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TRANSFORMED TO POLITICAL PARTIES

AUTHORS: Yasar Pinar ÖZMEN,Ruziye TALI

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FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO POLITICAL CONFLICT: TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TRANSFORMED TO POLITICAL PARTIES[*]

Yaşar Pınar ÖZMEN[1] **Ruziye TALİ**[2]

Abstract

Although the strategy used by terrorist organizations and political parties is different, the most obvious thing in common is that they have a political goal. In countries where terrorism is widespread, it is observed that there are poverty, corruption, injustice in political representation, and instability, and non-inclusive political institutions. In order for a terrorist organization to abandon acts of violence, these reasons must be eliminated to a certain extent. Transformation of organizations to political parties takes place by combining structural and strategic factors. In this context, how and under what conditions a terrorist organization turns into a legal political party identity is the subject of this study. For this purpose, terrorist organizations with a long history and an important sociological basis examined comparatively. It has been observed that the transformation to political parties takes place through peace processes and self-dissolution. Negotiations with terrorist organizations can start under a combination of conditions as follows; realizing that no solution can be reached with violence, weakening the organization, the emergence of a serious need for reconciliation, the support of the national and international public opinion for this reconciliation, focusing on the solution of the factors that motivate the conflict.

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[1]**Corresponding Author:** Assistant Professor, Yozgat Bozok University, ORCID: 0000-0003-2970-1110, pinar.ozmen@bozok.edu.tr.
[2] PhD, Independent Researcher, ORCID: 0000-0003-3650-1571, ruziyetali@yahoo.com.

1. Introduction

Terrorism is a dynamic concept that shows different characteristics according to historical context, but in all circumstances, it has been an expression of violence used for a political purpose. It is defined as that "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives" (NATO, 2021). The political objectives of terrorism are based on the illegitimacy of the dominant ruling order. In countries where terrorism is widespread; poverty, corruption, injustice in political representation, uncertainty, and political institutions that are not inclusive are observed. In order for a terrorist organization to partially or completely abandon acts of violence, these structural reasons must be eliminated to a certain extent. In this context, the process of abandoning the violent acts of a terrorist organization and transforming into legal political party identity constitutes the subject of work.

This study contributes to the literature by comparing terrorist organizations that have become political parties in terms of structural and strategic factors. The fundamental research question is how and under what conditions this transformation of terrorist organizations takes place. First, the conceptual framework and scope of the study were established by evaluating comparative studies on the relationship between political parties and terrorism. Groups that have changed from terrorist organizations to political parties are classified in terms of their goals and the basis on the basis on which their legitimacy is based. Then, the scope of the study is specified, and the method is explained. As a result of the comparative analysis, it was concluded that the transformation from terrorist organizations to political parties was mainly the result of either peace processes, or self-laying down their arms. The data obtained by comparing the transformation processes were evaluated in the results section. Ending an internal conflict in general; it is possible for the parties to understand that they cannot reach any solution with violence, that there is a serious need for reconciliation, that the national and international public support this compromise, and that similar elements such as the focus on solving the factors that motivate the conflict come together. In this case, when evaluated in terms of benefit/cost, there is a need for a terrorist organization to strategically carry its objectives to the political sphere.

2. Conceptual Framework

Comparative studies on the interaction between political parties and terrorist groups were not studied much in the academy until the 1990s. It can be said that these studies started systematically with Weinberg for the first time (Weinberg, 1991:423-438). Terrorist groups and political parties often share a common goal - to engage in some kind of political change, but the biggest difference is the strategy they use to achieve their goals (Wiegand, 2009:670). In the latest empirical research has presented evidence that terror groups shift their focus from violence to non-violent forms of politics in order to "either survive against the state government or that the path to politics was the only viable path to achieve their organizational objectives" (Black & Jabbour, 2023:15). In the literature, it has begun to focus on the costs and benefits associated with a transition to participating in politics especially from the perspectives of the terrorist groups (see Martin, 2014).

In the literature, the relationship between political parties and terrorist organizations, or more generally the tendency to resort to violence rather than traditional political paths, is examined with two main approaches. Structural approaches are focused on the characteristics of the political regime. It has been observed that structural characteristics such as the formation of the system with majority, or proportional representation, the fragmentation of the party system (Piazza, 2010:22) at the local level, and the effect of the ideology of the ruling party on state policies are effective in resorting to acts of terrorism (Danzell, 2011:100). It is uncovered an inverse U-shaped relationship between regime type and alternative forms of terrorism based on empirical evidence (Gaibulloev et al., 2017:503). Accordingly, rigid autocracies and consolidated democracies are much less affected by terrorism. In recent years, it shows that terrorist groups have found ground in emerging democracies and transitional states, as well as failed states.

The strategic approach dealt with terrorist organizations as 'rational actors' who engaged in armed actions in order to realize their political objectives. In the academy, the method of 'case study' have mostly adopted a strategic approach. For example, an empirical analysis shows that terrorist groups use two alternative mechanisms relating to governments. One of them is a strategic conflict avoidance resulting in reduced violence, or the other is increasing violence to push governments to make a mistake or to show their inabilities (Tokdemir & Klein, 2021:743).

Structural and strategic approaches provide a complementary theoretical framework for explaining the relations of terrorist organizations with political parties. Black and Jabour (2023)

use structural and strategic approaches simultaneously while comparing four transformation cases in their study. Terrorist organizations, which are rational actors, are eager for change to achieve their goals when they were incentivized by the government system to continue as a political group rather than a violent one. However, terrorist groups when becomes dissatisfied with their situation within the process, or there is a lack of government credibility, the return to violence is always a viable option (Black & Jabbour, 2023:15).

When the interactions between armed organizations and political parties are examined, the following points are noted in terms of determining the scope of this study:

(1) Some of the terrorist organizations use the party name, although it is not a legal party. Marxist-Leninist armed groups in particular prefer to call themselves political parties. For example, the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), The Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), etc.

