2 1/2¢ 1b.

Gordon, 182.

86 Josiah Brewer, *A Resident at Constantinople in the Year 1827* (New Haven, 1830), 73. David Porter also refers to the hawking of American cottons. See *An American, Constantinople and Its Environs in a Series of Letters*, 2 vols. (New York, 1835), Vol. I, 113 and 181.

87 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Offley to Clayton, 14 July 1850; and E. S. Offley to Marcy, 7 August 1854.

England, France, and Austria, Ottoman imports far exceeded exports. Ottoman-American trade, on the other hand, provided the Empire with a substantial export balance (see Appendix II)⁸⁸. Only in the last two years of the Crimean War did Ottoman imports from the United States exceed exports. In 1855, American exports of \$958,039 were \$167,150 above its imports; in 1856, Ottomans imported \$1,404,768 worth of goods from the United States against their exports of \$741,871. This was the first time since the start of trade between the two countries that American exports passed a million dollars. Such value would not repeat itself until 1870, when American exports totaled \$2,565,289⁸⁹. Hence trade with the United States, unlike the Empire's trade with European countries, contributed favorably to the Ottoman balance of payments.

For this period another important point, particularly for the Americans, must also be emphasized. Despite the increase in trade, the number of American ships which arrived at Ottoman ports declined. In 1832 and 1833, for example, 46 and 36 ships respectively called at İzmir. In the decade of 1840, the number of American ships calling at this port yearly averaged 24. In the 1850's a similar situation prevailed⁹⁰. Since the size of ships handling the carrying trade between the United States and Ottoman ports had not changed and virtually the same group of ships continued to sail between Boston and İzmir, the American merchant marine was losing its

88 American exports to and imports from the Ottoman Empire as well as total trade and balances for 1831-1899 are also given by Gordon in his Table 2, pages 46-47. His American export figures, however, reveal only the export of domestic goods. For 1838, for instance, his figure for American exports is \$142,448, the total value of domestic goods sold to the Ottoman Empire. For this year, we used \$257,909, which also includes colonial and other foreign goods exported by American merchants. For 1852, Gordon uses \$265,825 compared to the total value of \$316,196.

89 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1856, 1857, and 1871): 825, 886, and 1458. Also see Gordon, 47.

90 See *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, 22 January 1833; 1 September 1833; 1 January 1834; 5 July 1842; 31 December 1843; 4 January 1847; 8 June 1847; 16 October 1848; 14 July 1850; 15 February 1851; 4 March 1851; 18 February 1852; 28 April 1853; and 7 August 1854.

share in the carrying trade. The figures for the years 1830, 1840, 1850, and 1860 confirm the decrease⁹¹ :

Year	Total American Imports From the Ottoman Empire	Value of Goods Carried on U.S. Ships
1830	\$ 417,392	\$417,392
1840	563,476	537,637
1850	801,023	720,533
1860	1,379,860	631,156

In the following years this trend became more unfavorable for the United States. Up to 1880 the British, and thereafter the British with French, German, and Italian merchant marines, established a virtual monopoly on shipping to the eastern Mediterranean⁹².

With the Ottoman vessels not geared into transatlantic crossings neither the United States nor the Ottoman shipping benefited from the burgeoning trade between the two countries. Moreover, this situation undoubtedly created problems for both American and Ottoman merchants, since shipping schedules often were arranged according to the needs of other countries' merchants. Yet by 1860 American commerce had established itself in the Ottoman domains, especially at İzmir. A report of the United States consul at that port to Secretary of State Lewis Cass attests to the importance of American trade there in 1860⁹³ :

91 For imports and value of goods carried on American vessels, see *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1831, 1841, 1851, and 1861): 204, 209, 379, 604, and 1087.

92 In the Black Sea, where steamships started plying in 1836, shipping trade was controlled by the French, Austrian, and Russian lines. In many instances these shipping companies received substantial subsidies from their respective governments. See Royal Meeker, *History of Shipping Subsidies* (New York, 1905).

93 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, E.S. Offley to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, 15 January 1861.

Country	Imports to İzmir (in piastres*)	Exports from İzmir (in piastres*)
England	96,705,000	92,295,970
France	46,534,270	34,292,430
Austria	35,140,800	33,229,590
United States	15,810,460	24,518,740
Russia	5,834,600	5,373,350
Sardinia	4,350,400	—
Belgium	4,032,620	—
Greece	4,026,500	1,243,200
Tuscany	3,746,940	—
Holland	3,288,000	1,462,000

*27 83/100 Ottoman p. = U.S.\$1.00

Exports and imports of İzmir in that year totaled 519, 117, 220 Ottoman piastres and this volume was carried by 872 sailing vessels (tonnage 241,049) and 622 steamships (tonnage 589,387)⁹⁴. Thus while the United States began to lose its share of the carrying trade, by the middle of the century it ranked fourth among all countries trading at İzmir with 7.8 percent of the port's total trade.

* * *

The Treaty of 1862 and Further Growth of Trade :

Particularly after the Crimean War (1853-56) the Ottoman government made constant attempts to enter into commercial treaty negotiations with European nations. The main purpose was to rectify some effects of the 1838 Convention and various tariff agreements which proved detrimental to the Ottoman economy. In the late 1850's, informal agreements were reached with the major trading partners, but it was only in 1861 that Porte was able to sign a new commercial treaty with Britain, and again almost immediately with the other European powers⁹⁵.

94 Ibid.

95 For the text of the 1861 Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, see Hershlag, Appendix 11, 301-306.

During this period Ottoman officials also conducted negotiations with the United States legation in İstanbul, and in 1862 a new treaty of commerce was signed. Article I of the agreement extended reciprocal most-favored-nation status for commerce and navigation of the Treaty of 1830. It was agreed in Articles IV and V that the eight percent *ad valorem* duty on Ottoman exports to the United States, in effect since 1839 when the United States accepted the British schedule of tariffs agreed to in the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, would be gradually lowered to a permanent rate of one percent and that the eight percent *ad valorem* duty on American exports to the Ottoman Empire would be continued. Both of these duties were imposed by the Ottoman government on exports to and imports from all other nations. In addition, the United States accepted the Porte's prohibition on the importation of arms and ammunition into Ottoman domain (Article XV). A joint tariff commission drew up a schedule of values upon which the *ad valorem* duties were to be applied⁹⁶.

