

PAPER DETAILS

TITLE: DECONSTRUCTING THE "IDEAL POWER EUROPE" META-NARRATIVE IN EU
PEACEBUILDING

AUTHORS: Münevver CEBECİ

PAGES: 77-99

ORIGINAL PDF URL: <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/2902467>

DECONSTRUCTING THE “IDEAL POWER EUROPE” META-NARRATIVE IN EU PEACEBUILDING*

Münevver CEBECİ** 

Abstract

This article attempts to portray how the representation of the European Union (EU) as a model of peaceful regional integration helps legitimize the Union's imposition of a disciplining power on -what it refers to as- “conflict/fragile zones”. With such legitimacy, the EU imposes its “best practices” on others, projects its own values and norms, and, thus, practices a European type of governmentality. While doing so, the EU pays little attention to the specific cultural, political, economic and social characteristics of “conflict-prone” societies and overlooks local/grassroots agency. This article thus argues that representing the EU as a model of peaceful integration contributes to its construction as an “ideal power” and legitimizes its peacebuilding efforts in other regions and countries. Its major conclusion is that the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative produced and reproduced by EU researchers and policy-makers feeds into the Union's governmentality, helping it discipline recipient societies through its peacebuilding.

Keywords: European Union, “ideal power Europe”, meta-narrative, peacebuilding, governmentality.

* This article is a totally revised and updated version of the author's conference paper titled “Deconstructing the ‘Ideal Power Europe’ Meta-Narrative in EU Peacebuilding” which was presented at the “Power and Peacebuilding Conference”, the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI), the University of Manchester and the International Association for Peace and Conflict Studies, in Manchester, on 12-13 September 2013. The research for this paper was funded by the Scientific Research Projects Unit (BAPKO) of Marmara University, Istanbul, with the Project Number: SOS-D-120813-0358.

** Prof. Dr., Marmara University, Institute of European Studies, e-mail: munevvercebeci@marmara.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4205-8924.

AB'NİN BARIŞ İNŞASINDA “İDEAL GÜÇ AVRUPA” META-ANLATISININ ÇÖZÜMLENMESİ

Öz

Bu makale, AB'nin barışçıl bir bölgesel bütünleşme modeli olarak temsilinin Birliğin, “çatışma bölgeleri/kırılgan bölgeler” olarak tanımladığı bölgelerin üzerinde disipline edici bir güç uygulamasını nasıl meşrulaştırdığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB, bu meşruiyet ile kendi “en iyi uygulamalar”ını diğerlerine empoze eder, kendi norm ve değerlerini yansıtır ve böylece Avrupa tarzı bir yönetimsellik uygulamış olur. Tüm bu uygulamaları sırasında AB, “çatışmaya açık” toplulukların kendilerine has kültürel, siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal özelliklerine çok az önem verir ve yerel/toplumun tabanına ait failliği göz ardı eder. Bu makalede AB'nin bir barışçıl bütünleşme modeli olarak temsil edilmesinin onun bir “ideal güç” olarak yapılandırılmasına katkıda bulunduğu ve başka bölge ve ülkelerdeki barış inşası çabalarını meşrulaştırdığı argümanı öne sürülmektedir. Makalenin vardığı ana sonuç, AB araştırmacıları ve politika yapıcıları tarafından üretilen/yeniden üretilen “ideal güç Avrupa” meta-anlatısının Birliğin yönetimselliğini beslediği ve barış inşası ile alıcı toplumları disipline etmesine katkıda bulunduğuudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, “ideal güç Avrupa”, meta-anlatı, barış inşası, yönetimsellik.

Introduction

This article aims to reveal how the EU's depiction of itself as “the world's most successful supra-national peacebuilding venture” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2012) inevitably creates the binary of an “ideal power Europe” (Cebeci, 2012) and its “imperfect” others (in this case “conflict-prone/fragile states”) and how such constructions legitimize its foreign policy and reproduce its “ideal” self. The article argues that predicating the EU as a model of peaceful regional integration with a claim to be representing “universal” norms contributes to its construction as an “ideal power” and legitimizes its peacebuilding efforts in other regions and countries. The EU thus legitimizes its interventions/acts regarding these regions and countries through the claim to be imposing its “best practices” and projecting its own values and norms. Such practice refers to a European type of governmentality, which is based on the conveyance of certain knowledge about the EU (that it has achieved peaceful regional integration and that it thus represents a model) and its employment to legitimize the EU's use of security apparatuses (such as imposing its best practices in peacebuilding) in its dealings with recipient societies (conflict-prone/fragile societies). The claim that the EU represents peace, the “best

practices”, and, universal norms in peacebuilding reinforces the Union’s asymmetrical approach towards several regions and countries; while it pays little attention to their specific cultural, political, economic and social characteristics, and, fails to address the needs of the “local-locals” in their everyday lives (Richmond, 2010a: 666-667).