(2) Some terrorist organizations exist as the military wing of political parties. The striking example of this is the relationship between the Fascist Party and the Black Shirts, founded in Italy in 1921 and disbanded in 1943. In addition, during the Cold War period, many Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Castroist, Trotskyist and so on terrorist organizations, especially in Asia and Latin America, operated as the armed wing of communist and revolutionary socialist parties.

(3) At the same time, many paramilitary organizations (such as the Blackshirts) that acted together with the army and police forces against Marxist-Leninist groups, and representatives of the anticommunist struggle also existed in the political party identity. During the civil conflicts between 1970 and 1980, there was an organic connection between mostly nationalist and racist right-wing parties and paramilitary terrorist groups.

(4) Some structures can exist as both a social movement, a political party, and an armed organization. Therefore, these structures are often classified as 'violent non-state actors'. Lebanon's Hezbollah is typical of this (see Wiegand, 2009:673).

(5) The majority of national liberation movements primarily completed their struggle with an armed organization and became the first legitimate founding political party of an independent state they established. For example, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the Communist Party of Cuba, and Egypt Muslim Brotherhood (see Black & Jabbour,

2023) are the movements that some terrorist organizations today set a precedent for in order to establish a legitimate basis.

(6) Some of the terrorist organizations ended their violence and became political parties by dissolving themselves, or at the end of a peace process (negotiation). The subject of this article addresses this transformation, and the cases listed above are out of scope of the study. And in this study, it is not an objective to evaluate why some terrorist groups decide to participate in the electoral process, but not others. This kind of argument was tested using a large dataset of terrorist organizations in existence during the years 1968–2006 and with a case study and reached strong findings (see Brathwaite, 2013).

Terrorist organizations that become political parties are divided into three categories: ethno-nationalist/separatist, left or right ideological and religious. In addition, terrorist groups with special interests can be classified separately. Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism corresponds to violence deliberately used by ethnic groups and especially ethnic minorities to achieve the right to self-determination. The best-known example of ideologically targeted terrorist organizations is Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations[1]. In the twenty-first century, religious terrorist organizations became more common. This includes jihadist groups, sectarian groups and sometimes political parties that manipulate religious feelings and inflame religious radicalism and militancy. Religiously motivated terrorist organizations may be intertwined with an ethnically based conflict, e.g. Shiite in Lebanon and the Moro group in the Philippines.

3. Scope and Method

The scope of the study was created as a result of scanning the literature on political party relations with terrorist organizations. During the screening, terrorist organizations are classified according to their type (ethno-nationalist/separatist, ideological, religiously sourced) and the type of relationship with political parties. Among them, 9 organizations that have changed from terrorist organizations to political parties are included (see Annex 1). In the study, the transformation processes of the 9 terrorist organizations covered were discussed in terms of structural and strategic factors. As a source of data, case studies, researches, official documents, written and visual media and websites related to terrorist organizations were used. The basic data obtained are examined comparatively and summarized in a table. When the transformation

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[1] Maoist, Castroist, Trotskyist, etc. terrorist organizations are all covered in a single category as Marxist-Leninist in this study.

processes of 9 terrorist organizations into political parties are examined; 7 (IRA, FARC-EP, M-19, FMLN, URNG, RENAMO, MILF) have become political parties as a result of successful[2] peace processes, while 2 (ETA, Tupamaros) have self-dissolved and brought their arguments to the political sphere. Some have become a new political party; others have become a non-violent political entity within existing parties. A comparative examination of the conditions that led terrorist organizations and states to peace negotiations or their termination in terms of structural and strategic factors reveals the basic data of the research.

4. Transformation Processes of Terrorist Organizations to Political Parties

Within the scope of our study, two categories stand out when the processes of transformation from terrorist organizations to political parties are examined (for a summary of processes, see Annex 2): In the first case, peace process was carried out through dialogue between states and terrorist organizations. From the perspective of the negotiation processes of states and terrorist organizations, it is understood that each peace process has its own roots, problems, and dimensions (Özkan, 2018:89). At the end of the peace process, the terrorist organization turning into a political party after the ceasefire/handing over of weapons and the complete dissolution of the organization (Peace processes will be summarized under the headings below).

In the second case, terrorist organizations that were mostly diminished power, lost public support, and the legitimate ground on which they base themselves disappeared, were dissolving and bringing their arguments to the political sphere. ETA and Tupamaros are examples for this case.

ETA was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent Basque state. It started violent acts in 1968, carrying out his most violent acts until the early 1980s. ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in 2011, disarmed completely in 2017, and dissolved itself in 2018. ETA, which had fallen out of favor, declared a ceasefire during this period, and a controversial peace process began. Technical issues such as the status of exiles and detainees and disarmament have been discussed, but ETA announced that it is suspending peace talks, citing the Spanish government's reluctance (Duhart, 2019:408-409). Over time, the pressure on ETA increased, and ETA last declared a ceasefire in 2011. After their leader, Alejandro Zobarın Arriola was captured, mediators, including former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former

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[2] Although there have been some setbacks in the peace process, such as the FARC-EP, they are largely irreversible.

Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, and Irish nationalist Gerry Adams, forced ETA to cease operations.

Spain's new constitution and the intense fight against terrorism have been instrumental in its termination. In particular, the organization lost its influence and popular support, and it was severely weakened by the arrest of several of its leading members. At the end of the Franco era, Spain switched to a regional state system based on autonomy. In addition to the system of constitutional autonomy, the instruments of the EU (as it is now called) which Spain become a member in 1986, have been very influential in Spain's fight against ETA. The Basque Country, one of the richest regions of Spain, together with Catalonia, has the greatest autonomy under article two of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. It has the widest autonomy in Europe, The Basque country which can determine many policies such as education, health, security, and social welfare on its own, has not been able to prevent the idea of full independence. In 2005, for example, there was a request for the right to self-determination in the Basque parliament, but the Spanish parliament refused. Article 155 of the Constitution applies harsh sanctions against such demands.