In accordance with the provisions of the 1862 Treaty (Article XX), allowing periodic revision of the tariff, the Porte suggested in 1875 that the eight percent *ad valorem* duty on American exports to the Ottoman Empire be increased to twenty percent. The United States agreed on the basis of its being applied equally to all nations; but the European powers objected and no increase was made⁹⁷. The Ottoman government bided its time until 1883 when another attempt was made to increase the import duty; but again the powers refused. The United States objected to the increased duties if they were not collected on the exports of the nations. The Porte stated in 1884 that the Treaty of 1862 was null and void. The United States did not accept this unilateral termination of the treaty, but it henceforth based its claim for most-favored-nation treatment on

96 For text, see William Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers*, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1910-1913), Vol. II, 1321-1328. For the schedule of *ad valorem* duties, see the same work, 1328-1341.

97 Gordon, 162-63. For a brief review of the Ottoman financial condition in 1875 which made it imperative, in their eyes, to increase import duties, see Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1929), especially 76-80.

the Treaty of 1830. The United States and the European powers continued to object to any increase in the duty; consequently, the Porte was unable to change its import duties until 1907 when agreement of all powers, in return for various concessions, was finally obtained. A new duty of eleven percent on imports into Ottoman markets was effective from then until 1914. The concession to the American government for its agreement to this increase involved equality of treatment for American missionary institutions⁹⁸.

The positive impact of the 1862 Treaty on the Ottoman-American trade was not immediately perceivable. In fact, because of the American Civil War, the volume of imports from the Empire decreased from \$1,014,821 in 1861 to \$ 959,692 in 1862 and to \$663,350 in 1865. American exports to the Ottoman Empire for the same years followed a similar pattern, \$584,169, \$442,721, and \$614,187⁹⁹. During this period a number of American ships called at various Ottoman ports. In 1861, three United States vessels entered Beirut with a total tonnage of 1,286¹⁰⁰. At İzmir in 1864, 10 American ships cleared with total tonnage of 7,548; in the following year the number of vessels dropped to 8 and the tonnage was reduced to 5,876¹⁰¹. The decline in American shipping activity at İstanbul during 1861-1864 was best illustrated in the report of the British Consul-General Logie at the capital¹⁰² :

98 Gordon, 163-67. This dispute may be followed in the U.S., Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1875-1907.

99 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1862, 1864, and 1866), 1140, 1170, and 1268.

100 Great Britain, The House of Commons, *Accounts and Papers*, Beirut, LXX (1863): 449 (hereafter cited as *Accounts*, Beirut, Constantinople, Smyrna, Trebizond, etc.).

101 *Accounts*, Smyrna, LXIX (1866): 596, and LVII (1867): 156.

102 *Accounts*, Constantinople, LIXI (1866): 923. A glance at the shipping statistics (of İstanbul) of some major European countries during this period will provide a better perspective for America's position :

Country	1861*		1864*	
	No. of Ships	Tonnage	No. of Ships	Tonnage
British	1,323	442,085	1,607	571,544
Italian	2,028	621,469	2,289	643,410
Austrian	969	358,064	1,301	472,249

Year	No. of U.S. Ships Entered	Tonnage	No. of U.S. Ships Cleared	Tonnage
1861	72	29,186	71	28,840
1862	64	23,737	65	24,083
1863	26	13,255	26	13,255
1864	9	5,941	8	5,558

The exports of the United States to the capital consisted mainly of rum (total exports to the Ottoman Empire in 1862, \$339,920), dyewood, chains, coffee, and sugar. American cotton cloth, which had a modest success in the İstanbul market, no longer appeared on manifests and was quickly replaced by British produce. Ottoman exporters in İstanbul, on the other hand, shipped to the United States an increased amount of wool (\$392,616 worth in 1862), some mohair, chemicals, nuts, rags, and paper waste¹⁰³.

Immediately after the Civil War, American shipping showed increased activity. Between 1866 and 1869 over forty ships called at İzmir¹⁰⁴. The United States vessels, however, in line with the trend started in the 1850's would never regain their importance in the Levant. The volume of trade, on the other hand, almost immediately bounced back. American imports of \$ 866, 650 in 1866 jumped to \$1, 042, 912 in 1867, and increased to \$1, 781, 147 in 1869¹⁰⁵. Similarly, her exports advanced from \$ 570, 845 in 1866 to \$ 653, 195 in 1869. American petroleum which was used for illumination in the major Ottoman cities was replacing porpoise oil and it was now

Russian	611	237,152	727	238,675
French	396	139,209	557	212,675
Dutch	88	12,536	44	7,731

*(Ships entered İstanbul only.)

103 Items such as rags, madder root, licorice root, and valonia often appear on lists of Ottoman exports to the United States. For detailed information on these products and their use in various industries, the most helpful reference is J. R. McCulloch, *A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1847).

104 *Accounts, Smyrna*, LXVIII (1867-68): 226; LXIV (1870); and LXV (1871): 355.

105 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1867-1868 and 1870): 1301, 1348, and 1429.

carried to the interior on camels. From 292, 840 gallons in 1868, Ottoman import of this product increased to 443, 550 gallons in 1869. Distilled spirits, with 368, 674 gallons in 1867, contributed substantially to American exports, but later lost its importance in the Ottoman markets mainly because of high United States export duty and the Prussian supply of an inferior quality at lower prices¹⁰⁶.

The decade of the 1870's witnessed an unprecedented increase in Ottoman-American trade and a paradoxical phasing-out of the American merchant marine from the eastern Mediterranean scene. In 1870, for the first time American imports went over the two million mark, \$2,196,524; and with total exports of \$2,565,289, the United States experienced its third favorable trade balance with the Ottoman Empire. By 1876 Americans had become the fifth major trading partner of the Ottomans¹⁰⁷.