This article attempts to deconstruct the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative¹ created by European foreign policy researchers and EU policy-makers, through a second reading of their texts on the EU’s peacebuilding efforts in the years 2003-2021. It is designed in such a way to portray how the representation of the EU as a model in terms of being “the world’s most successful supra-national peacebuilding venture” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2012) helps legitimize the Union’s imposition of a *disciplining power* on –what it labels as– “conflict/fragile zones”. It argues that this pertains to the EU’s governmentality, giving a Foucauldian bend to its analysis.

Foucault (1994: 219) defines governmentality as a set of “institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” and argues that governmentality “has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security”. What is important in governmentality is the technologies of government; the way knowledge is produced and reproduced in a specific and subtle way that empowers the government. The EU’s governmentality, as employed in this article thus refers to the EU’s imposition of power over its others (as well as over European citizens) through conveying a specific knowledge/identity about itself (ideal power Europe) and legitimizing its acts through the reproduction of that knowledge. In case of EU peacebuilding, the EU’s governmentality pertains to having the societies in “conflict-prone” areas as its target, neoliberalism as its principal form of knowledge and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other peacebuilding tools as its apparatuses of security².

This article adopts a two-pronged research strategy. One of these prongs is a Derridean second reading and deconstruction which aims to reveal the binaries reproduced by the dominant discourse on the EU’s peacebuilding (e.g., peaceful

¹ Meta-narratives are general stories of the story of a subject, mainly, of life (Cebeci, 2019: 3, cf. Lyotard, 1984: 34). Lyotard (1984: xxiv) refers to meta-narratives as apparatuses of legitimation, “implying a philosophy of history”. The “‘ideal power’ Europe meta-narrative” is, thus, a term employed to refer to the general story of the progressive and universalist (hi)story of EUrope which legitimizes the EU’s governmentality in world politics (Cebeci, 2012 and 2019).

² A security apparatus (a *dispositif*) is defined by Foucault (2007: 6) as a mechanism for inserting a phenomenon within a series of probable events and it consists of reactions of power to this phenomenon and its employment sets an acceptable that must not be exceeded.

Europe vs. its conflictual others). The other prong is elucidating the performative function of discourse through an analysis of how the EU's representation as an ideal power legitimizes its peacebuilding activities and its imposition of a silent disciplining power on others. In doing this, the article mainly draws on an analysis of EU official documents on peacebuilding, in general (those documents which directly employ the term "peacebuilding"); as well as documents that do not necessarily use the term "peacebuilding" but are on the EU's police-training, rule of law, security sector reform, etc. activities³; and the EU's major foreign policy documents which portray the EU as "representing peace" and thus entitled to pursue peacebuilding in the world (such as the Europeans Security Strategy and the Global Strategy). The article further involves a review of the scholarly literature on EU peacebuilding. The time frame of the article is 2003-2021. The year 2003 is specifically chosen as it witnessed the operationalization of the military and civilian crisis management missions of the CSDP and the announcement of the EU's first security strategy -the European Security Strategy-. The year 2021 is taken as the full year before 2022 when the Russian aggression against and invasion of Ukraine changed the dynamics of EU foreign policy⁴.

This article only attempts to deconstruct the "ideal power Europe" meta-narrative in European peacebuilding; refraining from offering a solution to improve/replace current European practice⁵. As it further problematizes the rhetoric of "emancipation"; the article also diverts from peace studies that put forward the argument of emancipatory/post-liberal peace (see, e.g., Richmond, 2010b: 26-33, Visoka and Richmond, 2017) which ideally "signifies localized efforts for forming peace by peaceful means, autonomous from elite predation and external intervention but able to draw upon external support where necessary to prevent conflict actors from establishing blockages to peace, for security, resources, knowledge, and accountability" (Visoka and Richmond, 2017: 113). The article consists of four main parts. In the first part, it attempts to analyze the EU's representation as a successful model of regional peacebuilding -the "EU-as-representing-peace" discourse. Second, it enquires into the claim that the EU has the "best practices" for establishing peace- the "EU-as-representing-the-best-practices" discourse. Third, it discusses the argument that the norms that the EU pursues are *universal* and it has a civilizing role in promoting those norms and

³ The regarding EU's CSDP activities and missions that serve peace/state-building or might be regarded as peacebuilding.

⁴ This is also why the EU's Strategic Compass is not analyzed in this article.

⁵ It should be noted at this point that this article does not intend to magnify or underrate the EU's role in peacebuilding. The article also does not take the EU as a homogenous and coherent bloc, especially in its foreign policy. However, it is opposed to those who extenuate the EU's failures by basing them on the Union's non-unitary nature and put more emphasis on the its "normative" aspirations.

values in “conflict-prone zones” – the “EU-as-representing-universal-norms” discourse. In the fourth part, it looks into the EU’s peacebuilding rhetoric and practices; displacing the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative in them and revealing how the EU’s representation in such ways legitimizes the Union’s acts internationally and empowers it in imposing a European type of governmentality on other countries/regions.

