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Iran's Palestinian Policy after Hamas' 7 October Attack

Murat CİNGÖZ[1]

Abstract

This study examines Iran's Palestine policy after Hamas' 7 October attack on Israel. Firstly, Iran's Resistance paradigm, which expresses Iran's opposition to the US and Israel, and its Palestine policy are discussed through the ontological security approach. In this context, it is stated that after the 1979 Revolution, Iran adopted policies such as support for the Palestinian cause and anti-Israelism as a normative obligation and an identity belonging. The 7 October attack, on the other hand, was a critical turning point for Iran, which reinforced its anti-Israel stance but revealed its limited capacity to effectively support the Palestinian cause. The study argues that after the 7 October attack, despite Iran's support for Hamas and the broader Axis of Resistance, its actions were strategically measured and it pursued a policy of controlled tension that sought to limit the conflict. This is mainly due to the fact that Iran lacks the material capacity to meet its normative obligations. In this context, through discourse and content analyses of official statements, media sources and speeches, the increasing tension between Iran's normative obligations and material realities has been revealed. On the other hand, it has been argued that Israel's policy of escalation has put Iran's policy of controlled tension into difficulty, and this situation has brought new threats and challenges for both Iran and Israel.

Keywords: Iran, Palestine, Israel, Hamas, Axis of Resistance, Ontological Security

Hamas'ın 7 Ekim Saldırısı Sonrası İran'ın Filistin Politikası

Öz

Bu çalışma, Hamas'ın İsrail'e yönelik 7 Ekim saldırısı sonrasında İran'ın Filistin politikasını irdelemektedir. Çalışmada öncelikle ontolojik güvenlik yaklaşımı üzerinden İran'ın ABD ve İsrail karşıtlığını ifade eden Direniş paradigması ve Filistin politikası ele alınmıştır. Bu minvalde 1979 Devrim'i sonrasında İran'ın normatif bir yükümlülük ve kimliksel bir aidiyet olarak Filistin davasına destek ve İsrail karşıtlığı gibi politikaları benimsediği belirtilmiştir. 7 Ekim saldırısı ise İran için İsrail karşıtlığını pekiştiren ancak Filistin davasını etkili bir şekilde destekleme kapasitesinin sınırlı olduğunu ortaya koyan kritik bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Çalışmada 7 Ekim saldırısından sonra İran'ın Hamas ve daha geniş ölçüde Direniş Ekseni'ne yönelik desteğine rağmen eylemlerinin stratejik olarak ölçülü olduğu ve çatışmanın sınırlı kalmasını isteyen kontrollü bir gerilim politikası izlediği öne sürülmüştür. Bu durumun temel sebebi olarak İran'ın normatif yükümlülüklerini karşılayacak maddi kapasitesinin olmaması gerçeğine dikkat çekilmiştir. Bu bağlamda resmi açıklamalar, medya kaynakları ve demeçler üzerinden yapılan söylem ve içerik analizleri aracılığıyla, İran'ın normatif yükümlülükleri ile maddi gerçeklikleri arasındaki artan gerilim ortaya konulmuştur. Öte yandan İsrail'in gerilimi tırmandırma politikasının İran'ın kontrollü gerginlik politikasını zora soktuğu, bu durumun hem İran hem de İsrail için yeni tehdit ve meydan okumaları beraberinde getirdiği ileri sürülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İran, Filistin, İsrail, Hamas, Direniş Ekseni, Ontolojik Güvenlik

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Introduction

As one year has passed since the 7 October attack on Hamas, it is clear that the attack marked a new breaking point in the Middle East. The 7 October attack brought along a process in which Iran's effectiveness in its Palestinian policy was tested. Indeed, a group of researchers predicted that Iran would benefit from this crisis. According to this approach, the geopolitical tensions triggered by the war in Gaza will lead to public pressure in many Arab countries, slowing down the normalisation steps with Israel. The emergence of a new anti-Israel sentiment in the Islamic world is a positive development for Tehran's long-term plans (ELDoh, 2023). Another approach emphasises Iran's role in supporting the Axis of Resistance. This approach, which emphasises Iran's support for actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah and its missile attacks directly targeting Israel, argues that Iran has responded sufficiently to Israel and that Iran and the Axis of Resistance will benefit from this process (Kayhan.ir, 2024). A third approach argues that Iran's response to events such as the deaths of leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah, as well as Iranian generals, and Israeli attacks on Hezbollah, Hamas and Iranian bases has been inadequate, and that despite Iran's promises of revenge, it has failed to take actions that would seriously harm Israel. According to this approach, Iran is a kind of paper tiger and has suffered a great loss of prestige and power in the events after 7 October (Hunter, 2017). A fourth approach argues that Iran betrayed the Palestinian cause or did not support it sufficiently during the crisis (Aslani, 2023) The main question of this study is how Iran's Palestine policy has been shaped after the 7 October attack? In this sense, answers will be sought to questions such as whether there is a paradigm shift in Iran's Palestine policy after the 7 October attack, which of the above-mentioned approaches is more explanatory or whether a different perspective is required. In fact, answering these questions requires, on the one hand, understanding Iran's ontological security architecture and normative obligations based on the Resistance paradigm, and on the other hand, taking into account the adequacy of its material capacity, its political and economic difficulties, and the internal social and economic crisis.

In order to realise the aim of the study, the theoretical approach of ontological security is used. Ontological security was first used by Robert Laing to express situations in which identity and autonomy are not in danger (Laing, 1965). Antony Giddens, who expanded this concept, defined ontological security as 'the sense of confidence that actors have in their own self-identity and in the continuity of the social and physical environment in which they exist' (Giddens, 1990). This sense of trust is achieved through a self-narrative that coherently connects the actor's past, present and future, and/or through routines that express enduring relationships of friendship or enmity. According to the ontological security approach, actors need to ensure their ontological security, that is, the security of their identities, as well as their physical security. The ontological security approach also draws attention to the fact that emotions such as anxiety, shame, disappointment, suspicion, anger and prestige play an important role in relations between states. In this respect, according to the ontological security approach, actors do not always act within the framework of rational and strategic calculations (Kinnvall et al, 2018). Various emotional and identity motivations, i.e. the pursuit of ontological security, can guide actors' behaviour and limit strategic or rational calculations.