Country	Ottoman Exports	Ottoman Imports
Great Britain	\$31,000,000	\$51,000,000
France	9,300,000	37,540,000
Italy	2,700,000	7,720,000
Belgium	1,000,000	4,250,000
United States	3,101,000	1,497,000
The Netherlands	500,000	1,010,000

The year 1879 marked another first for the American merchants. Their exports to the Ottoman domains reached \$4,353,600, almost double the amount of their imports of \$2,209,685¹⁰⁸. This, however, was an exceptional year since Ottomans had just lost a war with Russia and during the previous two years their production had been substantially reduced. Simultaneously, American vessels were making their last calls at the Ottoman ports for the remainder of

106 *Consular Letters*, Smyrna, Smithers to Secretary of State Fish, 11 December 1869.

107 U.S., The Department of Commerce and Labor. *Commercial Relations of the United States With Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.), 1877: 49. The figures for the United States have been adjusted according to *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1877), Vol. 1760. All export-import figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

108 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1880): 1917.

the century. The British consular reports clearly indicate the dwindling of American ships in this region. For example, the number of American sailing vessels that called at Beirut would drop from 6 in 1870 to only one in 1872; at the port of İstanbul, against 4 ships that entered in 1870, only 2 would appear in 1879; at İzmir, where 12 American vessels called in 1871, 5 would anchor in 1873. Although this number would again increase to 8 in 1874 and to 10 in 1876, none would enter the port after the early 1880's¹⁰⁹.

The spectacular increase in American exports to the Ottoman Empire in this decade was partially caused by the sudden demand for mineral oils (\$890,535 in 1872) and fire arms and ammunition. The restriction on the importation of fire arms and ammunition in the Treaty of 1862 was removed by the Ottomans so that their army might be rearmed. In this connection an American resident in İstanbul recorded the importation of American arms and ammunition at the time of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78. He further stated that as of April 1877, the Ottoman army was equipped with, among others, 344,000 Martini (Peabody) and 39,000 Winchester rifles. During the War another 100,000 Martini rifles were received¹¹⁰. The American Minister Horace Maynard also reported, in October 1877, that several cargos of ordnance stores from the United States had reached the Empire since the beginning of the War¹¹¹.

Apart from these strategic exports, American petroleum continued to be an important item for Ottoman markets. In the early 1870's the Ottoman Empire yearly was consuming 400,000 cases of petroleum all imported from the United States and the use of it was becoming very popular even in the remote areas of the Empire¹¹².

109 *Accounts*, Beirut, LVIII (1872): 866, and LXVII (1874): 320; Constantinople, LVII (1872): 303, and LXXV (1880): 1873; Smyrna, LVIII (1872): 1358, LXVII (1874): 1003, LXXVII (1875): 1796, and LXXXIII (1877): 1040.

110 Henry Otis Dwight, *Turkish Life in War Time* (New York, 1881), 80, 84-5, 136, 161, and 163. These rifles were manufactured in New Haven; Connecticut (Winchester) and Providence, Rhode Island (Martini).

111 *Foreign Relations* (1877): 609-10.

112 Charles de Scherzer, *La Province de Smyrne* (Vienna, 1873), 221. Each case contained two barrels with ten gallon capacity. Consumption by region was as follows:

Most of the iron nails and timber imports of İzmir (£327,040 in 1875) had come from the United States as did a considerable amount of sugar, coffee, medicine, and provisions to various parts of the Empire. Ottoman exports to the United States consisted mostly of familiar produce—figs, opium, wool, rags, and paper waste. Fig shipments to America in the early 1870's were double of what they were in the previous decade¹¹³.

İzmir remained as the most active port for this trade. Exports and imports to and from the United States at other Ottoman ports, however, also showed a marked increase. At the port of Beirut, imports from the States averaged nearly \$65,000 for the first three years of the decade; İstanbul's exports rose partly because «thousands of mohair goats have been shipped to the United States of America»; \$12,798 worth of petroleum and metals for local consumption that found its way to Trabzon in 1874 increased to \$15,192 in 1878¹¹⁴.

In the last two decades of the century new trends had developed in American-Ottoman trade. American exports which had reached record proportions in the late seventies started declining in 1880, dropping as low as \$44,894 in 1890 (see Appendix III). In the following years, it gradually increased again, but stayed under a half a million dollars until 1899. The reasons for such a drastic decline were manifold. First, after the entry of one sailing vessel to İzmir in 1881, no American ship visited that port for almost two

İzmir	70,000 cases
Syrian Provinces	50,000 cases
Salonica	25,000 cases
Rest of the Empire	255,000 cases

For its popularity in Anatolia, see *Accounts, Trebizond*, LXXXI (1878-79): 1019 and LXVII (1874): 1629.

113 For example, from 25,000 *kintals** in 1863, it increased to 53,000 *kintals* in 1872. Scherzer, 124. *(One *kintal* equals a hundredweight-100 pounds in the United States.)

114 *Accounts*, Beirut, LXVI (1874): 321, and LXVII (1874): 1527; Constantinople, LXVII (1874): 1553; Trebizond, LXXVI (1875): 860, and LXXVI (1877-78): 1749. Figures for Trabzon should be read with caution since there are indications that some American exports were shown as English produce in the manifests of the British ships.

decades despite the fact that it remained the center for Ottoman exports to the United States (see Appendix IV). Neither did the American vessels visit İstanbul and Beirut during this period. Other major Ottoman ports such as Trabzon never appeared on the list of ports visited by the American merchant marine¹¹⁵. It was during this period that the British established a near monopoly on shipping to the eastern Mediterranean¹¹⁶. The schedule of freight rates threatened to seal off the entire market to American exporters between 1889 and 1898. This monopoly was not challenged until 1899 when an American shipping firm, Barber & Company of New York, opened direct service between New York and İzmir-İstanbul¹¹⁷. Although this service was discontinued in 1902, mainly because of pressures by London and Liverpool, shipping companies, other lines were established by German, French, Italian, and Greek firms. These were subsidized by their respective governments so that they could compete with the British lines. The transshipment services offered by these companies were utilized by American exporters for the rest of the period, but not to their full satisfaction.