The “EU as representing peace” discourse

Tonra (2010: 63) argues that “the dominant narrative traditionally presented of the Union is as a successful European peace process”. In his view, it is this dominant narrative about the EU, which normalizes its role of delivering peace (Tonra, 2010: 63). Both European Foreign Policy researchers and European policymakers are keen on expressing how successful the EU had been in making war unthinkable between its member states; how it became a successful model of peaceful regional integration and how it projects (and should project) its own model to the other parts of the world. Representing a view from the practitioners’ side, the European Economic and Social Committee’s rapporteur Morrice states:

Often described as the world’s most successful supra-national peace-building venture, the EU can be seen as a role model for others in this arena. Its own experience, bringing sworn enemies together in the aftermath of World War II must be its greatest ever achievement (European Economic and Social Committee²⁰¹²).

Similarly, the then President of the European Commission Barroso (2009) claimed that the EU was a “*role model* for a global world order” and “by showing the successful functioning of a peaceful Union, based on democracy and respect for human rights, Europe [was] *leading by example*”. The then President of the European Council, Van Rompuy, on the other hand, stated: “Do we need Europe in order to preserve peace? Do we still need people to carry and promote the idea of Europe? Yes, we do. I personally have always been convinced of this. Ultimately, peace is at the heart of what we are doing as a Union” (European Council, 2012a). These statements all reveal how the EU is constructed as representing peace and being a role model by the EU practitioners. The EU’s choice of the name “PEACE” (EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2014 – 2020) for its structural funds programme which aims to “reinforc[e] progress towards a peaceful and stable society, and promot[e] reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland” (European Commission, n/a) is also reflective of how it equates itself and its own practices with peace.

Analysts also use the rhetoric of the EU’s model of successful peaceful integration. Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005: 319) claim that “the logic of inter-regional cooperation derives from the *successful European model*, which has transformed the relations between formerly warring parties into some sort of

a cooperative structure where divergent interests are tackled and resolved by negotiation”⁶. Linking the EU’s normative power to designing “a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace”, Manners (2008: 56) argues that any EU normative ethic should be based on “living by virtuous example”. This shows that European foreign policy researchers produce and reproduce the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative in EU peacebuilding.

The Nobel Peace Prize has been another factor that contributed to the reproduction of the EU’s identity as representing peace.⁷ The Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that it was because of its contributions “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” for over six decades that the EU was given the prize (Nobelprize.org, 2012). This statement clearly shows the ground on which the EU is equated with peace (Cebeci, 2020: 301). This is also reflected in the joint statement that Barroso and Van Rompuy made on the Nobel Peace Prize:

This Prize is the strongest possible recognition of the deep political motives behind our Union: the *unique effort* by ever more European states to overcome war and divisions and to jointly shape a continent of peace and prosperity. [...]

[...] Over the last sixty years, the European Union has reunified a continent split by the Cold War around values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. [...]

These are also the values that the European Union promotes in order *to make the world a better place for all*. The European Union will continue to promote peace and security in the countries close to us and in the world at large (European Council, 2012b)⁸.

Barroso and Van Rompuy’s statement clearly shows how the EU is constructed as representing peace. EU member states are represented as the ones that have engaged in a “unique effort” to bring peace to the European continent. Labelling the EU’s effort as “unique” is about underlining its difference from others: The EU is depicted as the only one which can be equated with peace whereas the others are automatically constructed as not putting the same effort into peace. This provides the basis for constructing the EU as an actor that promotes its values “to make the world a better place for all” (European Council, 2012b) and legitimizes the EU’s promotion of peace and security (in other words, its interventions) in other countries. The statement also reflects how the EU is constructed as a “force for good” (Pace, 2008) in the world, especially with regard to bringing peace. In Pace’s view (2008: 203) “EU actors are part of and

⁶ Emphasis added.

⁷ See for example, Manners and Murray (2016). Also see: Hayes (2012).

⁸ Emphases added.

their practices replicate an epistemic community” as they “accept an optimistic version of the narrative of the EU as a ‘force for good’, which they continuously validate, produce and reproduce”.

The representation of the EU as a “force for good” in the world inevitably brings about its depiction as an inherently capable actor in peacebuilding. The link between the EU’s equation with peace and its peacebuilding capacity is neatly established by many EU analysts and policy-makers. The Lisbon Treaty (European Commission, 2010), for example, stipulates that the EU’s “aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples” and that “[i]n its relations with the wider world”, it should “contribute to peace” and “security” (Article 3). Then, in Article 21.2(c), the Treaty also sets “preserv[ing] peace, prevent[ing] conflicts and strengthen[ing] international security” as an objective of the EU’s common policies in its external action (European Commission, 2010). The Concept on EU Peace Mediation refers to this as a “core mandate” of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2020: 2). The same document also defines the “promotion of international peace and security” as “part of the EU’s *raison d’être*” (Council of the European Union, 2020: 4). This clearly shows how the depiction of the EU as representing peace automatically brings about the assumption that it should take on the responsibility and thus the task of promoting and preserving peace elsewhere.