The main argument of the study is that although the Islamic Republic of Iran's Palestine policy is largely shaped within the framework of religious-ideological narratives and normative obligations, Iran's material capacity and geopolitical conditions significantly limit its normative obligations. In this sense, it is seen that Iran cannot match the US (United States) and Israel militarily, economically and technologically, and has significant internal and external challenges, while on the other hand, it is worried about experiencing a normative bankruptcy if it remains indifferent to the events. For this reason, Iran, which is not completely indifferent to the Resistance paradigm, is trying to respond to Israel and the USA, albeit in a limited way. This is because the Resistance paradigm and support for the Palestinian cause are the source of the Islamic Republic of Iran's basic biographical narratives and routines. In this respect, after 7 October, Iran has tried to maintain its confrontation with Israel and the US in the form of a 'controlled tension'. However, Israel's aggressive behaviour makes this policy difficult for Iran.

This study adopts the case study method to analyse Iran's Palestine policy after Hamas' 7 October attack in depth. Case analysis is a contextual and multidimensional approach to understanding the dynamics of an event or process. In this study, the 7 October attack is taken as a case study and the reflections of this event on Iran's Palestine policy are evaluated in a historical and theoretical framework. Discourse and content analyses were also used from time to time to support the case analysis. In this respect, scientific research such as articles and books, official and semi-official sources were analysed. In

addition parliamentary minutes, statements of prominent politicians, religious and military leaders, articles in the press, social media sources, surveys and interviews, and the opinions of prominent intellectuals were also analysed. The study consists of three main parts. In the first part, the Islamic Republic's Palestine policy is presented through the Resistance paradigm. In the second part, Iran's Palestine policy after 7 October and its reaction to Israel's attacks are analysed. In the third part, The challenges and limitations of Iran's normative obligations in its Palestinian policy are discussed.

The Palestine Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Based on the Paradigm of Resistance

Before the Islamic revolution, Iran was ruled by the Pahlavi monarchy, and domestically, it was dominated by a secular ideology based on Western modernisation and Iranian nationalism. In foreign policy, Iran was positioned as an ally of the United States and an opponent of the Soviet Union. In this respect, Iran has shown a tendency towards the West and the US. It has been in alliance with the Western bloc through organisations such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. Iran's Palestine policy during the Pahlavi era was largely shaped by systemic factors, namely alliance relations with the US. In this respect, Iran's relations with Israel were also favourable as a reflection of its alliance with the Western bloc. The two states came together against the Soviet Union and/or pro-Soviet Arab countries, which were seen as a common enemy in the region. Iran was also Israel's most important oil supplier in the region. Moreover, there was intense co-operation between the two countries on issues such as security and intelligence. For example, Israel contributed significantly to the training of SAVAK, the domestic intelligence agency of the Pahlavi era. During this period, while the relations between Iran and Israel developed and reached a level that could be interpreted as a strategic alliance, the Pahlavi regime showed little interest in the Palestinian issue. (Javaid et al, 2016).

The 1979 Iran Revolution shifted Iran's Palestinian policy and its relations with Israel to a different plane. After the revolution, Iran radically changed its domestic and foreign policy paradigm and distanced itself from the western coalition engaged in American foreign policy. The transformation from monarchy to the Islamic Republic was accompanied by the emergence of a new biographical narrative and routines based on a revolutionary Islamic identity (Roomi, 2023). In the post-revolutionary period, the political identity that emerged in Iran was largely shaped by the ideas of Khomeini and the ideology of the Shiite clerics who supported Khomeini. In this period, the main biographical narratives of the Islamic Republic were characterised by themes such as anti-imperialism and resistance, Islamic solidarity, sacrifice, anti-Westernism, cultural conservatism and self-sufficiency. In addition, the new constitution and the rhetoric of the leaders emphasised the Islamic ummah transcending the borders of nation-states and the need to support the oppressed and liberation movements (Bardakçı, 2018). Eventually, behind the scenes of the embassy raid, the Iran-Iraq war and the domestic crises, Iran-US relations began to deteriorate. Describing America as the Great Satan, Iran has portrayed Israel, which it sees as a subcontractor of the US in the region, as an evil entity that poses a danger to the Islamic world and a non-negotiable actor. In this respect, Iran allocated the Israeli embassy in Tehran to Palestine immediately after the revolution, objected to Egypt's Camp David agreement with Israel and severed its relations with Egypt (Moghaddam, 2018). Especially after the Gulf War, Iran came to the fore as a more important threat for Israel, and in this process, the emphasis on anti-Israelism increased in Iran. Even if Iran establishes relations with the biggest normative and material enemies such as the United States of America, it has avoided bilateral relations with Israel, except for events such as secret arms purchases, and has not even accepted to see Israel as a legitimate entity (Tabatai and Soilemani, 2013). Eventually, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel began to see each other as a geopolitical and normative opponents.

In tandem with the Iran-Israel confrontation and Iran's Resistance Narrative, Iran facilitated the establishment of Hezbollah in the 1980s and played an important role in the rise of this organisation. Hezbollah not only shares the same Imamiyya Shi'ism with Iran, but also recognises the principle of Velayat-e Faqih and is fully loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader. In this respect, the cooperation and partnership between Iran and Hezbollah is very deep, both ideologically and geopolitically. One of the important events for Iran's Palestinian policy was the Oslo Talks. Iran openly opposed the El Fatah/Arafat administration's negotiations with Israel to reach an agreement. In this process, Iran developed relations with actors such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which were opposed to negotiations with Israel, and in time became the largest financier of these two organisations, which have their roots in the Muslim Brotherhood (Nazari et al, 2013).