Declining demand for fire arms and ammunition by 1892 was a second factor that caused a decrease in trade. The same was true for mineral oil; in 1892, its exports fell to the insignificant amount of \$20,948 from \$1,322,550 in 1882. Russia had opened oil wells and

115 *Accounts*, Smyrna, LXXIII (1883): 1039-1040, LXXXVI (1887): 2, and LXXXI (1889): 2; Constantinople, LXXIV (1883): 1732-33, and LXXXVIII (1894): 4; Beirut, XLIII (1897): 8; Salonica, XCVII (1893-94): 6; and Trebizond, LXXIV (1883): 2099, 2101-04, LXXXV (1901): 5 and 15 (for Samsun).

116 For example, in 1893 the British ships transported 75.7 percent of the total tonnage carried in and out of İstanbul. In 1894, their share increased to 77.5 percent, followed by Greece (7.6), Italy (2.2), Austria-Hungary (1.5), Germany (1.4), and the Ottoman Empire (0.8). *Accounts*, Constantinople, LXXXV (1901): 10. In İzmir, in 1900, the British held the lead with a total of 280,464 tons. *Accounts*, Smyrna LXXXV (1901): 10.

117 *Accounts*, Smyrna, XCVII (1900): 17-18. Only «13 sailings took place, the last one being in February, 1900.» *Accounts*, Smyrna, LXXXV (1901): 35. Actually the American line serviced until 1902. On the advantages provided by this line to American exporters, see U.S., The Department of State, *Reports From the Consuls of the United States* (Washington, D.C.), LXII (1900): 103 for Salonica; LXIII (1900): 501 for İstanbul, İzmir, and Salonica; and LX (1899): 245 in general. Hereafter these reports will be cited as *Consular Reports*.

started a fierce competition with American exporters. By employing American packaging and indeed copying well-known American brand names such as «Pratt's Radiant», Russia soon replaced the United States as the major supplier by offering inferior quality but cheaply priced oil from Baku¹¹⁸. And, finally, the notable absence of an American bank in the Ottoman capital or in İzmir limited the growth of the United States exports. The European powers had earlier recognized the importance of establishing financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire to boost their trade. In 1856 the British had formed the London-based Ottoman Bank in İstanbul, and the French had joined the enterprise in 1863 when the bank was reorganized with a branch in İzmir. Also, the French in 1871 independently established the İstanbul branch of Crédit Lyonnais, followed by a branch in İzmir in 1887. The Germans followed suit by opening branches of the Deutsche Bank and the Deutsche Palästina Bank. All these banks aided the merchants of their respective countries by supplying them with vital market information and by promoting their transactions with local merchants. Extension of credit to Ottoman importers, a practice especially important

118 See U.S., The Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (1887), Samuel Cox to Secretary of State, 5 April 1886. In 1886, the British consul at Trabzon reported that «Russian petroleum, though very inferior in quality, being considerably lower in price, has shut the market against America.» *Accounts, Trebizond, LXXXVI* (1887): 4. In the same year the consul also reported that «Petroleum now coming entirely from the Baku wells of Russia has increased, and is gradually superseding Belgian and French candles, which are already showing a decrease.» *Accounts, Trebizond, LXXXVI, No. 135* (1887): 3. This no doubt affected candle exports of the United States as well. On elimination of American petroleum from the Trabzon region, see also *Accounts, Trebizond, CIII* (1888): 3.

Again, the British consul at Beirut reported in 1900 that «Petroleum is imported exclusively from Batum.» *Accounts, Beirut, LXXXV* (1901): 8. At Erzurum, where petroleum from the United States was regularly imported, the total amount of United States petroleum brought in during 1895 amounted to only \$220. *Consular Letters, Erzurum, Leo Bergholz to Assist. Sec. W.W. Rochhill, 20 October 1896*. On competition between the American and Russian petroleum distributors, see *Foreign Relations* (1888-1889), 1557, 3 December 1888; and 710-11, 3 December 1889 (both covering the Ottoman Empire in general and İzmir in particular).

in the Ottoman Empire where domestic credit was lacking, enhanced the trade of the European firms.

Some American manufactured goods, albeit in limited quantities, began making inroads into the Ottoman markets in this period. Sewing machines, agricultural implements, coal stoves, and electrical appliances were imported by some major Ottoman firms¹¹⁹. This category of American exports would receive its greatest impetus after World War I.

In contrast to exports, American imports from the Ottoman Empire in the 1880's and 1890's markedly increased¹²⁰:

Year	American Imports
1881	\$2,720,524
1886	3,665,269
1891	4,664,968
1896	6,037,949
1897	6,853,611
1898	4,444,415
1899	5,644,080

During these two decades several Ottoman export items, especially opium, figs, and raisins between 1891 and 1900 (see Appendix V),

119 In 1883, for example, some people in Beirut established small garment industries by using American sewing machines. Importation of ready-made clothes from Austria and Switzerland in the mid-1890's, however, drove most of these entrepreneurs out of business. *Accounts*, Beirut, XI (1883-84): 644. On «Opening for stoves in Asia Minor», see *Consular Reports*, LIX (1899): 140, and III, No. 10 (August 1881), J. B. Marengo, U. S. consular agent at Trabzon to Consul-General Dickinson.

In 1898, the United States consul at Sivas (a central Anatolian city) M. A. Jewett reported that «the Singer Sewing Machine Company is the only American company which has yet penetrated Asia Minor, and the agent here is being rewarded by a good and increasing sale of machines». *Commercial Relations* (1898), II: 1165. In 1899, consul Jewett also reported that only Russian oil could be found in the city markets, and «a few cases of Milwaukee beer appeared in Sivas, but proved to be too expensive-16 cents per bottle». *Commercial Relations* (1899), 875.