Representing the analysts/scholars part of the European epistemic community, Brück declared (as the incoming director of SIPRI, then): “The awarding of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize reminds us that the European Union is the most successful example of peacebuilding ever achieved in world history[.]” (SIPRI, 2012). Brück’s statement is especially significant as it refers to the EU as a peacebuilding project itself. This is exactly the premise on which many EFP researchers and policy-makers, alike, build their notion of EU peacebuilding in the world. Wallensteen (2010: 51) refers to the EU as “a *unique* example of peacebuilding that has left a lasting imprint on world history”⁹. Referring to “the idea of the EU as a peacebuilding project *par excellence*”, Duke and Courtier (2009: 13) contend that such an idea “informs the outlook of the EU in its external peacebuilding efforts since the EU sees itself as exemplar”. Morrice, on the practitioners’ side, contends:

Peace-building is in the European Union’s DNA. Its very creation, enlargement and survival in times of crisis are a testament to its peace-building prowess. As a community of nations promoting democracy, human rights, equality and tolerance, the EU has a moral obligation to support peace-building worldwide and it now has a Treaty mandate to do so (European Economic and Social Committee, 2012).

⁹ Emphasis added.

A second reading would suggest that in the EU-as-representing-peace discourse, the use of the terms “unique”, “par excellence”, and “in the EU’s DNA” all help portray the EU as the ideal, superior, desirable – the peaceful – against the imperfect, conflictual others which are incapable of achieving peace without the EU’s help. Such a discourse surely empowers the EU, legitimating its peacebuilding practices. It further justifies the rhetoric that the EU has the *best practices* for building peace and is thus well-placed to intervene in “conflict-prone” zones of the world.

The EU as representing the “best practices”

“Best practices” can be defined as “norms of conduct” or prescriptions of “doing things without being presented as rules” (Garapon, 2013: XI). They come into being “by time, by regularity, by a habit” and they get “slowly transformed into a rule” in the end (Garapon, 2013: XI). Vincent (2017: 131¹⁰) argues that the dominant tendency today is “analysing and [...] bringing to light the ‘best practices’” in an endeavour either to “release” them “on an empirical and comparative basis”, or to make them “subject to a preliminary, normative and theoretical reflection, [...] to determine what would be in such or such a situation the good practice”, and that in both cases, the aim is to “generalize” them. This pertains to making them common (of common sense/conventional wisdom – i.e., normal). In his view, “against this very dominant tendency today, other tendencies that remain in minority strive to situate themselves differently” (Vincent, 2017: 131¹¹). This means that other practices which are not deemed as the “best practice” according to the dominant tendency are sidelined or marginalized. This reflects the power-knowledge relationship in which the “best practices” and the knowledge produced/reproduced about them become part and parcel of governmentality as they help impose a certain (neo-liberal) way of doing things.

The EU does not have a clear official definition of best practices, but a brochure by the EU-CIVCAP¹² defines “best practices” as follows:

In line with EU terminology, best practice is understood most generally as “an activity which conventional wisdom regards as more effective at delivering a particular outcome than any other technique”. Also in line with EU terminology, such best practices can be directly inspired by so-called lessons learnt on the part of the EU [...]. (Smith et.al., 2018)

¹⁰ Translated from French by the author.

¹¹ Translated from French by the author.

¹² EU-CIVCAP was a Horizon 2020 project conducted in 2016-2018 with the aim of “provid[ing] a comprehensive, comparative and multidisciplinary analysis of the EU’s capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in order to identify existing shortfalls” (EU-CIVCAP, 2018).

Peacebuilding is an area in which the EU has a claim to be representing/possessing “best practices”. Rasmussen (2010: 175-176) contends: “the ideology of peace is based on a practice of peacebuilding which assumes that the Western ‘custodians of peace’ *know best* how to build it.”¹³ Following his contention, it is easy to trace the discourse of the “best practices” in EU peacebuilding. The EU’s report titled “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the – The role of the European Union in peace building in external relations: *best practice* and perspectives” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2012)¹⁴ is significant as it is an exemplar of such inclination to name the EU as knowing and having the “best practices”. Similarly, the EU’s Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention which is a part of the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for 2021-2027 underlines the importance of the exchange of “best practices” (European Commission, 2021). In practice, the best practices mentioned here are all based on EU experience and lessons learned as well as standards/benchmarks set by the EU. This means that EU peacebuilding/conflict prevention does not take into account local dynamics (also, local practices and lessons learned) in imposing them on recipient societies. For example with regard to EUCAP Nestor, Ejodus (2017: 475) contends that the local authorities in Somalia were reluctant “to adopt the Coast Guard [bill], whose drafting was supported by EUCAP Nestor [...] as it [foresaw] a civilian Coast Guard, which [was] in line with the European *best practice*”¹⁵. In his view, authorities in Mogadishu “would prefer to build the future Coast Guard of Somalia as part of the Ministry of Defence and a nucleus of their future Navy”, instead (Ejodus, 2017: 475). Another example in this regard is EULEX Kosovo, about which EU and Kosovar priorities significantly differ because the Kosovars seek more emphasis on corruption whereas the EU prioritizes war crimes (Mahr, 2018).