The Basque nationalist coalition Herri Batasuna (Basque: People's Union), which existed with ETA with the same goal since 1978, became a political party in 2001 under the name Batasuna (Union). Batasuna was declared illegal by Supreme Court of Spain in 2003 based on the Spanish Constitution and organic law on political parties, as it maintains ties to ETA. The presence of some members and lawmakers convicted of terrorism offences in the past, the fact that some of their members were members of both ETA and the party, and the failure to condemn assassination by ETA by Batasuna senior management were enough to be considered terrorism-related. Batasuna denied any ties to ETA and condemned the attacks. In Spain, more than 10 parties linked to ETA were shut down for the same reason. After the closure of Batasuna, nationalist votes shifted to the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJP), which was founded in 1895, which won 10% of the vote in the Basque Region's local parliamentary elections in 2001. Since 2011, Batasuna's successor, the pro-independence socialist party Sortu, has five representatives in parliament (see Leonisio, 2022, for the voter support on political groups which are historically linked to ETA by its generic name the Basque Patriotic Left).

Transformation process of the Tupamaros of Uruguay was a little bit different. The Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T) was an urban-based armed organization founded in Uruguay in the early 1960s. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the communist

guerrilla movement (VietCong) in Vietnam in 1963 were instrumental in the emergence of most of the organizations in Latin America, and the Tupamaros as well. The organization, including socialist party members, anarchists, and Maoists, had a non-strict Marxist-Leninist ideology. Bank robberies with stolen weapons and uniforms during the economic crisis, bombings of transnational companies, robberies on food carts and the rich, and distribution of what they obtained to the poor provided them popular sympathy (Lessa, 2003:19-34). Jorge Pacheco Areco, who was elected president in the 1967 elections, declared a state of emergency in 1968 against a series of labor protests, revoking all constitutional guarantees. This movement led to increased actions by armed resistance organizations. After the adoption of constitutional reform in 1971, and dubious election fraud in 1973, the country became a dictatorship under military tutelage that lasted until 1985. During this period, the Tupamaros, was attacked, and many of its members were arrested and killed as a result of bloody conflicts. During the dictatorship, the leaders of the organization, including José Mujica, were held hostage in solitary confinement to be killed in any act of terrorism. Some members of the organization have also been deported to European countries. During the transition to the democratic system in 1985, political prisoners were freed, and the Tupamaros decided to join the Frente Amplio alliance, which they had previously supported. Since 1989, Frente Amplio alliance, together with other political groups and independent leaders, has transformed to a party (MPP). Especially after 2004, the political party with the most votes in the alliance was represented in various ministerial positions. The former Tupamaro leader José Mujica was elected president on November 29, 2009.

4.1. IRA – United Kingdom

Peace negotiations between the IRA and the United Kingdom were conducted through Sinn Féin, an Irish nationalist political party that dates back a long time (see Duhart, 2019 for a more detailed history). Sinn Féin, which defines itself as a left-wing party despite its extreme nationalist attitude towards the British government, and the IRA are intertwined organizations. Sinn Féin is known to be the political wing of the IRA, although they highlighted their separation, especially after the 1990s. Sinn Féin was subject to expulsion decisions and broadcasting bans in both the UK and Ireland, as many of its leaders are thought to be members of the IRA. After two decades of civil war, the first contact between the IRA and the British Government was initiated between 1987-1990, and it opened a line of communication with Sinn Féin using a "confidential backdoor" (Brún, 2008:13) channel that had been in place for many years. In fact, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, direct and indirect negotiations between the

British government and the IRA took place on many occasions. The contact in 1990 can be considered the first step in the strategy that led to the final agreement with the IRA. When the negotiations in the process up to this date were leaked to the public, they were considered a sign of political shift and exhaustion for the state and were interpreted as the desire of the British government to get rid of the Northern Ireland problem (Bew, 2011:17). Perhaps the most important reason for the start of the peace process is that both sides believed/understood that they could not win militarily. In the early 1980s, the IRA saw that it could not achieve a decisive victory through violence, and therefore, sought a political solution. For the British government, the IRA ceased to be an actor that can only be fought through military means. In 1990, the first request for political opening from the IRA took place on a very favorable basis for the parties (Powell, 2011:24).

The IRA's request for peace was the result of the organization's strategic decision to focus on the politicization process after IRA militant Bobby Sands died in prison after being elected as an independent member of parliament. This led to Sinn Féin, considered the political wing of the IRA, being regarded as a legal party and gaining support in Northern Ireland with the slogan 'ballot box-gun'. Sinn Féin published some documents in late 1980s and early 1990s that changed its old line and gave the impression that it was ready for dialogue (Alonso, 2016:522). Sinn Féin's leader Gerry Adams sent a letter to the prime minister, John Major, demanding the start of peace talks. Although the Major government declared unwillingness to sit down with terrorists, secret talks that had already begun earlier at the initiative of intelligence officer Michael Oatley continued. UK governments stated that they had never dealt with the IRA and had refused to accept secret conversations leaked to the press. Sinn Féin's inclusion in the peace process, despite the backlash, was meticulously constructed with great care, patience, and a sense of balance (Bew, 2011:18-19). The fact that Sinn Féin was able to be expertly involved in the process as a structural factor was peace's greatest achievement. In the process, allegations were raised that members of the leadership were on the IRA's military council, but these were not used by the British government not to make the process difficult (Özçağatay, 1998:153-154).

The first significant outcome of the talks was the signing of the Downing Street Declaration in December 1993 (Brún, 2008:13). The British and Irish governments agreed to achieve peace and a permanent end to the use or support of paramilitary violence, according to article 9 of the declaration, which sets the conditions for peace talks. Under these circumstances, it was stated that parties that were exclusively committed to peaceful methods and democratic

principles were free to fully participate in democratic politics and, when the time came, to participate in dialogue between governments and political parties. Although this declaration, whose purpose was to ensure a lasting ceasefire, carries some uncertainty, it served to establish the basic rules before the IRA ceasefire of August 31, 1994 (Bew, 2011:18). The ceasefire provided political progress by Sinn Féin formally sitting down with the British government. However, the IRA ended the ceasefire on February 9, 1996 due to some reasons such as the failure of the Major government to take concrete action because of the pressure of the Unionists, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew's proposition to hand over weapons from the IRA for the process to continue, and the failure to release IRA prisoners, and the continued violence of the Police Service of Northern Ireland against Catholics. The government's stance led to the IRA breaking the ceasefire. The IRA carried out a bomb attack in London, targeting the government, which it blamed for the blockade of the process.