120 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1882, 1887, 1892, 1897, 1899, 1900): passim.

consistently stood out. Opium contributed more than any other product to Ottoman exports to the United States, 15.3 percent of the total between 1881 and 1900¹²¹. For this same period, Ottoman opium exports composed 5.2 percent of the Empire's total exports to all countries¹²². The expansion of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century increased the American demand for Anatolian opium with high morphine content. Also, from 1880 the direction of opium trade had changed. After the Sino-American treaty in that year which forbade American opium imports to China, almost all the opium purchased by American companies in İzmir, İstanbul, Selanik, and elsewhere was carried to American ports on the east coast. Fig exports which totaled \$335,169 in 1884 had since been surpassed by opium; nonetheless, along with raisins, it remained an important Ottoman export item¹²³. Wool exports, \$134,589 in 1880 and \$435,599 in 1890, also contributed favorably to the Ottoman trade balance.

Starting in the early 1880's the export of licorice root, cultivated in the hinterlands of İzmir, reached amazing proportions. It was used in the United States for flavoring chewing tobaccos, in manufacturing of confectioneries, and in the making of soft drinks, and was imported free of duty. In 1880 about one-half of the licorice crop of that region was shipped to the United States. In the years that followed, the increased output of these industries in America gave a powerful stimulus to Ottoman production. In 1886 its exports amounted to \$1,068,870, approximately one-third of the total United States imports from the Ottoman domains; in 1887, it increased to \$1,437,928. By the last decade it leveled off and varied between

121 Percentages are mine and are based on the figures in *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1882-1900/1901), passim.

122 Percentages based on figures given by Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Başvekâlet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Ticaret Muvazenesi, 1878-1913* [Trade Balance of the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1913] (Ankara, 1939), 62 and 73.

123 For a detailed discussion on «Fruit Culture in Asia Minor», see the report of consul W.E. Stevens, Smyrna, 28 February 1884, in *Consular Reports*, XII (1884), No. 41 1/2, 744-48.

one-half million and a million dollars¹²⁴. Other items such as rags and hides, also sporadically contributed to the increase of Ottoman exports¹²⁵.

Turkish carpets and rugs, all-hand-made in the provinces of western Anatolia, had entered the American markets in small quantities early in the century. By the 1880's a taste for oriental rugs had developed in the United States and in 1888-1889 American imports of «Turkish rugs» totaled \$1,650,691¹²⁶. During the following decade it remained an important export item from İzmir and İstanbul particularly to New York, Boston, and Philadelphia dealers.

* * *

124 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1887, 1889): 2475 and 2552. In 1890 and 1892, for instance, licorice root imports were \$570,120 and \$825,628 respectively. Ibid., (1891 and 1893): 2853-54, and 3102. In 1912, MacAndrews and Forbes, licorice importers, formed their own shipping line-American Levant Line-to carry their cargos from İzmir. DeNovo, 42.

125 In 1881, \$360,832 worth of cotton and linen rags were shipped to America for use in paper industry. In 1883, exports of hides and skins totaled \$201,168, and reached \$266,803 in 1892. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1882, 1884, 1893): 2025, 2197, and 3102. Exportation of chromium, a major item in the Turkish-American trade in the following century, also started assuming importance at the end of the nineteenth century; Ottoman exports in 1900 totaled \$289,502. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1900): 4126.

126 *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (1889-1890): 2647 and 2737. Also see *Accounts*, Smyrna, LXXXV (1901) 6-7. For production figures, see Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1894), Vol. III, 407-8.

127 In 1891, export figures for İzmir show that the United States, with 9,140,110 francs, ranked third in importance among fifteen countries, preceded only by Great Britain (40,493,350 francs) and Austria (13,470,079 francs). Cuinet, 430-431.

Imports from the United States reached other ports of the Empire; for Trabzon, see Cuinet, Vol. I, 31, 34-35. One Ottoman produce, tobacco, which became a chief export item early in this century, is conspicuously absent from the lists of major American imports during the nineteenth century. It was only after 1902, when the «Turkish blend» cigarettes were introduced in the United States, that American firms began importing large quantities of leaf tobacco. «In 1928 the value of [American] tobacco imports amounted to approximately 50 percent of the value of all imports [from Turkey]... Formerly the United States purchased from 50 to 60 percent of all tobacco exported from Turkey, but in recent years Italy and Germany have become increasingly important as markets for Turkish tobacco. As a result American imports for 1928 constituted only 24 percent of the total...» Gordon, 83. Also see 84-86.

Closing the Century :

In 1900, the total trade between the United States and the Ottoman Empire reached \$8,321,249, American imports constituting \$7,754,237 of this value. Since the commercial treaty of 1862, the Ottomans closed every year but six with favorable trade balances (see Appendix IV). It is not surprising to see that those years where the United States showed export balances all fell into the decade of the 1870's. Undoubtedly, the political upheavals in the Balkan territories of the Empire, the 1877-1878 war with Russia, the unbearable burden of public debt, and political instability in the capital, all in different manners, impeded the export capacity of the Empire. Ottoman exports to the United States had stayed agricultural in nature and İzmir remained the major export center for such produce¹²⁷. The major portion of American exports to the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, were at first colonial, then increasingly domestic, and finally included manufactured goods.

Generally, American merchants conducting business in the Ottoman domains during the second half of the nineteenth century suffered from the absence of American shipping between the United States and Ottoman ports. Equally important, they also felt the inconvenience and difficulties arising from the lack of extensive consular services throughout the Empire as well as the timidity of the United States consuls there in promoting the trade. As far as establishment of regular United States shipping services was concerned, although an attempt was made at the turn of the century, American firms had to wait until 1918. The involvement of the United States consuls in the promotion of trade, however, came earlier.