On the other hand, the EU’s representation as knowing/having the “best practices” constructs its identity against the others which are usually portrayed as incapable of maintaining order and stability and achieving good governance on their own. Kappler (2012: 616-617) argues that the relations between the EU and the political elites in BiH “are based on an underlying assumption that the EU knows best how to cope with peacebuilding (compared to the local actors), as illustrated in the European Commission’s references to ‘problems’, ‘failure’, ‘very little progress’ and ‘difficulties’ when referring to the conditions for democratization in BiH”. Similarly, emphasizing the “productive power” of the EU’s “fact-finding experts” in police missions, Merlingen (2011: 159) contends:

¹³ Emphases added.

¹⁴ Emphases added.

¹⁵ Emphasis added.

[...] the fact-finding experts created an unbridgeable gap between the imaginary subject position of the good European “copper” and the really existing subject position of local “coppers”. The imaginary *high standards of European policing best practices* led to benchmarks for mission reforms that were unachievable. Also, the exaggerated gap between EU policing and local policing created *a false sense of superiority* on the part of the CSDP administrators and decision-makers in Brussels.¹⁶

With regard to the experience of the EUPOL COPPS on the ground, İşleyen (2018) points to how the recipient societies are constructed as problematic by EU experts. She argues that the capacity-building efforts of the EUPOL COPPS reveal how its experts act with the logic that they “represent the normal with the necessary expertise, skills and experience to address the supposedly abnormal Palestinian side that is in need of being taught, educated and amended to acquire personal skills to become more ‘professional’, ‘specialized’ and ‘advanced’” (İsleyen, 2018: 334). Such constructions of the host societies as imperfect and lacking Western/“universal” qualities, surely give the EU the justification to impose some form of governmentality on them. In Merlingen’s (2011: 157) view, “[EU] experts employ contingent and contestable premises and discursive filters in order to construct” those societies as problematic and thus in need of the EU’s peacebuilding. Together with Ostrauskaitė, he argues:

[...] police aid that ignores the necessarily particularizing nature of its projects runs the risk of deteriorating into efforts to establish and secure a policing order informed by supposedly *universal standards* against deviant local conduct and organizations. In such a scenario, recalcitrant natives are disciplined and normalized before being inserted into a ‘best Western’ policing order (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 10).¹⁷

The link between the argument on representing the best practices and the claim to universality in terms of the norms and values that the EU promotes in the world is significant. Claims to universality, just like the claim to having the best practices, help the EU impose its disciplining power on other countries. The two discourses usually go hand in hand, supporting each other.

The EU as representing universal norms

Many EU documents promote the idea of representing universal values and norms. In the Preamble of the Lisbon Treaty, it is stated that the Union should act by “[drawing inspiration] from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the *universal* values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy,

¹⁶ Emphases added.

¹⁷ Emphases added.

equality and the rule of law'(European Commission, 2010).¹⁸ Article 21, on the other hand, reads as:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the *universality* and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (European Commission, 2010)¹⁹

Similarly, EU Global Strategy underlines that the Union “will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to *champion* the indivisibility and *universality* of human rights” (EEAS, 2016: 18)²⁰. The use of the verb “champion” is significant as the word (as a noun) also means surpassing all rivals in a game. In other words, championing something has a quality to it, which is more than vigorously supporting a cause. Thus, the depiction of the EU as the one to champion the universality of human rights pertains to automatically placing it in the position not only of representing universal values but also of being their “champion”. This inevitably adds to the binary of an ideal power Europe vis-à-vis other actors.

The EU's tendency to pursue liberal peace²¹ also adds to the use of the rhetoric of universality. This is because one of the most important claims of the liberal peace approach is building peace in line with universal norms and values. However, liberal peace has several shortcomings such as its underlying neo-liberal (markets-oriented) logic, problems with the sustainability of its results, its emphasis on statebuilding, etc. (Paris, 2010).²² Among other discrepancies, liberal peace is also criticized for “its methodological inability to move beyond its ‘universal’ prescriptions derived from a narrow Western experience” (Richmond, 2012: 116). The depiction of the EU as a normative power reflects and nurtures the claim that it represents universal norms and values. This inevitably contributes to the assumption that “liberal states and peoples are effectively superior in rights and status to others” (Richmond, 2009: 565)²³. It also reminds one of “direct or subtle forms of colonialism” (Richmond, 2009:

¹⁸ Emphasis added.

¹⁹ Emphasis added.

²⁰ Emphases added.

²¹ Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011: 452) contend: “Overall the emerging [EU Peace Framework] has complied with the general promotion of the liberal peace and its key components as a long term approach to building peace.”

²² On the EU's peacebuilding practice which equates “building a just and durable peace with building liberal/neoliberal states”, see: Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011: 458). On the difference between statebuilding and peacebuilding see: Richmond (2013).

²³ Note that Richmond refers to Jahn (2006: 203) and Chandler (2006, 36).

565). On the other hand, claims of universality are also problematic in the sense that the EU is rather particularistic about promoting “universal” norms and values (Bickerton, 2011: 80). Bickerton (2011: 80), for example, asks: “can the EU pass from the particularism of its selected norms to the universality of the norms that currently underpin the international system, such as sovereignty and non-intervention?”.