The deteriorating negotiation process began to regain momentum when Labour Party came to power in 1997. As long as Tony Blair stopped the issue of "disarmament" that led to the cessation of negotiations, he made the biggest strategic contribution, and the talks continued openly or privately despite the reaction of pro-union Protestants. To further strengthen the trust environment, the Blair Government announced an independent investigation into the "Bloody Sunday" incident in 1972. In this period, it is seen that international actors played an important role. With the breakdown of the ceasefire, US. President Clinton stepped in and invited Gerry Adams to the White House. These contributed significantly to the negotiation process (Mansergh, 2011). In addition, the European Union (EU) provided a special programme of funds for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Brún, 2008:14). Sinn Féin demanded that the process leading to final peace be tied to a timetable at this stage. The IRA declared a ceasefire in 1997 and never again resorted to armed struggle except in isolated incidents.

Negotiations continued between other political parties, the Irish government and the British government, led by US Senator George Mitchell, General John de Chastelain of Canada and former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. This was the first official and public talks involving all parties to the conflict since the first negotiations that led to the partition of Ireland. Mitchell played a crucial role as a mediator in the negotiations, making an invaluable contribution to the outcome (Brún, 2008:15). These negotiations resulted in the historic Belfast Agreement, or Good Friday Agreement as it was popularly known after it was signed in 1998. The agreement was put to a referendum on May 22, 1998, and approved by 72% of the people of Northern Ireland and 94% of the people in the Republic of Ireland. The agreement includes

regulations on the constitution, political institutions, equality and human rights, weapons, victims of conflict, the release of political prisoners, policing, and justice. In July 2005, the IRA officially declared an end to the armed struggle and ordered its members to help develop political and democratic programs through purely peaceful means (Çınar, 2017:168). In September 2005, IRA confirmed that the handing over of weapons process had been completed.

4.2.FARC-EP and M-19 - Colombia

The decade-long civil war over a distorted state system created by injustice and socioeconomic inequality in resource sharing in Colombia ended in 1958 with a rotating governance solution between liberals and conservatives. This so-called solution failed to represent the interests of the lower classes of society and led to armed rebellion movements. During the Cold War, the FARC stood out as a representative of the peasant population that formed its own defense groups against state's operations, which received support within the framework of the US anticommunism policy. It evolved from a rural/regional movement into the largest armed revolutionary resistance group representing the entire Colombian countryside (Phelan, 2019:838). The main purpose of the FARC is to seize power and to carry out radical land reform through all kinds of military, political, or social struggles. Over time, the organization moved away from this goal, become an organization of illegal crimes such as drug production and trafficking, and lose public support. In 1982, the FARC added the phrase "People's Army" (Ejército del Pueblo) to its name to influence the public and changed it to FARC-EP, but continued to be called the FARC in the media and among the public.

Violence in Colombia since the 1980s had increased as a result of complex relations among the paramilitary groups collaborated by the official army and police, drug cartels and terrorist organizations. The decline of the industry along with narco-terrorism reduced the support to armed organizations by people who were tired of violence. This is when the government of President Betancur began developing a "national dialogue" with terrorist organizations including the M-19 (19 April Movement)[3] and FARC. In 1985, a large left-wing alliance party was formed under the name of the Patriotic Union (UP). However, as a result of the weakness and disconnection of relations, disarming did not occur, and members of political parties were killed by paramilitary groups. Violence against the government escalated exponentially and killed prosecutors and politicians. On these developments, President Vargas

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[3] Founded in 1974, M-19 is an urban-based Castroist organization against the oligarchic state. It emerged in response to electoral fraud that prevented Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of the National People's Alliance from coming to power in the presidential election on April 19, 1970.

initiated the peace process in 1988, when he spoke with terrorist organizations with clear intentions including disarmament and the political participation of former guerrillas. This policy of peace was maintained by President César Gaviria and successful negotiations were held with terrorist organizations. The M-19 became the first organization to lay arms and transformed to a political party in 1990 (Boudon, 2001:76-77) called the Democratic Alliance (AD/M-19). Former M-19 leader Gustavo Petro, who become mayor of Bogotá in the 2011 elections, had been running for president of Colombia as a favorite candidate in the 2022 election. He is the president of Colombia now.

The peace process, including the M-19, also allowed a wide range of social and political groups to participate in developing a new constitution and influenced the creation of the 1991 National Constituent Assembly. Despite the shortcomings of the 1991 Constitution, it created a new point of action in the structural context. Antonio José Navarro Wolff, founder of the M-19 Democratic Alliance and a former guerrilla, was elected co-chair of the National Constituent Assembly of the 1991 Constitution of Colombia. The first meeting with the FARC, a powerful armed organization at the time, took place in 1991 and failed to produce a positive result. Efforts by the FARC and the state to establish a dialogue have spread over a longer and more troubled period. In 1997, the FARC was included in the US. State Department's list of terrorist organizations, and in 1999-2002, the negotiations took place in which several national and international actors participated. The peace process declined and was not concluded due to the continuation of the FARC's terrorist attacks. President Uribe became a right-wing government leader who was able to take drastic action against the FARC by the influence of 9/11 attacks. As a result of cooperation with the intelligence services of other states, especially the United States (US), the FARC was strongly pursued. Attempts were also made in 2005 to restart peace talks with a weaker FARC structure, but the FARC did not want to negotiate with the Uribe administration. The 2008 murder of FARC commander and spokesman Raúl Reyes in Ecuador, followed by the death of one of its leaders, from a heart attack, further weakened the organization. During this period, it was observed that governments took a more realistic approach to the causes and victims of the civil conflict in Colombia, and the populist attitude was largely abandoned. At a time when Latin America's leftist wave was on the rise, Juan Manuel Santos, the defense minister of the Uribe government, realized that the participation of international actors was important for negotiations. Santos needed the support of those who could provide some degree of confidence to the FARC guerrillas, namely Chávez and Castro. Indeed, Venezuela, Cuba, Chile, and Norway were directly involved in the peace process.