By the turn of the century, President William McKinley's (1897-1901) policy of commercial diplomacy had been felt in the Ottoman Empire. Under instructions from the President, the American Minister in İstanbul, Oscar Straus, entered negotiations with the Porte to raise the status of the United States legation from a mission to an embassy in accordance with the Act of 3 March 1893. This status would not be granted until 1906, but American efforts indicate the importance placed by the United States on Ottoman relations. In March 1899, Straus emphasized the importance of trade between the two countries and said :

I have every reason to believe that if enterprising American houses would study this market and establish agencies under American representatives, they would in the course of a short time do a profitable and, in many articles and products of manufacture, a large business. But, in order to extend such trade, it would be advisable to send in first instance agents with American energy and reliability. A knowledge of the French or German language, or both, would be of great advantage¹²⁸.

At the same time, the United States Consul-General Charles M. Dickinson in Istanbul, after the establishment of a new United States shipping line to Ottoman ports, reported on 7 April 1899 that:

It may interest American manufacturers to know that the latest steamer of the new steamship line between New York and Constantinople brought three locomotives to Alexandria for the railway through the Soudan. The efforts to extend American commerce in Turkey is assuming such proportions that not only the newspapers of this region, but those of England, Germany, and Austria are sharply calling the attention of their readers to the fact that a new and dangerous commercial rival has entered the field¹²⁹.

Dickinson was, in fact, referring to frequent publication of articles in major trade journals and newspapers appearing in European capitals, all emphasizing the potential growth of exports for American manufactures to the Levant. A dispatch, filed by a British commercial inspector from Vienna that appeared in the *London Times* of 22 March 1899, reported:

Sooner or later the European powers will find in the Americans a dangerous rival in the Eastern markets... When the Americans once secure a hold on the markets of the Levant, their vast resources, their business capacity and

128 *Consular Reports*, LX (1899): 246. For Straus's career in Istanbul, see Oscar S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft* (Boston, 1922).

129 *Consular Reports*, LX (1899): 573. The new United States shipping line was viewed as a major threat by the British shipping agencies. Only a few weeks after its inception, «the Cunard and three other companies carrying freight to the United States by transshipment at Liverpool have already combined, and orders have come from Liverpool to make any cuts in rates that may be necessary 'to kill the Yankee Line.'» *Consular Reports* LX (1899): 76.

energy, and the vigilance of their consuls will give them the lead in many classes of goods. The industrial states of Europe, and foremost among them, Austria-Hungary, are warned by the *Deutsche Zeitung* of the danger with which they are threatened by American exportation¹³⁰.

As Consul-General Dickinson issued circulars to all American consuls in the Empire to take all necessary steps to improve the position of American manufactures in the Levant, Ali Ferruh Bey, the head of the Ottoman legation in Washington, entered negotiations with the Department of Agriculture for the appointment of agricultural specialists to Ottoman provinces. Among his proposals was one for the opening of a factory in Istanbul to produce agricultural machinery under the direction of Mr. Caleb Witehead. The negotiations, however, were suddenly dropped when Dr. Herman Schoenfelt, a German resident of Washington, D.C., was appointed Ottoman Consul-General to the United States. Although Dr. Schoenfelt «did not accept the idea of those that maintain that closer relations between Turkey and the United States may prejudice the German interests»¹³¹, he did little during his tenure to help promote American-Ottoman trade.

As American consular reports reveal, the United States consuls and agents in the Ottoman Empire during the last years of the decade started assuming major responsibilities for promoting American trade. Copies of reports from consuls of other countries were often attached to American reports indicating the extent of commercial intelligence. They were no longer interested only in the affairs of American residents in their districts but often made comparative reviews of commerce between the Ottoman Empire and her European allies. At the end of one such report in September 1899, Dickinson stated:

The manufacturers and exporters of the United States should understand that their German competitors are extremely watchful and aggressive in their commercial

130 *The London Times*, 22 March 1899. For some translations of various articles in European journals that were sent to Washington, see *Consular Reports*, LXI (1899): 559, from the *Cologne Gazette*; and LXII (1900): 164-65, from the *French National Journal of Foreign Commerce*, Paris.

131 *Consular Reports*, LXI (1899): 559.

work in this country, and the energies of their consular officials and subordinates are freely given to this branch of the service. I note these facts for the purpose of informing the Bureau of Foreign Commerce and those interested in the export trade that there is pressing necessity for earnest and united effort, if any marked advance is to be made in behalf of American commerce¹³².

In the early 1890's German firms formed a trade association in İstanbul. It was a branch of the Export Verband Deutschen Maschinenfabrik und Hüttenwerke established in Berlin around 1890 with membership of over a hundred manufacturers to promote exportation of industrial goods. The association had «premises in Galata [the most active business district in İstanbul], where specimens of various machinery [could] be seen, ploughs, traction engines, pumps, etc., and show rooms full of all kinds of tools and implements»¹³³. It also sent samples and technicians to various towns in the interior of the Empire. In a few years, German manufactures reached the remotest corners of the Ottoman domains.

In order to prevent the domination of German manufactures in Ottoman markets and to advance American exports, Dickinson in 1899 established a permanent exhibition of American goods in İstanbul, and later in İzmir. As sixty American companies displayed and sold their manufactures at the exhibition, Dickinson also «succeeded in concluding with a local banker an arrangement thanks to which the future establishment will be protected from the risks necessarily incurred in granting credit in a foreign place. Without credit, in short, it would scarcely be possible to conduct business»¹³⁴. Thus at least temporarily, one major handicap to American commerce was overcome. Prior to this, while European companies sold their products on credit to Ottoman buyers, American exporters could offer only cash sales.

A few months after the opening of the exhibition the Consul-General reported:

¹³² Ibid., 558.

¹³³ *Accounts*, Constantinople, LXXXVIII (1894): 8, Acting Consul-General Wrench to the Earl of Kimberley, 10 May 1894.

¹³⁴ *Consular Reports*, LXII (1900): 164-65.

There have been substantial additions within the last thirty days to the number of American exporters under whose auspices an exposition has been opened in this city. The combination now includes 108 manufacturers and exporters, and negotiations with others are in progress The American end of the combination will be in the hands of its agents-W.S. Bigelow & Co., of New York-and with direct steamship communications, goods can be shipped directly to the Constantinople concern or to branch houses at the Mediterranean ports as circumstances may require¹³⁵.