On the other hand, the US, which came to the fore as the global gendarme after the Soviet collapse, started to demonise Iran in the Middle East. Washington has focused on policies such as increased sanctions and political pressure against Iran, claiming that Iran is aiding terrorism, destabilising Iraq and working on weapons programmes on the grounds that it supports actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Eventually, increased sanctions and pressure led Bush to name Iran as a central component of the Axis of Evil (Marandi & Halalkhor, 2015). Especially after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran's presence and influence in the region has become more prominent. So much so that Arab states began to worry that Iran was pursuing the Shiite Crescent. Iran, on the other hand, has stated that its increasing activities in the region are due to the rise of anti-US and anti-Israeli actors rather than sectarian expansionism. In this sense, the term Axis of Resistance, which was used as a response to Bush's Axis of Evil discourse, started to be widely used in the 2000s to refer to anti-US and anti-Israeli actors. In this period, the Iran-centred Axis of Resistance extended to countries such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bahrain. In this process, the calls of the reformist wing in Iran to integrate with the international community and pursue a pragmatic policy lost ground, while the Resistance paradigm became more prominent in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. The prominence of the Resistance paradigm has also led to an increase in Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric and actions. In this respect, Hezbollah's war with Israel in 2006 was one of the most prestigious events for Iran and the Axis of Resistance. In this war, according to the supporters of the Axis of Resistance, Israel suffered significant losses but could not achieve a decisive victory. Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force, played an active role in Hezbollah's struggle against Israel with Imam Mugiyya, the leader of the Hezbollah militia. (Sönmez et al, 2020). In addition, Hamas, supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and took control of Gaza following a dispute with Fatah in 2007.

The "Arab Spring" uprisings has been a major breaking point for Iran's foreign policy, while Iran's sincerity regarding its Palestinian policy has been seriously questioned. In fact, in the first phase of the Arab Spring uprisings, Iran defined these uprisings as an Islamic Awakening and predicted that the US and Israeli-backed regimes in the region would be replaced by Islamic regimes. However, the spread of the uprisings to Syria changed Iran's approach towards the uprisings. Iran interpreted the anti-Assad uprisings in Syria as a sedition movement aiming to eliminate the Axis of Resistance and involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Arabia and takfiri terrorists. The Islamic Republic of Iran has attributed a meaning to the Syrian crisis that goes far beyond geopolitical and strategic calculations. In fact, Syria has gone from being a 'stepping stone' for Iran to an unofficial regional extension of Iran, known as the '35th province'. According to the Iranian leadership, the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria would mean the rupture of the golden ring of the Axis of Resistance and such a development would create a domino effect that would affect Iran's other allies and even its own regime (Elhan, 2019). In this regard, Khamenei's foreign policy representative Ali Akbar Velayati said, 'If Syria falls and its government collapses, it will affect the entire Axis of Resistance, starting from Iran and extending from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon and Palestine' (Rezaei, 2019, p. 142). In fact, Assad, who lost control of the country to a great extent as of 2015, was only saved from being overthrown with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. While actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and the UAE have largely pursued an anti-Assad policy, the public opinion of these actors has accused Iran and Hezbollah of pursuing sectarian policies.

The threat to the Axis of Resistance posed by the spread of the "Arab Spring" uprisings to Syria was not only the weakening of the Bashar al-Assad regime. The solidarity and co-operation between the actors within the Axis of Resistance has also been shaken. For instance, Hamas and Iran disagreed on which side to take in the Syrian crisis. While Hamas preferred to support Sunni groups opposing the Assad regime, Iran supported the Bashar al-Assad regime (Ertan, 2021). Hamas, which can be considered an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, closed its offices in Damascus with the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, while Ismail Hsniyye described the opponents of Assad as heroes. However, Hamas could not maintain this attitude for long. The Muslim Brotherhood movement weakened with the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, who came to the fore as a new supporter of Hamas, in 2013, while Israel attacked Gaza in 2014. For these reasons, Hamas had to turn towards Iran again. Thus, relations between Iran and Hamas were restored after 2015. The deterioration of Iran's relations with Hamas has brought criticism that Iran is not consistent in its Palestinian policy. Moreover, the fact that Hezbollah fought on the side of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war at Iran's urging has led to debates on whether Hezbollah's main goal is anti-Israel. Many have argued that Iran, together with Hezbollah, acts as an actor pursuing sectarian policies and seeks a Shiite Crescent (Nabil, 2021). During this period, Iran's Palestinian policy has seen a pause, with Iran focusing more on its regional struggle with actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. With

the nuclear negotiations coming into play, the question arose whether there would be a change in Iran's Palestinian policy and anti-Israel stance. However, such a softening has not fully materialized. Although Hassan Rouhani and his supporters, who favor integration with the international community, have softened their rhetoric on the US and Israel in the climate of the nuclear deal, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his supporters have not abandoned their anti-Israel stance. For example, on April 19, 2017, the Revolutionary Guards test-fired a missile with a range of two thousand kilometers and the slogan "Death to Israel". President Rouhani saw this test as a step to undermine the nuclear deal and wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei demanding the removal of the slogans, but Khamenei refused. In one of his speeches during this period, Khamenei stated that "the Zionist regime is built on weak foundations and is therefore doomed to collapse in the long run". In another speech, he described Israel as a "cancerous tumor" and said that "Israel cannot see the next twenty-five year" (Rezaei, 2019, p. 217). In fact, Iran's continued anti-Israel stance is closely linked to its quest for ontological security. In an environment of softening relations with the United States, the Islamic Republic has adopted a policy to keep its biographical narratives and routines alive. In this respect, it has emphasized anti-Israelism, one of its basic routines. With its populist anti-Israel rhetoric, the Iranian leadership has sought to preserve the legitimacy and credibility of the Islamic Republic and sustain the Resistance paradigm.