During Santos' presidency (2010-2018), the killings of two of the FARC's top executives prompted the organization to move closer to a peace deal. The first official meeting with the FARC took place near the Venezuelan border in March 2011. In November 2011, the FARC announced the first unilateral ceasefire, which lasted until January 20, 2014. In 2012, secret talks took place in Havana. This secrecy was a commitment for the two sides to have confidence in each other (Özkan, 2018:94). Apart from the Havana talks, all talks until the 2016 peace agreement were shared with the public.

In 2016, the first text of the agreement was signed by President Santos and FARC in Cartagena de Indias on September 26, 2016. The referendum on October 2, 2016, resulted in a 50.2% negative result, contrary to expectations. Uribe, the former president who leads the 'No' front, polarized the people at this delicate stage. However, support was higher in the capital Bogotá and in conflict-affected areas (BBC News, 2016). The text of the agreement was finalized with opinions from representatives of those who said no. In this revision, which was widely reported in the press, the demands were generally agreed, and the controversial demands of the opposition (not allowing the political participation of the FARC and aggravating the conditions of imprisonment) were rejected on the grounds that they were contrary to the essence of the negotiation. The government stood by the Peace process and the final text of the peace agreement was signed by the parties on November 24, 2016, and adopted by a majority of parliament. Although there were some difficulties at the end of the process, the longest conflict in the Americas ended irrevocably to its former violence.

The peace agreement covered extremely challenging issues such as special courts, rural transformation policies, increased investments in infrastructure and settlement of displaced families, compensation for victims and political participation. The title of political participation includes the structural steps taken by the state to turn the FARC into a political party. According to an additional article in 2017 Constitution, which states that the FARC could continue as a political movement or a party after laying down its weapons, the party to be formed will receive equal budgets with other parties and have equal rights. In addition, it will have the privilege of requesting an additional budget from the general budget during the establishment period. The party will not be able to nominate individuals who have been convicted. Even if the party does not get enough votes, it will have 5 seats in congress and the senate, and if not, enough votes are obtained, it will be able to complete the number of representatives in both congress and senate with the names it will choose from among its members during the two election periods. As a political party, the FARC has unfortunately been renamed Common Alternative

Revolutionary Force, using the same acronym in Spanish. It removed the weapons from his name and chose the rose logo preferred by the European left as a symbol. The party charter has also been prepared in accordance with the profile of left-wing parties in Europe. As a political party, it has made the already difficult process more difficult for people to use the acronym FARC, which represents years of violence in their painful memories. The party changed its name to 'Comunes' in early 2021.

4.3. Farabundo Martí FMLN – El Salvador

El Salvador is the Latin American country with the highest concentration of income inequality. The reason for socioeconomic injustice is that most of the income is in the hands of the small, powerful, and land-owning oligarch, which has almost complete control over the country's economy and society. In contrast, there were landless peasants who had to work for very low wages on inefficient farmland in the northern highlands, forming the biggest support of guerrilla organizations in the 1980s (Álvarez, 2011:219-220). In the second half of the 1970s, as political frustration and the violence of social struggles grew, leftist organizations, including workers and landless peasant movements, began to unite in the country. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas' victory over the dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979 demonstrated that armed revolutionary struggle is necessary. Romero, a US-backed man who attempted to destroy all opposition elements and declared martial law to prevent a similar revolutionary movement from taking place in El Salvador, was overthrown in a coup in November of that year. His successor, the Revolutionary Junta Government, tried to block guerrilla movements. The 'liberal' junta was removed from power when the demands of the people for better wages, health care and freedom of expression increased with the land reform that the Oligarch never wanted. However, the junta's bloody suppression of peaceful dissent laid the foundations for the civil war that will take place over the next decade (González et al., 2013:89).

There were major popular uprisings following the murder of a popular religious leader on October 10, 1980. Meanwhile five leftist guerrilla groups merged under the FMLN as an umbrella organization and were named after Farabundo Martí, the leader of the 1932 peasant massacre. The FMLN, which started the revolutionary civil war between 1980 and 1992, failed to gain power in its first national-scale offensive, but within two years managed to control at least a third of the country's territory (Call, 2003:831). In the 12-year armed conflict, it was understood that the Government could not liquidate the FMLN and the FMLN could not carry out a socialist revolution (González et al., 2013:89). It was also accepted that none of the parties

in the conflict achieved a military victory under the current circumstances. The peace treaty which was built on this impasse (Önderer, 1992:251) between the FMLN and the far-right Government revolved around two main issues: first, the democratization and demilitarization of society; second, the integration of guerrilla forces into the legal political system of the state (Segovia, 2009:4). The Geneva Convention of April 1990, which set the parameters for the negotiation process, set out four goals for an ambitious peace-building programme: to end armed conflict by political means as soon as possible, to promote democratization; to guarantee unlimited respect for human rights, to reunite Salvadoran society. Commitments to these goals were laid out in all three agreements between 1990-1991.

Alvaro de Soto, the special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), mediated the peace talks. The final agreement was signed on January 16, 1992 at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, by FMLN members, the government, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali. The ceasefire came into force on February 1, 1992, and the FMLN was scheduled to demobilize its military forces and laid down its weapons by the end of October. On the other hand, it is envisaged that the army will be narrowed down and a new 'Civil National Police' will be established with the participation of former FMLN fighters. The long negotiation process had a positive effect on the ability of the agreements to address the root causes of the conflict and led to the lasting peace (Whitfield, 2001:38). At the end of the Peace Agreement, the FMLN became a legal political party and participated in elections for the first time in 1994. In 1995, the five parties that formed the FMLN alliance self-dissolved and integrated into one party. FMLN, together with the Nationalist Republican Alliance-ARENA, has been part of the two-party system for 30 years until 2019. FMLN candidates won the mayorship of San Salvador (the first female mayor Violeta Menjívar) in 2006 and the presidency (Mauricio Funes) in 2009.