The companies that were represented in the exhibition (see Appendix VI for a partial listing), competed directly with German and British manufacturers of similar products which already had a hold in the Ottoman markets.

The activities of American companies, despite the low volume of their exports, and the efforts of the United States consuls, were carefully watched by political and commercial representatives of European countries. In a dispatch filed to the Foreign Office in mid-1900, the British Vice-Consul at İstanbul, Sarell, dealt extensively with American trade and apprehensively reported that:

A determined attempt is being made to obtain a footing on this market for American goods. The Consul-General of the United States is extremely active in the matter, and he has recently initiated an «exhibition» or sample warehouse of American goods so as to make them known on this market. Through the influence of the Consul-General a very well-known Greek banker has been induced to invest capital in the establishment of this depot under the name of «American Oriental Agency»; handsome premises have been engaged in a prominent position, and a large assortment of samples of American goods are displayed in a very attractive manner. The establishment should prove an excellent advertisement for the firms whose goods are to be seen there. The field covered is very wide, and samples have been collected of house and office furniture, hardware, wall and other papers, leather and electro-plated goods, cottons, ropes, belting, machinery of various kinds, typewriters, & c.¹³⁶

135 Ibid.

136 *Accounts, Constantinople, LXXXV (1901): 35.*

In 1899, the total trade of İzmir had amounted to £6,345,666; with £3,265,925, the British share was 51.5 percent of the port's imports and exports. Austria-Hungary with 14.6 (£926,035), France with 7.9 (£504,149), Italy with 5.6 (£354,733), and Germany with 4.8 (£306,844) followed. The United States trade had totaled £175,921, or 2.8 percent¹³⁷. The following year presented a similar picture. In the trade of the Empire as a whole, in 1900 American goods had made up less than one percent of Ottoman imports while British, French, and Italian shares, for instance, stood at 33.9, 12.1, and 5.4 percent respectively. As regards Ottoman exports, the United States had received only 3.7 percent of the total, while Britain, France, and Italy imported 35.4, 30.5, and 4.5 percent¹³⁸. It seems, therefore, that the concerns expressed by the British and other Europeans regarding the American competition in the Ottoman markets were based on the potential United States trade rather than actual figures. Indeed, they would prove to be right when the total Ottoman-American trade would reach \$24,171,596 in 1914.

At the turn of the century the variety of American goods entering Ottoman markets had considerably increased. In April 1900, Consul-General Dickinson, thrilled with acceptance of American consumer products, reported as follows:

The American goods and products delivered at Smyrna, Constantinople, and Salonica include pumps, phonographic goods (nearly 4,550 pounds), leather, rubber boots and shoes, large variety of hardware, cotton cloth, tinware, lamp goods, wooden ware, milling machinery, cotton belting, mowing machines, chairs and other furniture, clocks, iron bedsteads, one Mosler safe, paints, lard and oleo, domestics, flour, and nearly 6,000 kegs of wire nails ... a few other articles of American manufacture appear to have taken possession of the Levantine markets. In the opinion of good judges, many other staple articles will be equally popular when once fairly introduced. For the first time in the history of Constantinople, as I am in-

137 *Accounts*, LXXXV (1901): 9, Report on the Trade of Smyrna and District for the Year 1900, by Mr. Vice-Consul Hampson, 27 May 1901. Percentages are based on the figures given by Hampson.

138 See *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Ticâret Muvazenesi*, 30-31, and 35.

formed, some of the leading stores, notably the Bon Marche and Hayden Brothers, have given orders for a line of American boots and shoes. They are so far superior to those of European manufacture that importers have every confidence in their extensive sale¹³⁹.

There was cause for Dickinson's optimism; no doubt the Ottoman population in major urban centers had long since acquired a taste for European and more recently for American goods. Political events of the next few decades and subsequent changes in economic policies, however, placed different priorities on this trade. Particularly in the early years of the Turkish Republic the emphasis was placed mainly on capital goods, and the United States increasingly participated in this development.

* * *

In the early decades of the nineteenth century the development of American commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire had remained in the hands of New England merchants and sea captains. American ships anchored at İzmir with rum, some cotton cloth, and colonial goods, and sailed out with opium, figs, raisins, raw wool, skins, and hides. The Treaty of 1830 which established formal diplomatic relations between the two countries also opened the Ottoman markets for American trade. Even though the treaty was in some respects unsatisfactory, the most-favored-nation status that it mutually accorded was the cornerstone of Ottoman-American diplomatic and commercial relations throughout the century. The United States adherence to the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 and reaffirmation of her trading rights in 1862 further developed Ottoman- American trade in the later decades.

Notwithstanding the decline of the United States shipping in the Mediterranean after the 1870's and its failure to recover because of the British monopoly from the 1880's, American imports from the Ottoman Empire increased. As licorice root, linen rags, rugs, and

139 *Consular Reports*, LXIII (1900): 501, Constantinople, 14 April 1900.

chromium entered the United States, the products upon which the early trade was based kept their prominence. Indeed, opium, figs, and raisins consistently composed a major portion of Ottoman exports. Naturally İzmir, the major outlet for regions raising such produce, remained the center of trade. The nature of American exports, on the other hand, changed more substantially. Early trade in colonial items gradually gave way to domestic produce and later these were displaced by manufactured goods. Throughout the century, with the exception of a few years, the Ottomans maintained a favorable trade balance. Thus Ottoman-American trade followed a different pattern than the Empire's trade with European nations.

In the intense competition to supply the Ottoman markets with manufactured goods, the foreign banks established in İstanbul and İzmir played an important role. Besides the lack of regular American shipping in the Levant, the absence of an American bank handicapped the United States exporters. Even so, American firms sought increased participation in this market. At the turn of the century a new factor entered the Ottoman-American commercial relations. The modest efforts of the United States consuls in promoting commerce at the major trading centers in the Ottoman Empire in the early decades were replaced by more energetic endeavors. They soon matched the zealous activities of their European counterparts who had been in these markets much earlier. Their efforts, however, began to bear fruit only in the twentieth century.