On the other hand, Israel's anti-Iranian actions and policies continued to increase during this period. In fact, according to Netanyahu, Tel Aviv pressured the US to shelve the nuclear deal and declare the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization (CFR, 2024). Based on this discourse, it is possible to say that Iran's Palestinian policy and anti-Israel stance during this period was one of the factors that damaged relations with the US. However, the main event that turned Iran's relations with the US upside down was Trump's coming to power. Trump, who has criticized the nuclear deal on many occasions, claimed that the gains made by Iran through the nuclear deal were given to the cross-border forces of the Revolutionary Guards as blood money (Collina, 2024). Trump was of the opinion that Iran's activities within the framework of the Axis of Resistance should not be limited to limiting Iran's nuclear activities. In the end, Trump shelved the nuclear deal and started to implement a policy of maximum pressure against Iran. With actors such as Saudi Arabia and Israel supporting and even encouraging Trump's anti-Iran policy, Iran-US relations have been condemned to a Hobbesian anarchy. By increasing sanctions and pressure on Iran, the US has aimed to weaken not only Iran's nuclear activities but also its regional actions and the Axis of Resistance. In this regard, the US, in cooperation with Israel, has organized military operations and cyber-attacks against Iran and its proxy forces. The most notable of these was the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, who would be considered the admiral of the Axis of Resistance, by US drones on January 4, 2020. The killing of Soleimani on the orders of US President Trump was perceived as a humiliation and insult by the Iranian leadership. Iran's national honor was damaged, and feelings of sacrifice, independence and revenge were revived (Mesri, 2021). Soleimani's assassination has also fueled feelings of solidarity and struggle among the Axis of Resistance actors. For example, Ismail Haniyeh called Soleimani "the protector of the Palestinian resistance, the leader of the resistance against conspiracies and the martyr of Jerusalem", while Hezbollah erected a huge statue of Soleimani on the Israeli border to show its support for Soleimani (Akgül, 2020).

Trump's policy of maximum pressure has led to the weakening of Iran's tendencies towards normalization and liberalization of relations with the West, while the tide has turned in favor of radicals who advocate siding with Russia and China and pursuing a tougher policy towards the US and Israel. Public support for Iran's hawkish policies has increased, while the Islamic Republic's policies in line with the Resistance paradigm have gained weight (Kodmani, 2021). Even the rhetoric of Hassan Rouhani, who favors integration with the West, has hardened. For example, Rouhani stated that "the root cause of terrorism in the Middle East is the US and Zionism, and there will be no peace in the Middle East unless the US leaves the region". Rouhani also stated that "the Palestinian issue has returned to its rightful place as the top priority of the political agenda of the Islamic Ummah" (Holliday, 2020, p. 12). These statements show that the Resistance paradigm has come to the fore again in Iranian foreign policy.

In January 2020, a new development took place when Donald Trump presented to the public a plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he called the "Deal of the Century". The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly opposed this plan, as did organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In fact, Khamenei called the plan "a folly doomed to failure" and harshly criticized its Arab neighbors for supporting it, calling them traitors. Khamenei stated that the plan must be responded to through jihad and that Iran will continue its support for armed Palestinian groups (Demirbaş, 2021, p. 190). Parallel to Khamenei's

statements, in May 2021, Ismail Haniyeh thanked Iran on a television program, saying, "The Islamic Republic of Iran has never stopped providing funds and weapons to the resistance's brave struggle," and Yayha Sinwar similarly stated, "Without Iran, we would not have been able to build thousands of long-range missiles" (Ertan, 2021).

At a time when Iran was emphasizing the Resistance paradigm based on opposition to Israel and the US, almost the opposite situation emerged for the Arab world (Semin, 2023). Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while seeing Iran as the main threat, have embarked on a path of rapprochement with Israel. For example, in an interview with Fox News, Mohammed Bin Salman stated that Riyadh is moving closer and closer to normalization with Israel (RadioFerda, 2024). In this process, when the winds of peace began to blow between Arab countries and Israel, the Ibrahim Agreements came to the agenda. The Ibrahim Agreements were related to goals such as ending Israel's isolation in the region, starting the normalization process with the Arab world, uniting the forces of the UAE (United Arab Emirates) and Bahrain, and increasing the influence of the US and Israel in the region. In the first instance, the UAE signed a peace treaty with Israel. With this agreement, the UAE became the third Arab country after Egypt and Jordan to sign an agreement with Israel. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said that the agreement would bring peace to the region and that they welcomed it, while Hamas described it as a knife in the back of the Palestinians (Duz and Rezeg, 2020).

Hamas' path to the October attack was related to the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel and the negative relations between the US and Iran. Hamas was convinced that the Arab world was abandoning the Palestinian cause and came up with an action plan to reverse this situation. In an environment where the Palestinian cause is being forgotten, Israel continues its occupation in the West Bank ignoring the decisions of the international community, and Trump has declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Hamas seems to have thought that a more radical action was needed. In the meantime, its main supporter Iran's anti-American and anti-Israeli stance became more pronounced, which made such an attack possible. Indeed, Hamas' ability to carry out the October 7 attack is directly related to the military technology, intelligence and financial support it received from Iran (Kayhan.ir, 2024).

Iran's Palestine Policy after the 7 October attack: Seeking Controlled Escalation?

On October 7, in a meticulously and secretly planned operation, Hamas launched thousands of rockets from Gaza, crossed the Israeli border and launched a ground operation. In this surprise attack, Israel suffered hundreds of casualties and many Israelis were taken hostage by Hamas. Hamas called the attack the "Al-Aqsa Flood" and said it was motivated by the occupation of Palestinian territories, Israel's oppression of Palestinians, its violations of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and its imprisonment of many Palestinians. In a separate statement, Hamas said that actors such as Iran or Hezbollah were not aware of the attack, and that even senior leaders in Hamas and Islamic Jihad were not fully informed (Mroue and El Deeb, 2023). In the October 7 attack, Israel suffered one of the biggest losses in its history, shattering the myth of invincibility and the prestige of its intelligence power. Israel began an unprecedented military mobilization, characterizing Hamas' surprise attack as an act of terrorism.