4.4.URNG- Guatemala

Guatemala, just like El Salvador, was the scene of a civil war that spread throughout the country, which began in 1960 and lasted for 36 years, ended with a peace treaty. Terrorism was used as a common method by armed guerrilla units, paramilitary organizations, and the military, the main actors of the civil war. Social reforms in the early 1950s were not welcomed by US companies that had already settled in the country, and US-backed coups and administrations encountered in many Latin American countries followed. In a country with a high number of income distribution injustices, successive military, and civilian dictators, questionable elections, assassinations resulted in a civil war. The main political development that started the

civil war was the overthrow of the elected government in Guatemala in 1954 with the support of the US. The civil war, which developed under the influence of the Cold War period, caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, thousands of missing people, the displacement of many people, human rights violations. In Guatemala, guerrilla groups came together and acted together as URNG. After this merger, in 1982, government forces embarked on a comprehensive contra-guerilla operation, committing grave human rights violations against both civilians and armed groups. URNG also took armed action targeting security forces, foreign diplomats, and businessmen (Gonzalez et al., 2013:89-98).

Negotiations for peace to end the civil war began at the initiative of the UN in the early 1990s. Five years later, on December 29, 1996, during the presidency of Irigoyen, they ended with the signing of the Final and Permanent Peace Agreement between the Guatemalan Government and URNG. The Truth Commission revealed the heavy balance sheet of the civil war and reported that the government and paramilitary forces were responsible for 93% of the acts of violence of the Mayan people and mestizos such as genocide, torture, and massacre. Ethnic conflict was a major aspect of Guatemala's civil war, and the situation of the Mayan people led to prolonged negotiations. At the end of the peace process, the implementation of a long-term development strategy was an indication that the root causes of the war were taken into account (Preti, 2002:115). URNG, on the other hand, has become a political party since 1998 as a small part of the ultra-multiparty system. In the 2019 elections, URNG won three seats in the 160-member parliament.

4.5. RENAMO - Mozambique

Mozambique was Portugal's most important colony and the center of the slave trade until the late nineteenth century. The independence movements that began in the mid-twentieth century followed by the Marxist-Leninist Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in 1962. FRELIMO received the support of the Soviet Union and China and was declared the independent People's Republic of Mozambique on June 25, 1975, after 10 years of armed conflict. After independence, FRELIMO became a political party and seized power, but the political turmoil and conflict in the country did not end. The tension between RENAMO which was established against FRELIMO as part of the anti-communism and FRELIMO government eventually turned into a violent civil war. RENAMO was founded in 1975 by neighboring Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Agency in Rhodesia as an ethnic-religious militant organization (Hall, 1990:46-51). With the support of the Republic of South Africa and the US,

it carried out a very violent massacre with brutal actions to overthrow the government. RENAMO, whose main strategy consists of attacks on infrastructure facilities and indigenous people, was also dubbed armed gangs or 'puppets'. The 16-year armed conflict between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO in 1977 caused great damage to both human life and infrastructure facilities (Oliverira, 2018:31).

The end of the Cold War and then the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1992 and the severe drought in Africa were instrumental in the FRELIMO government and RENAMO's sit-down for peace talks. First of all, in 1990, the new constitution was adopted, the multiparty system was introduced, and the government declared that it had abandoned the concept of communism. These developments also accelerated the first official talks between the two sides, which began secretly in Rome on July 8, 1990. The Mozambique government did not want a mediator. The talks ended with the Rome General Peace Accords on 4 October 1992, which included a call for an end to the conflict and democratic and multi-party elections. After the civil war ended, the name of the country was changed to The Republic of Mozambique. Under the UN treaty, peacekeepers sent ONUMOZ (UN Operation Mozambique) at the end of 1993 to support the process of negotiation and transition to democracy. ONUMOZ was created to monitor and support the ceasefire, the discharge of forces and the holding of national elections. With the agreement, RENAMO transformed from a guerrilla movement into a political party (RENAMO-UE). In 2012, RENAMO continued its normal political activities and representation in the national parliament since it participated in the first multiparty elections, but its supporters, led by President Afonso Dhlakama, began the guerrilla movement against the military and civilians, declaring their condemnation of the peace deal. Despite the peace agreement, the fighting continued. These developments were in three different forms since the establishment of RENAMO: The guerrilla movement (1976-1992), the political party (1994-2012) and the political party and guerrilla power after 2012 (Guilengue, 2014:1-2).

Tensions between RENAMO and FRELIMO were reigning high due to the controversial results of the 2014 general election and corruption, which led to the start of violence in mid-2015. As a result of the negotiations that began, the mediators agreed to dissolve the RENAMO armed wing with an agreement signed by UN Secretary-General Envoy Mirko Manzoni, Neha Sanghrajka, Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi, and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade in Gorongosa National Park on August 1, 2019. Thus, nearly 40 years of hostilities ended, and a new amnesty law was adopted in parliament for people involved in armed conflicts. Since 1994, RENAMO has participated in four general elections, three local elections (two municipalities

and one province), but has not been successful. FRELIMO has ruled the country since independence was gained. In the last 2019 elections, FRELIMO won 180 seats in parliament, while RENAMO won 60.