The claim to be representing universal values and norms, especially in peacebuilding, risks overlooking the local and its particularities. Referring to “the universality of norms and development paths” (also as the offer of liberal peacebuilding), Petrova and Delcour (2020: 339) argue that “resilience-building suggests the reform of domestic structures following Western templates to increase their viability, whereas local ownership entails the responsibility of domestic actors to implement externally developed policies”. Following the Western templates mean mimicking the appropriate “universal” behaviour as defined/determined by the West. By imposing its own model legitimized through the discourse of universality and with little consideration for the specific cultural, economic and social characteristics of certain regions and countries, the EU thus encourages mimicry and, in a sense, adds to the colonial tradition²⁴ rather than engaging the people of those regions and meeting their local needs. Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė (2006: 17) argue: “by looking at norm projection in terms of nice universals such as democracy and human rights, analysts overlook the concrete exclusions and elisions entailed by the contingent *savoir faire* a norm promoter such as the EU deploys in its international projects of improvement.”

On the other hand, in cases when the EU attempts to engage the locals, paying more attention to their cultural, societal and economic needs, its efforts remain rather rhetorical and do not usually resonate in practice. Analyzing the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kappler and Richmond (2011: 263) argue that the “‘universal’ blueprints” of EU peacebuilding, such as pluralism and social justice, “have not yet reached most of the Western Balkans”. Responding to criticisms against the EU’s claim for universal values and norms, Manners (2010: 36) argues that “[t]he normative power approach attempts to strike a critical path between culturally insensitive universalism and the reification of cultural relativism in order both to critique and change the EU in world politics”. However, this statement cannot help explain the problems caused by the EU’s

²⁴ Bhabha (1994: 86) argues that mimicry represents a *difference* as it pertains to “a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power”, and he also refers to it as “the sign of the appropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers”.

insistence on promoting universal norms without paying enough attention to the cultural, economic and social orientation and needs of host societies.

Beyond the discussion of whether the norms that the EU represents are universal or Western norms, or whether they are culturally insensitive; what is crucial here is that the claim for the universality of the norms which the EU represents empowers the Union to impose its own standards on others. Diez (2005: 628) contends: “[T]he standards of the self are not simply seen as superior, but of *universal* validity, with the consequence that the other should be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self”²⁵. This is exactly the point that this article aims to make: by claiming to be representing the universal, the EU legitimizes its use of security apparatuses to discipline its others, in general, and in its peacebuilding, in particular.

The Workings of the “Ideal Power Europe” Meta-narrative in EU Peacebuilding

Arguing that “all intergovernmental organisations [...] more or less accept as common-sense the self-evident virtuosity and truth of the liberal peace project”, Taylor (2010: 157) contends: “This normative agenda is dominant within the UN system, with a broad consensus on what peacebuilding is, as well as what constitutes the fundamentals of any sustainable peace.” This is also the case for the EU: There is also a “general consensus” on what the EU is (an “ideal power”), and about its approach to peacebuilding (that it represents peace, the best practices and universal norms).

The EU’s role in peacebuilding is conveyed through the same way in which Europe is constructed as an “ideal power”: On the assumption either that the EU acts in “ideal ways” or that it “aspires” to act in ideal ways (Cebeci, 2012: 583). The EU’s attempts to prevent conflicts, to support democracy, human rights and the rule of law in post-conflict situations, and, the humanitarian and development aid that it provides to “conflict-prone” societies are all represented as examples of the “ideal ways” in which the Union acts. On the other hand, underlining the EU’s “aspirations” to pursue a bottom-up, emancipatory/post-liberal approach to peace, engaging more with civil society actors, and addressing the needs of the locals is also a way of constructing its difference from other peacebuilding actors²⁶. This means that the EU’s difference from other peacebuilding actors has mainly been constructed on the premise of its *aspirations* rather than its acts. For example, in the years when the dominant discourse on the EU revolved around the notion of “normative power Europe”, although Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler (2009) criticized EU peacebuilding for its liberal peace practices (as they

²⁵ Emphasis added.

²⁶ See, for example, Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011: 455); and Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler (2009: 15).

are critical analysts who argue for an “emancipatory” form of peace²⁷), they still believed that the EU’s *aspirations* to achieve hybrid peace demonstrated its normative difference²⁸. They also stated that the EU’s *aspiration* towards “a socially and politically sophisticated hybrid peace approach to peacebuilding” (Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009: 15)²⁹ marked its difference from the UN. This statement shows that even for critical peace researchers, the EU’s *aspirations* made it a “force for good” in peacebuilding³⁰. Although the idealization of the EU by peace researchers – and, also, especially by European Studies researchers – got eroded by the EU Global Strategy’s emphasis on principled pragmatism and resilience, it can be argued that they still see the EU as a point of reference for peace. For example, Tocci (2021: 288) sees the EU as a point of reference for peace and argues:

the EU has moved from a hyperliberal idealist approach based on conditionality, social learning, and passive enforcement to building peace and reconstructing states to a more bottom-up principled pragmatism centered around supporting states’ and societies’ resilience and integrating the EU’s capabilities and instruments to leverage greater and above all more coherent impact.