Immediately after the October 7 attacks, the Iranian leadership congratulated the Palestinian nation and Hamas. Speaking after the attack, Ali Khamenei described it as "an irreparable failure of the Zionist regime and a courageous epic" (Khaberonline, 2023). According to Khamenei, in this attack, the Zionist regime suffered an irreparable defeat both militarily and informationally, and Israel, which was considered invincible, has become a defenseless regime with a crisis of legitimacy. Khamenei also said that the psychological taboo that Palestine and Hezbollah cannot enter the Israeli-occupied territories has been broken (Khamenei.ir, 2023). The Iranian leadership congratulated the October 7 attack, but emphasized that it was not based on its own information or suggestions, and that the Palestinians acted independently according to their own internal assessments and calculations. For example, on the fourth day of the attack, Khamenei said, "The regime's supporters and some men of the usurper regime have spread rumors in the last two or three days that Iran is behind these actions. They are mistaken. We defend Palestine, we kiss the foreheads and arms of the talented and clever designers of the Palestinian youth, but this work is the work of the Palestinians themselves" (Mehr News, 2024). The Iranian leadership's statements that they were not informed about the attack and that they were not involved in it are closely related to the Israeli leadership and public opinion's attempt to blame Iran for the attack. According to the Iranian leadership, by involving Iran in the Gaza war, Israel is trying to turn the Gaza crisis into a war between Iran and the

US. In this sense, the Iranian leadership has declared that the members of the Axis of Resistance are capable of defending themselves and that Iran will not intervene in this conflict unless the Israeli apartheid regime intends to attack Iran, its interests and its citizens (Hammihanonline.ir, 2024). After the October 7 attack, Tehran stated that a ceasefire should be reached as soon as possible in line with Hamas' demands and that Israel should refrain from a ground operation in Gaza before the crisis there escalates further. For example, ten days after Hamas attacked Israel, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, stated that a ground attack on Gaza could open the gates of hell (Kayhan.ir, 2024)

On the other hand, Israel's ground invasion of Gaza, with mass killings and massive destruction, led to a hardening of Iran's rhetoric. Tehran pointed out that the Zionist regime is committing genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza and described the United States as an absolute accomplice of the Zionist criminals. Khamenei also emphasized the need for all-out efforts to increase political pressure on the US and the Zionist regime to stop the bombings in Gaza and threatened that the Axis of Resistance could attack Israel and the US if the massacres of civilians continue (irdiplomacy.ir, 2024). However, far from easing, Israeli attacks have intensified and the conflict between Hamas and Israel has deepened. In order to maintain his power at home, Netanyahu avoided a ceasefire plan in which Hamas could release the hostages. After the attack, Netanyahu lost prestige and his power was shaken. Therefore, Netanyahu sought to revitalize his reputation by making war gains. Netanyahu and the right-wing extremists have launched attacks that would spread the conflict in Gaza to other regions and escalate tensions. Tel Aviv seems to have surrendered to Netanyahu's warmongering. For example, on April 1, 2024, Israel struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing Iran's IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Zahidi and his deputy. In response to this attack, Iran launched its first missile strike directly targeting Israel (Gadzo, 2024).

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in an Israeli attack during his visit to Tehran on July 31, 2024 was a major challenge to Iran's Palestinian policy. The assassination caused great disappointment and anger on the part of Iran and its allies and made it difficult for Iran to pursue a policy of controlled escalation. While Haniyeh's death exacerbated military and diplomatic tensions in the region, Iran was obliged to respond to his assassination (Ibrahimi, 2024). The fact that the attack took place in Tehran, Iran's capital, was both a major loss of prestige for Iran and a major challenge to Iran from Israel. The attack exposed the weaknesses in Iran's intelligence and security structure, and demonstrated Israel's superiority over Iran in terms of operational techniques, advanced surveillance, espionage and cyber warfare tools (Hezarany & Nouradin, 2024).

Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei said in a statement on Haniyeh's death that "Israel martyred our honored guest in our house" and blamed Israel for the airstrike, saying that the murder deserved "harsh punishment". Iranian president Massoud Pezeshkian similarly said, "We will make the occupying terrorist regime regret what it has done" (Naji, 2024). Although Iran has promised revenge, it has not abandoned completely its policy of controlled escalation against Israel. The Iranian leadership was of the view that an out-of-control escalation would complicate a possible ceasefire, increase political and economic pressure against it, and even lead to the possibility of direct war with the United States. Hamas, on the other hand, replaced Ismail Haniyeh with Yahya Sinwar, known as the architect of the October 7 attack, signaling that it would pursue a tougher strategy against Israel. Although the assassination of Haniyeh is a message showing Israel's capacity, it is far from being a step that will lead to the destruction of Hamas. This is because the Hamas leadership is not dependent on a single individual, but is a collective network of deep social, political and military structures. The most important impact of this assassination was the deepening of the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the climate of conflict in the region (Soliman, 2024).

On the other hand, Iran's other major regional objectives and concerns are related to Lebanese Hezbollah. Although Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah were reluctant to go directly to war to rescue Hamas, they were also aware of the loss of legitimacy and prestige if they did not fight back. It was also known that the US was pressuring Iran and Hezbollah not to escalate tensions. However, while the US put pressure on Iran and its partners to deter them from attacking Israel, it did not exert any serious pressure on Israel to stop its warmongering. Israel's destruction and occupation of much of Gaza also made it difficult for Iran and Hezbollah to maintain a policy of controlled escalation. Eventually, Lebanese Hezbollah, along with other Axis of Resistance actors such as Ansarullah, carried out low- and medium-intensity attacks against Israel, escalating tensions between the parties. The closer Israel came to destroying Gaza, the more likely it became that Hezbollah and Israel would engage in a wider war. Nevertheless, these attacks were largely carried out within the framework of the rules of engagement

established in the 2006 ceasefire. An important turning point in this escalation was the assassination of Fuad Shukr, one of Hezbollah's top military commanders, following the Israeli attacks on Lebanon. (Shamala, 2024). Subsequently, Israel detonated thousands of pagers and radios belonging to Hezbollah members, inflicting significant casualties on Hezbollah. Moreover, Tel Aviv decided to launch a more comprehensive attack on Hezbollah and intensified its attacks on Hezbollah from September 2024. Israel escalated tensions with Hezbollah and launched intense air strikes, killing Hassan Nasrallah, among many other Hezbollah officials. The killing of Nasrallah, who had been the leader of Hezbollah for decades, was a major earthquake for Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah has a much more important and privileged position in the eyes of Iran than Hamas and other Axis actors. Unlike Hamas, which is Sunni, and Ansarullah (Houthis), which is Zaidi, Hezbollah's leadership and supporters largely belong to the Imamiyya (12 Imams) branch, like Iran, and Hezbollah also accepts the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, the main political and religious doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This means that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is also recognized as the religious leader of Hezbollah. In this respect, the ties between Hezbollah and Iran are deep and deep-rooted. In Iran's eyes, Hezbollah is Iran's most important non-state ally, one of the most important stakeholders in the struggle against Israel and the foremost "success story" of the Resistance Narrative (Steinberg, 2021). Hezbollah responded to Iran's increasing attacks on Hezbollah and the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah deepened. One of the most important attacks of Hezbollah took place on 13 October. In this attack, Hezbollah carried out an effective attack on Israel with Sikhs and missiles and gave the message that it was still standing.