4.6. MILF- The Philippines

After the Republic of the Philippines declared independence in 1946, the continuation of discriminatory policies by Christian rulers against the Moro people deepened the religious and ethnic divide in the country. The conflict in the south of the Philippines since the 1960s stemmed from tensions between the Christian-Muslim poles. The agreements (1942-1972 and 1976-2000) were reached between the government and the representatives of the Moro people for long periods. On the other hand, the government used considerable force to control Muslims living in the Mindanao and Sulu regions. Muslim groups also responded by taking action against it and fighting back with armed struggle (Macdonald, 2013:26). The Jabidah massacre in 1968 triggered the Moro people to organize and start an armed struggle against the Philippines administration, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded in 1969. With the aim of establishing an independent state called Bangsa Moro, MNLF gathered everyone who felt like they belong to Moro identity. MNLF, which had been fighting politically and armed for years, was well known both by locals and internationally. Hundreds of villages were destroyed, and thousands of people were forced to emigrate during the conflict between the MNLF and the Philippines State. In 1976 and 1996, two peace agreements were signed and mediated by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, gave up the request for full independence and accepted the autonomous region administration of the Philippines.

MNLF lost its unitary structure and entered the process of disintegration in the late 1970s (Söylemez & Kavak, 2021). In 1977, a new armed organization called Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was established after the disintegration of MNLF. Unlike MNLF, the MILF saw its religious beliefs as the main motivation for the struggle for independence. The organization continued its armed resistance since its inception and at the same time continued peace talks with the state. A 1989 law adopted in accordance with the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines stipulated the establishment of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. In 1990, the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region was officially declared and the city of Cotobato became the capital of this region. Since then, disputes over devolution have continued (Yokuş, 2016:6). Fighting for the freedom of the Moro people, the MILF already reached the stage of reconciliation with the government of the Philippines and has become the implementing party

of the current peace process. Peace has been declared with negotiations with the government of the Philippines since 1996, and steps have been taken to establish the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (Söylemez & Kavak, 2021). When the negotiation process resumed in 2001, Malaysia was invited as an intermediary. In 2012, the "Bangsamoro Framework Agreement" was signed between the government of the Philippines and the MILF, and a roadmap for autonomy was established. However, the Constitutional Court annulled the law due to the term "Ancestral Lands." At this stage, the Philippines government signed the agreements but somehow blocked its implementation, the need for guarantors was born and representatives of the United Kingdom, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were added to the Contact Group. The Contact Group was the first to bring together the state and non-governmental organizations. In 2013, the Independent Observer Committee (Malaysia, Indonesia, Libya, and the EU) was established to observe the peace process and the implementation of the agreements. Following the completion of the annexes of the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement, the Bangsamoro Comprehensive Agreement was signed between the parties on March 28, 2014, and the process that will lead Moro to autonomy has officially begun.

The MILF officially registered as the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, a regional political party aimed at participating in the 2016 elections. As a result of negotiations and discussions, the Bangsamoro Organic Act was passed by the Philippines Congress; it was signed by President Rodrigo Duterte on July 26, 2018. According to this law, an autonomous region called Bangsamoro was established and given its administration to the Moro people. Bangsamoro, which has more fiscal autonomy, a regional government, parliament, and justice system, replaced the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region after the law was approved in a popular vote on 21 January 2019. This law is the culmination of peace agreements signed between the MILF and past governments.

5. Comparative Evaluation

How and under what conditions the transformation of terrorist organizations into political parties took place has been discussed in separate cases above. Annex 1 gives descriptive information about organizations including the names of the political parties they have become. First of all, it has been determined that this transformation process takes place in two ways: Peace process and dissolution. IRA, FARC-EP, M-19, FMLN, URNG, RENAMO, MILF cases are examples of "successful" peace process; ETA and Tupamaros cases are examples of dissolution; even once a failed peace process was tried, e.g., in the ETA case. The basic stages

of the negotiation and dissolution process of terrorist organizations in the transformation into a political party are given in Annex 2. Some common points were determined by evaluating 9 cases of transformation:

(1) In general, the first starting point of the transformation processes took place in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War was effective especially in organizations based on Marxist-Leninist ideology (FARC-EP, M-19, FMLN, URNG, Tupamaros). The prominence of politics based on identities in this period also provided the basis for an agreement with terrorist organizations based on ethnic and religious grounds (IRA, ETA, RENAMO).

(2) Incentivizing by the government actors are very important element for the transforming process in the path to political participation (as in the case of IRA and ETA), this also largely supports the findings of Black and Jabbour (2023).

(3) Contrary to the trend that generally talking with terrorists legitimizes terrorism (for symbolic and practical grounds of this legitimization issue see Duhart, 2019; see Alonso, 2016 for critics on legitimation of terrorist campaign in IRA case), it has been observed to be a bold and effective method to end terrorism. Peace processes, in particular, are processes that involve sensitive and courageous steps carried out under the burden of criticism.

(4) The peace process is shaped in the relative balance (from a cost-benefit perspective) of two mutually critical points: While the terrorist organization proves that its capacities are recognized by negotiating with the state ("through gain access to the bargaining table", Martin, 2014:96), the state aims to end the violence by making the least concessions possible. If this balance is not achieved, the peace processes are failed (e.g. ETA), and they are successful when mutual balance is largely achieved (e.g. IRA, FARC).

(5) The transformation process had the mediators such as the states, or influential people. Influential people who contributed to the process received peace awards from various organizations (see Annex 2).

(6) The other influential factors in the transformation of terrorist organizations into political parties are as below:

  (1) The two sides (state – terror organization) understand that they can not defeat each other (e.g. IRA, FMLN)

  (2) The protection of secret talks (most effective in IRA, FARC-EP).

(3) New constitutional reforms (e.g. Colombia, Spain and the Philippines).

(4) 9/11 – Change of global security perspective and intense fight against terrorism (e.g. FARC-EP, MILF and ETA).

6. Conclusion

It has been observed that terrorist organizations that have become political parties have a long history and an important sociological basis. However, the ideological degeneration or expired validity of the arguments of terrorist organizations over time has caused the public to withdraw their support. On the one hand, various conjunctural changes have allowed governments to approach the causes of terrorism with a more responsible and realistic perspective. At the same time, governments have weakened terrorist organizations by clamping down more decisively. In some cases, it has become clear that both parties will not have any mutual advantage in the continuation of the conflict. These reasons initiate the process that will lead to the disarming of terrorist organizations. In this process, it is seen that terrorist organizations have moved their targets to the political sphere, that is, they have become political parties. After turning into political parties, there is no major change in their basic ideological views, and the causes of the conflict are not completely destroyed.