Tocci (2017, 2021) represents the EU rather as an ideal and almost naïve actor before the adoption of the Global Strategy in 2016; underlines the realization on the part of Europeans that the world outside was different; and explains the EU’s discursive shift to principled pragmatism through this realization, emphasizing that the EU had to remove its “rose-tinted glasses” (2017: 499). This is exactly how the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative (Cebeci, 2012) is constructed. The “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative produced and reproduced by EU researchers and policy-makers nurtures securitized and dominative forms of relationship that the EU establishes with recipient societies in its peacebuilding and helps their institutionalization. It helps the EU discipline those societies through the exercise of conditionality, and the mechanisms of the CSDP. Mainly through EU conditionality (imposed via enlargement or trade relations), the recipient societies (which are portrayed as different from the European self, due

²⁷ See: Richmond (2010b: 26-27).

²⁸ Also see: Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler (2011).

²⁹ Emphasis added.

³⁰ It should be noted at this point that Richmond, together with Visoka, recognized the EU’s limitations in providing positive hybrid peace and underlined that instead of conditionality, the EU should provide stronger economic initiatives for achieving peace in Kosovo (Visoka and Richmond, 2017). Still, they pursued a progressivist approach to peace, which this article sees as another point of contention because the term “progress” itself is as burdened as the term “emancipation” as both terms resonate well with civilisationist and colonial practices.

to their “conflict-prone” nature) are homogenized³¹. The imposition of the EU’s model and its best practices via the CSDP also serve the same purpose. On the other hand, the CSDP is also the platform through which the conflictual others are securitized and the need for civilizing them through various mechanisms (e.g. police and rule of law missions) is justified. This shows that the EU operates through the apparatuses of security; as the essential technical means of its governmentality.

The representation of the recipient societies as “conflict-prone” contributes to the EU’s governmentality as it reproduces and legitimizes the Union’s “civilizing ethos” in peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité 2006:5)³². Merlingen (2011:157) argues that the problematization of host societies by EU fact-finding experts leads to their portrayal as “problem spaces” and this legitimizes the “security governance provided; by the CSDP”. Kappler (2012: 615) also contends that EU policy-makers and peacebuilders on the ground believe that conflict in such societies “can only be transformed into less violent conflict” and, thus, it cannot be “overcome” but “can only be externally mitigated”. The result is a European type of governmentality that operates “not through repression, prohibition and censorship but through the discursive production of contingent standards of normality calibrated against eclectic European practices, and their implantation in local subjects and institutions by virtue of inconspicuous political technologies” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2006: 4).

The EU reiteratedly underlines local ownership in its official documents regarding conflict prevention, crisis management and/or peacebuilding (e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Council of the European Union, 2005; European Commission and High Representative, 2016). The EU’s Global Strategy also stipulates that the EU “will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, and support fragile states in building capacities, including cyber” (EEAS, 2016: 26). Nevertheless, this emphasis remains in rhetoric, because EU practice on the ground is rather different: First, it is the EU which defines the scope and the content of the peacebuilding missions³³, and the recipient states and societies are

³¹ On the EU’s “homogenizing temptation in peacebuilding”, see: Merlingen and Ostrauskaité (2006: 5).

³² On the civilizing character of EU peacebuilding, see: Linklater (2005).

³³ Ejodus (2017: 468) contends: “EU interventions are usually launched without a sufficient local input into the planning phase. Fact-finding and technical assessment missions are too short and rarely consider the local views beyond the top layer of governmental elites. Based on the limited understanding, and usually under a political pressure from one or a few member states to deploy as quickly as possible, the member state delegates in the PSC negotiate and decide internally how the mission should look like. Then the EU deploys and returns to the locals, in the words of one PSC delegate, with the following request: ‘here is your mission, now please have some ownership’.”

expected to own them as such (Ejdus, 2017: 467-470). Second, EU peacebuilding mainly operates through cooperation with governments and co-opted professionalized civil society actors rather than “local-locals” (cf., Ejdus and Juncos, 2018: 15). Third, the European experts sent for the peacebuilding missions either lack expertise or hardly have any knowledge of local dynamics (Ejdus, 2017: 469). This proves the argument by Wilén (2009) and Rayroux and Wilén (2014) that “local ownership” is a buzzword (if not a “norm”) employed by international organizations (and especially the EU) to legitimize their peacebuilding interventions and avoid accusations of having neo-colonial intentions. Ejdus (2017: 465) thus asserts: “*local ownership* has achieved a particularly strong resonance in the policy rhetoric of the EU because it chimed well with how the Union portrays its role in the world”³⁴. This is exactly the point that this article aims to make: that the EU, rather than acting as an “ideal power” (which it claims to be) represents itself as one through the use of a specific discourse to construct its identity as such³⁵.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to deconstruct the ideal power Europe meta-narrative in EU peacebuilding. It has portrayed how this meta-narrative is constructed through the portrayal of the EU as representing peace, having/known best practices and promoting universal norms and values. It has tried to reveal how the EU’s governmentality is legitimized in its peacebuilding efforts, through the use of such representations. It has also shown the agency of European researchers in the construction of the EU’s identity in world politics in general, and in peacebuilding, in particular.