On the other hand, after Nasrallah's death, Iran has been accused of remaining silent or failing to respond adequately to Israeli attacks and assassinations, despite promises of revenge. In response to Israeli attacks and criticism, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a missile attack directly targeting Israel. The IRGC stated that this strike was in response to Israel's deadly attacks on civilians in Gaza and Lebanon and the assassinations of IRGC, Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. It said that the strikes targeted Iranian military and intelligence facilities using hypersonic missiles. Iran announced that its attacks had ended for the time being, but that it had more missiles ready to be fired in the event of an Israeli response (Al Jazeera, 2024). According to the Iranian leadership, this attack has brought Israel's famous Iron Dome to the precipice of destruction, while bringing a smile to the faces of the people of Lebanon, Palestine, Gaza and Yemen. According to the Iranian leadership, Revolutionary Guards used hypersonic missiles to deliver rapid and pinpoint strikes, inflicting heavy casualties on Israeli air bases (khabaronline.ir, 2024). The Israeli side stated that the attack was unsuccessful and ineffective and that no Israelis were killed. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said that Tehran had made a big mistake and would pay for it. (Holmes, 2024). Although these missile attacks do not seem to have caused any major damage to Israel, this attack carries an important symbolic meaning. Iran has both translated its anti-Israel stance from rhetoric to action, warned Israel by showing its missile capacity, and demonstrated its support for the Axis of Resistance actors. However, Iran's Palestinian policy has a material infrastructure that is incompatible with its normative obligations and assertive rhetoric. This makes Iran's Palestine policy challenging and restrictive.

Iran's Palestine Policy Dilemma: High Risks and Insufficient Material Capabilities

The Islamic Republic considers support for the Palestinian cause and opposition to Israel as an Islamic duty and a constitutional obligation. In fact, the Islamic Republic has built the regime's identity and ontological codes on the Resistance paradigm (Bagheri et al, 2021) (Cingöz et al, 2024). However, Iran's material circumstances significantly limit its normative obligations. The first thing to note is that the Islamic Republic faces a major challenge, even a crisis of legitimacy, at home, stemming from the discontent of its own people. Indeed, popular support for the Islamic Republic of Iran has declined significantly in recent years. For example, turnout rates in elections have dropped to 30% and 40%, while social unrest has increased significantly. (Rahimkhani, 2024). In this respect, a significant part of the population is dissatisfied with the political and ideological stance of the Islamic Republic. In fact, the main reasons for popular discontent are economic problems, political isolation and the lack of democratic institutionalization (Haciyossofi, 2005). However, Iran's Palestinian policy based on the Resistance paradigm has the consequence of increasing Iran's economic and political problems. As this policy increases Iran's political isolation, it is reflected as an economic burden on Iran and leads to Iran's transformation into a military-security state.

The most important issue limiting Iran's normative obligations on the Palestinian issue are major economic problems. Iran is currently experiencing a major economic crisis due to problems such as

mismanagement, corruption and sanctions. Moreover, Iran's support for the Palestinian issue and its opposition to Israel, i.e. the Resistance paradigm, trigger sanctions against Iran and deepen its economic problems (McInnis, 2017). Indeed, the main reason for the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was Iran's support for Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Again in the 2000s, Iran's Palestinian policy and the Resistance paradigm paved the way for new sanctions against Iran. The nuclear deal was also shelved largely because of Iran's activities in the Middle East region, its opposition to Israel and its support for members of the Axis of Resistance (Axworthy, 2020).

Another important issue that needs to be emphasized in terms of Iran's Palestinian policy is the heavy burden that Iran's security expenditures place on its economy. For example, Iran is the biggest sponsor of actors such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah (Barzegar & Divsallar, 2017). The fact that Iran, which is experiencing a major economic crisis within itself, spends its resources on these actors makes the economic crisis and social problems even more difficult. The slogans of the opposition in Iran such as "Neither Lebanon nor Gaza, my life for Iran, leave Gaza and look at Iran" are closely related to this situation (Uygur, 2017).

Another key point limiting Iran's normative obligations in its Palestinian policy is related to its military technology and intelligence capabilities. As seen after the October 7 attack, Israel has a great advantage in military technology and intelligence over Iran and its allies. Iran is vulnerable in terms of military technology and intelligence due to sanctions and embargoes as well as economic problems (Chandler, 2018). Israel can take advantage of this situation and organize relatively successful operations in the field. In this respect, Iran's statements on the Palestinian issue are not in line with its military and technological capabilities. Although Iran has made significant advances in missile technology, the Iranian military has significant shortcomings in advanced conventional weapons and military technology, especially compared to its regional and global rivals. For example, Iran has a major deficit in air defense systems. Iran lacks an effective and modern fleet of combat and early warning aircraft, and its existing inventory is a mixed and often incompatible mix of Russian, American, Chinese and indigenous air defense systems (Cordesman & Peacock, 2015). Although the Iranian leadership claims that its conventional deficit is covered by the deterrence provided by the Axis of Resistance, in practice this view is highly questionable.