The FARC's involvement in the drug trade, the prolonged actions of the IRA and ETA targeting civilians, and the damage caused by the civil war involving the FMLN and URNG have caused public frustration. In addition, the states' effort to make a new constitution (e.g. Colombia, Uruguay), its adoption of regulations involving autonomy, democratic opening steps (e.g. Spain, The Philippines), and also the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, have weakened the reasons for the existence of terrorist organizations. The 9/11 (2001) attacks, when the understanding of global security began to develop, led states to go more effectively on terrorist organizations by providing international support. And, in the case of IRA, FMLN, and MILF, the state and the organization were at a point unable to prevail over each other, such a point initiated the Peace process.

To start the negotiation process with terrorist organizations; to need reconciliation, to support this compromise by the national and international public, and to focus on the solution of the factors that motivate the conflict are important elements for the states. In addition, it is important for the success of the process that politicians do not use the issue as a tool for populist discourse in the flow of daily politics, and the privacy of secret talks in the first place formed the basis of the peace process. Peace processes begin with a framework agreement that includes

regulations on the constitution, political institutions, equality, human rights, the handover of weapons, victims of conflict, the release of political prisoners, security, justice, special courts, socioeconomic policies, etc. The transformation of the terrorist organization to a political party takes place as part of this agreement and these political parties become one of the main elements in monitoring the process and they participate in the first national and local elections, and some of the former organization leaders were elected president, candidates, or elected to other important levels of the state.

Annex 1
Terrorist Organizations Transformed to Political Parties

Abbreviation of the Organization [(*)]	Country	Active Period	Process	Type	Political Party
IRA	United Kingdom	1969-2005	Peace process	Ethno-nationalist separatism	Sinn Féin ([We] Ourselves)
FARC-EP	Colombia	1964-2017	Peace process	Marxist-Leninist	Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC)
M-19	Colombia	1974-1990	Peace process	Marxist-Leninist	Democratic Alliance M-19 (AD/M-19)
FMLN	El Salvador	1970-1995	Peace process	Marxist-Leninist	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
URNG	Guatemala	1962-1996	Peace process [(**)]	Marxist-Leninist	Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit (URNG-MAIZ)
RENAMO	Mozambique	1975-2019	Peace process	Right-populist - nationalist	Mozambique National Resistance -Electoral Union (RENAMO-UE)
MILF	The Philippines	1977-2014	Peace process	Religious-ethnic	United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP)
ETA	Spain	1959-2011	Dissolution [(***)]	Ethno-nationalist separatism	Batasuna (2001-2003)
Tupamaros (MLN-T)	Uruguay	1960-1973	Dissolution	Marxist-Leninist	Movement of Popular Participation (MPP)

(*) IRA: Official Irish Republican Army, FARC-EP: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army, M-19: April 19 Movement, FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, URNG: Guatemala's National Revolutionary Unit, RENAMO: Mozambiquean National Resistance, MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front, ETA: Basque Homeland and Freedom, Tupamaros (MLN-T): Tupamaros National Liberation Movement.
(**) The Guatemalan civil war ended with a peace treaty and the organizations were united under one political party.
(***) Peace processes failed, organizations were weakened, they had to lay down their arms.

Annex 2

Basic Stages of the Negotiation and Dissolution Process of Terrorist Organizations in Transformation to a Political Party[*]

Abbreviation of the organization	First contact (Who are the delegates)	Intermediary states	Influential people/rewards	The most influential factors in the transformation into a political party
IRA	1987-1990, State minister level; first effective informal contact with IRA	USA, Canada, Finland	John Hume (SDLP leader) and David Trimble (UUP leader) winner of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize. Hume was awarded the Gandhi Peace Prize and Martin Luther King Award.	* the two sides understand that they can not defeat each other. * the protection of secret talks, the apparent state's involvement with Sinn Féin. * the Blair Government facilitating the terms of negotiations.
FARC-EP	1991, Caracas and Tlaxcala talks, first official meeting 2011	Venezuela, Cuba, Chile	Juan Manuel Santos received the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize.	* the organisations's drug ties. * 9/11- change of global security perspective. * intense fight against terrorism. * mediation of leftist governments in Latin America. * protection of the secret talks.
M-19	1989-1990, Corinto, Cauca Agreements	-	Trujillo (President of Colombia), Carlos Pizarro ve Navarro Wolff (M-19 Leaders)	* drafting the1991 Colombian Constitution.
FMNL	1990 Cenevre Agreement	UN	Alvaro de Soto and Boutros Ghali (UN Secretary-General)	*the two sides understand that they can not defeat each other. * civil war dynamics. * the end of Cold War.
URNG	1990	UN	Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen (President of Guatemala) and Rolando Morán (Secretary-General of URNG) jointly received the UNESCO Peace Prize.	* civil war dynamics. * the end of Cold War.
RENAMO	1990	UN	Mirko Manzoni (Ambassador of the UN Secretary-General), Neha Sanghrajka, Filipe Nyusi (President of Mozambique)	* civil war dynamics. * the end of Cold War. * the end of Apartheid Regime in South Africa.
MILF	1976	Malaysia, United Kingdom, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey	Beningo Aquino III and Rodrigo Duterte (Presidents of Philippines) and Hacı Murad İbrahim (MILF Leader)	* granting autonomy in the 1987 Philippines Constitution. * 9/11- change of global security perspective. * intense fight against terrorism.
ETA	1986 Algeria talks	Ireland, UN	Kofi Annan (UN Secretary-General), Bertie Ahern (Former Irish Prime Minister) and Garry Adams (Irish Nationalist-Sinn Féin leader)	* 1978 Spanish Constitution. * intense fight against terrorism. * 9/11- change of global security perspective.

(*) Tupamaros MLN-T is not covered in the table due to special conditions of its transformation.

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