APPENDIX I

American Opium, Figs, and Raisins Imports from the Ottoman Empire 1831-1860

(in U.S. Dollars)

Years	Opium ^(a)	Figs and Raisins ^(b)
1831-1835	\$533,579	\$ 468,873
1836-1840	746,766	577,542
1841-1845	301,972	396,806
1846-1850	492,612	485,967
1851-1855	292,185	623,823
1856-1860	157,870	1,211,117

Source : U.S., The Department of Treasury. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1832-1861).

Notes : (a) These figures do not include the opium carried by American ships directly from Ottoman ports to China, or opium purchased by Americans but entered the United States on British ships via Liverpool and London.

(b) The bulk of these amounts is fig imports. Until the 1880's, Spain remained the chief supplier of raisins to the United States, followed by the Ottoman Empire and Greece; in the early 1890's, Ottomans surpassed Spain.

APPENDIX II

Ottoman-American Trade, 1831-1860
(in U.S. Dollars)

Years ^(a)	Ottoman Imports	Ottoman Exports	Ottoman Balance of Trade
1831-1835	\$1,750,911	\$3,188,335	\$1,437,424
1836-1840	1,629,247	3,157,731	1,528,484
1841-1845	657,071	2,335,357	1,678,286
1846-1850	654,334	2,919,823	2,265,489
1856-1860	4,123,138	4,200,565	77,427 ^(b)

Source : U.S., The Department of Treasury. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1832-1861).

Notes : (a) From 1831 through 1841, years ending September 30; for 1842, year ending October 1; thereafter years ending June 30. Also see Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930, An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia, 1932), 46.

(b) American export balance of \$167,150 for 1855, and \$662,897 for 1856.

APPENDIX III

Ottoman-American Trade, 1866-1900
(in U.S. Dollars)

Years(a)	Ottoman Imports	Ottoman Exports	Ottoman Balance of Trade
1866-1870	\$ 4,914,091	\$ 7,362,868	\$ 2,448,777 (c)
1871-1875	9,920,391	8,458,319	(1,462,072) (c)
1876-1880 (b)	10,079,002	9,342,915	(736,087) (c)
1881-1885	5,766,396	14,821,283	9,054,887
1886-1890	2,303,616	22,708,327	20,404,711
1891-1895	879,155	24,605,036	23,725,881
1896-1900	1,740,921	30,734,292	28,993,371

Source : U.S., The Department of Treasury. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1867-1900/1901). Also see Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930* (Philadelphia, 1932), 47.

Notes : (a) Years ending June 30.

(b) Does not include 1877.

(c) American export balances of :

\$ 368,765 in 1870
 342,724 in 1872
 445,956 in 1873
 2,059,545 in 1875
 1,604,571 in 1876
 2,143,915 in 1879

APPENDIX IV

Ottoman Exports From İzmir, 1882-1885

Countries	1882	1883	1884	1885
Britain	£ 1,778,632	£ 1,653,829	£ 2,128,034	£ 1,706,565
France	622,056	811,366	673,828	605,812
Austria-Germany	393,894	641,120	545,244	501,982
United States	367,447	582,500	502,582	563,849
Italy	165,567	204,272	247,818	254,417
Holland	191,256	192,572	159,526	216,608
Spain	125,006	152,760	256,671	200,622
Russia	90,900	177,448	158,365	159,358
Rumania	12,090	22,973	4,194	5,163
Belgium	6,212	24,342	84,161	33,578
Greece	2,840	15,900	3,314	16,325
Egypt & Other Ottoman Provinces	85,962	231,674	56,646	51,061
TOTAL	£ 3,841,862	£ 4,710,756	£ 4,820,383	£ 4,315,340

Source : Great Britain, The House of Commons. *Accounts and Papers*. Smyrna:
LXXXVI (1887): 8.

APPENDIX V

American Opium, Figs, and Raisins Imports from the Ottoman Empire

Year	Opium	Figs	Raisins	Total Imports from the Ottoman Empire	Percent of Opium to Total	Percent of Figs and Raisins to Total
1891	\$760,241	\$486,767	\$123,218	\$4,664,968	16.3	13.1
1892	868,799	314,699	109,959	4,969,029	17.5	8.5
1893	834,920	455,643	185,585	5,777,846	14.5	11.1
1894	1,282,287	234,174	75,316	3,930,391	32.6	7.9
1895	652,588	378,679	178,956	5,262,802	12.4	10.6
1896	551,384	563,851	276,662	6,037,949	9.1	13.9
1897	1,784,646	449,844	286,832	6,853,611	26.0	10.7
1898	50,252	406,213	219,170	4,444,415	1.1	14.1
1899	843,528	189,728	203,137	5,644,080	14.9	5.3
1900	751,205	434,539	110,760	7,754,237	9.7	8.2

Source : U.S., The Department of Treasury. *Commerce and Navigation Reports* (Washington, D.C., 1892-1900/1901).

APPENDIX VI

Partial Listing of the American Companies
at the Permanent Exhibition
in İstanbul in 1899

American Cutlery Company
Buffalo Forge Company
C. H. Mulford Company
Cleveland Store Fixture Company
Cliff Paper Company
Concord Rubber Company
Ely Hoe and Fork Company
Fairbanks Scale Company
Goulds Manufacturing Company
Hecker, Jones, Jewell Milling Company
Henry Diston and Sons Ltd.
Mosler-Bowen Safe Company
New Home Sewing Machine Company
New Haven Clock Company
North Packing and Provision Company
Payne Engine Company
Sargeant Lock Company
Standard Heating Company
Swift & Company of Chicago
United States Glass Company
Van Camp's Packing Company
Wright Shovel Company

Source : U.S., The Department of States. *Reports From the Consuls
of the United States*. Vol. LXII (1900) : 65.