Conclusion, Discussion, and Implications

On 7 October 2023, the Izzettin Kassam brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, carried out a large-scale and effective attack against Israel under the name of 'Aqsa Flood'. While Israel suffered significant losses in these attacks, this event became an important breaking point for many actors in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack, the Islamic Republic of Iran is caught between its normative obligations and material realities in terms of its Palestinian policy. Although the October 7 attack inflicted heavy casualties on Israel and shattered the myth of Israel's invincibility and the prestige of its intelligence forces, it was followed by a multifaceted and violent Israeli counter-strike. In these operations, Gaza was largely destroyed, thousands of Gazans and Lebanese, mostly civilians and children, were killed and millions displaced. In addition, Hezbollah's communication systems were damaged, Hamas and Iranian military headquarters were bombed, and key operational leaders of the Axis of Resistance were assassinated. During this process, Iran maintained its support for the Palestinian cause at the rhetorical level, but in practice tried to implement a strategy of "controlled tension". This is a reflection of Iran's efforts to balance its domestic and foreign policies. Iran's Palestinian policy is based on many factors such as religious-ideological teachings, historical legacy, normative obligations, geopolitical imperatives and material conditions. However, Israel's aggressive stance and the Netanyahu government's strategy of escalating the crisis make it difficult for Iran to strike this balance. Over the course of more than a year, with Israel's attacks and Iran's loss of prestige, Iran's lack of financial capacity has become more evident. The deaths of leaders such as Haniyeh and Nasrallah, as well as Iranian generals, the large-scale occupation of Gaza, the attacks on Hezbollah, and the start of a ground invasion of Lebanon, have violated many of Iran's red lines. For this reason, Iran's Palestinian policy and the effectiveness of the Axis of Resistance have been called into question. Although Iran has occasionally carried out missile attacks on Israel and made statements implying that its non-proliferation doctrine may change, these rhetorical statements have not yet been sufficiently reciprocated on the ground.

The main hypothesis emphasized in this study is that Iran is trying to pursue a strategy of controlled escalation after the October 7 attack. Two fundamental questions come to the fore here: Why does Iran

need to maintain tension and why does it want to keep it at a controlled level? Iran's ontological security architecture and normative obligations based on the Resistance paradigm constitute an obstacle to the normalization of relations with Israel. Iran's post-revolutionary identity has been built on narratives of anti-imperialism, anti-US and anti-Israel sentiments. Accordingly, support for Palestine and opposition to Israel have become an important routine and normative obligation for the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the possibility of tensions spiraling out of control poses serious threats for Iran. Iran lacks the military and economic capacity to meet its normative obligations and is struggling with sanctions and isolation on the outside and crippling economic crises and political discontent on the inside. Even before October 7, Iran was seeking a nuclear deal to ease sanctions. From this perspective, the atmosphere of tension in the aftermath of the October 7 attack is undesirable for Iran. Because of its support for the Axis of Resistance, Iran faces the danger of aggravating sanctions and political pressure on the outside and deepening economic problems on the inside.

On the other hand, the Netanyahu administration is taking actions that will spread the conflict in Gaza to other regions and escalate tensions, making it difficult for Iran to carry out its strategy of controlled escalation. The strained relations between Israel and Iran have created a new spiral of crisis and uncertainty in the Middle East, deepening the ontological and geopolitical security dilemma between Iran and Israel. It is not yet clear how far this tension will go. However, failure to de-escalate and even escalation of tensions is likely to have negative consequences for Iran and Israel in the long term. As Iran faces risks and threats that exceed its material capacity, its social, political and economic problems will deepen as a result. On the other hand, even if Israel makes some gains on the ground and expands its occupied territories, in the long run, it will be faced with the reality that its politics based on destruction and hamasas will not bring order and stability. Israel's violations of international law and human rights may weaken Israel's international legitimacy and facilitate the acceptance of a Palestinian state in the eyes of the international community. Moreover, actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah are not easy to destroy, and Israel's civilian massacres and the destruction they cause may lead to a stronger anti-Israel wave and even radicalization.

Ethical Declaration

In the writing process of the study titled *"Iran's Palestinian Policy after Hamas' 7 October Attack"*, there were followed the scientific, ethical and the citation rules; was not made any falsification on the collected data and this study was not sent to any other academic platform for evaluation.

Declaration of Conflict

There is no potential conflict of interest in the study

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TÜRKÇE GENİŞ ÖZET

Bu çalışmada ontolojik güvenlik yaklaşımı kullanılarak Hamas'ın 7 Ekim'de İsrail'e düzenlediği saldırının ardından İran'ın Filistin politikasının nasıl şekillendiği irdelenmiştir. Araştırmanın temel sorusu, 7 Ekim saldırısının ve sonrasında yaşanan olayların İran'ın Filistin'e yönelik yaklaşımında bir değişimi tetikleyip tetiklemediği ve İran'ın normatif yükümlülükleri ile kısıtlı askeri ve ekonomik kapasitesi arasında nasıl bir denge kurduğu etrafında dönmektedir. Araştırmanın temel savı ise İran'ın 7 Ekim saldırısı sonrasında normatif yükümlülükleri ile maddi gerçeklikleri arasında sıkıştığı, bu minvalde kontrollü bir gerginlik stratejisi yürütmeye çalıştığıdır. Ancak İsrail'in krizi tırmandırma çabası ve Binyamin Netanyahu'nun savaş çığırtkanlığı İran'ın kontrollü gerginlik stratejisini izlemesini zorlaştırırken kendisine yönelik eleştirileri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Çalışmada yöntem olarak ise belge ve içerik analizinden yararlanılmıştır. 7 Ekim saldırısı İran'ın bölgedeki rolünü test etmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda Filistin davasını desteklemedeki etkinliğini de yeniden tanımlamıştır. İran'ın rolüne ilişkin literatürde çeşitli perspektifler bulunmaktadır. Bir görüşe göre Gazze'deki savaş Arap devletleri ile İsrail arasındaki normalleşme çabalarını sekteye uğratarak İslam dünyasında İsrail karşıtı duyguları canlandırabileceğinden İran bu krizden kilit bir fayda sağlayan taraf olarak ortaya çıkacaktır. Bir başka görüş ise İran'ın Direniş Ekseni'nin koruyucusu ve destekçisi olduğunu, 7 Ekim saldırısından sonra Direniş Ekseni'nin ABD (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri) ve İsrail karşıtı mücadelesinde başarı sağladığını ileri sürmektedir. Bu yaklaşımda Hamas, Hizbullah ve İran'ın kararlı bir şekilde İsrail'ê karşı durduğu ve etkinli füze ve SİHA (Silahlı İnsansız Hava Araçları) saldırıları gerçekleştirdiği belirtilmektedir. Karşıt bir yaklaşım ise İran'ın tepkisini yetersiz bularak İran'ı İsrail'in eylemlerine yeterince karşılık veremeyen "kağıttan kaplan" olarak nitelendirmektedir. Bir diğer görüş ise İran'ın Filistin davasında samimi olmadığını hatta ihanet ettiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu farklı görüşlerden yola çıkarak çalışmada İran'ın Filistin politikası 7 Ekim saldırısının ardından nasıl geliştiği ve nasıl bir yaklaşımın İran'ın 7 Ekim sonrası Filistin politikasını açıklayacağı gibi sorulara yanıt aranmıştır. Ontolojik güvenlik kuramsal çerçevesi bu soruların yanıtlanmasında önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. İlk olarak Robert Laing tarafından ortaya atılan ve daha sonra Anthony Giddens tarafından genişletilen ontolojik güvenlik en basit şekliyle, aktörlerin istikrarlı bir kimliğe sahip olduklarına dair güven hissini ifade eder. Bir aktörün ontolojik güvenliği biyografik anlatı ve rutinlere sahip olmasıyla ilişkilidir. Bu anlamda İran için İsrail karşıtlığı ve Filistin'e destek temelindeki biyografik anlatı ve rutinler istikrarlı bir kimliği sürdürmek adına önemlidir. Bu çalışma, İran'ın 1979 Devrimi sonrası kimliğine derinlemesine gömülü olan İsrail karşıtı dini-ideolojik anlatılarının Filistin politikasını şekillendirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte çalışma, İran'ın ekonomik zorluklar ve askeri zafiyetlerle belirginleşen sınırlı maddi kapasitesinin, normatif yükümlülüklerini tam olarak yerine getirme kabiliyetini kısıtladığını da ortaya koymaktadır. Nitekim İsrail ve ABD'ye karşı Direniş teması üzerinden şekillenen İran'ın Filistin politikası çeşitli maddi zorluklarla karşı karşıyadır. İran 7 Ekim saldırılarından sonra Hamas ve Direniş Ekseni'ni destekleyen bir retorik

benimsemesine rağmen İran'ın tepkileri stratejik olarak ölçülü olmuş ve İran liderliği kontrollü bir gerilim politikasını sürdürmeye çalışmıştır. Bu yaklaşım, İran'ın yaptırımlar, jeopolitik tehditler, ekonomik sorunlar ve iç siyasi huzursuzluk gibi kırılganlıklardan duyduğu kaygılardan kaynaklanmaktadır. İran füze ve SİHA teknolojisinde ilerleme kaydetmiş olsa da konvansiyonel askeri kabiliyetleri, askeri teknolojisi ve istihbarat gücü ideolojik taahhütlerinin gereklerini karşılamakta yetersiz görünmektedir. 7 Ekim saldırısı İsrail'in istihbaratına ve askeri yenilmezliğine indirilen bir darbe olarak kutlanmışsa da 7 Ekim saldırısı sonrasında gelişen süreç İran'ın önemli zorluklar, zafiyetler ve riskler içerisinde olduğunu da açığa çıkarmıştır. Zira İsrail'in acımasız saldırıları Gazze'yi harabeye çevirmiş, binlerce sivilin ölümüne ve büyük bir yıkıma yol açmıştır. Ayrıca Hizbullah'ın iletişim sistemleri zarar görmüş, Direniş Ekseni'nin birçok operasyonel lideri suikaste uğramıştır. Bu süreçte İran ve müttefiklerinin askeri yeteneklerinin özellikle de teknolojik ve istihbarat üstünlüğü açısından İsrail ve ABD'den geri olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Yine de İran ve müttefikleri füze ve SİHA saldırılarıyla ayakta durmaya devam ettikleri mesajını vermiştir. İran'ın içeride ve dışarıda sahip olduğu maddi kabiliyetler normatif taahhütlerine uygun hareket etme kabiliyetini zorlaştırmaktadır. Yine de İran karmaşık jeopolitik baskılar ve iç sorunlara rağmen ABD ve İsrail karşıtlığını kontrollü bir gerginlik şeklinde sürdürmeye devam etmiştir. İran'ın gerginlik stratejisini yürütmesi Filistin davasına destek ve İsrail karşıtlığı gibi söylemlerle şekillenen Direniş paradigmasına bağımlılığına dayanmaktadır. Kontrollü durumda tutmak istemesi ise maddi kabiliyetlerinin sınırlılığı ile ilgilidir. Ancak. İsmail Haniye ve Hasan Nasrallah gibi kilit liderlerin öldürülmesi, İsrail'in Gazze ile Lübnan'daki yıkıcı saldırıları ve işgalleri hatta İran generallerini ve üslerini hedef alan saldırıları İran'ın kontrollü gerilim politikasını zora sokmuştur. Tel Aviv'in temel politikası bölgedeki gerilimin arttırılması ve İran ve müttefiklerinin krize daha çok müdahil olması yönünde gibi görünmektedir. Ancak gerilimin tırmanması olasılığı İsrail ve İran için uzun vadede önemli riskleri ve maliyetleri beraberinde getirecektir. Lübnan ve Gazze'deki çatışmaların tırmanması hatta diğer bölgelere yayılması Orta Doğu'nun uzun yıllar boyunca barış ve istikrarını sarsarken radikalleşmeyi ve İsrail karşıtlığını besleyecektir. Eğer kriz tırmanmaya devam ederse İsrail kısa vadede bazı saha kazanımları elde etse bile uzun vadede gerilimi tırmandırma, insan haklarını ihlal etme, uluslararası hukuku hiçe sayma gibi politikaların olumsuz sonuçlarıyla karşılaşacaktır. İran ise maddi kabiliyetlerinin sınırlılığı sebebiyle İsrail ve ABD karşıtlığına ilişkin normatif yükümlülüklerinin ağır maliyetleri ile karşılaşma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıyadır. Yine de İran'ın Filistin politikası büyük ölçüde normatif yükümlülükleri ve müttefiklerine yönelik ideolojik desteği çerçevesinde gelişecektir.