The imposition of the EU’s model, its best practices and the promotion of “universal” norms and values in peacebuilding inevitably cause insensitivity towards the needs of the local populations in recipient societies. What usually happens instead is that such peacebuilding efforts help produce co-opted elites and professionalized civil society organizations in recipient countries and those groups can hardly empathize with their own locals (Richmond, 2013: 379). This is the case for the EU mainly because the Union also relies on “liberal peacebuilding blueprints” (Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler, 2011: 461)

³⁴ Emphasis added.

³⁵ Note that Chandler also problematizes the post-liberal peacebuilding’s emphasis on local engagement as a whole when he argues: “The postconflict or postcolonial subjects, who are ascribed the agency of ‘resistance’, flatter Western interveners, enabling them to reinterpret the gap between liberal promise and the institutionally embedded inequalities at the level of locally produced nonliberal rationalities, temporalities, or ways of being, resistant to liberal peace” (Chandler and Richmond, 2015: 3). Chandler’s remarks are important as they reveal how governmentality functions, legitimizing its ways through a continuous reproduction of the self and its others.

despite its changed rhetoric towards opening more space to bottom-up, locally owned policies (Ejdus and Juncos, 2018³⁶). Thus, rather than addressing grassroots needs and empowering the “local-locals”, EU peacebuilding, as legitimized by the “ideal power Europe” meta-narrative, reproduces the securitized and dominative forms of relationship that the Union establishes with recipient societies. These societies are disciplined and homogenized through the exercise of conditionality and the mechanisms of the CSDP – the EU’s major apparatuses of security.

Due to its post-structuralist approach, this article has not offered any emancipatory solutions to the EU’s problems in its peacebuilding. Rather it has attempted to show how the EU’s construction in a specific way legitimizes its governmentality; how the EU itself and European foreign policy researchers inevitably empower the state and the traditional notions of power and sovereignty through their discourses and practices; and how the EU tends to ignore the agency of the local-locals and their everyday needs, especially in its peacebuilding. The article’s suggestion for future research can be a further deconstruction of the EU’s various representations as “ideal” in various areas of its foreign policy. Although studies paying more attention to local contexts for developing a better understanding of EU peacebuilding are increasing there is still room and need for more critical approaches in this regard.

³⁶ See, also: Juncos and Blockmans (2018).

References:

- Bargués, P. (2020) "Peacebuilding without peace? On how pragmatism complicates the practice of international intervention", *Review of International Studies*, 46(2): 237-255.
- Barroso, J. M. D. (2009) "Leading by Example: The EU and Global Governance", Conference on Global Governance, Brussels, SPEECH/09/239, 12 May 2009, <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/239>> (24 April 2020).
- Bayne S. and Trolliet, P. (2009) "Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership", European Commission- External Relations 2009, August 2009, <http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/pbp/docs/study_en.pdf>, (30 August 2021).
- Bhabha, H.K. (1994) *The Location of Culture*, (London and New York: Routledge).
- Bickerton, C. J. (2011) *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan).
- Björkdahl, A., Richmond O. and Kappler, S. (2009) "The EU Peacebuilding Framework: Potentials and Pitfalls in the Western Balkans and the Middle East", *JAD-PbP Working Paper* 3, June.
- Cebeci, M. (2012) "European Foreign Policy Research Reconsidered: Constructing an 'Ideal Power Europe' Through Theory?", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 40(3): 563-583.
- Cebeci, M. (2019) *Deconstructing "Ideal Power Europe": The EU and the Arab Change*, (Lanham: Lexington Books).
- Cebeci, M. (2020) "Representing Peace? The EU's Temporal Selves and its Statebuilding", *Geopolitics*, 25(2): 294-314.
- Chandler, D. (2006) *Empire in Denial* (London: Pluto).
- Chandler, D. and Richmond, O. (2015) "Contesting postliberalism: governmentality or emancipation?", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 18(1): 1-24.
- Commission of the European Communities (2001) "Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention", COM(2001) 211, Brussels, 11 April, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0211:FIN:EN:PDF>> (19 May 2021).
- Council of the European Union (2005) "EU concept for ESDP support to security sector reform (SSR)", 12566/4/05, Brussels, 13 October, <<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12566-2005-REV-4/en/pdf>> (19 May 2021).

- Council of the European Union (2020) "Concept on EU Peace Mediation", 13951/20, Brussels, 11 December, <<https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.en20.pdf>> (19 May 2021).
- De Flers, N. A. and Regelsberger, E. (2005) "The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation", in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 317-342.
- Diez, T. (2005) "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 33(3): 613-636.
- Duke S. and Courtier, A. (2009) "EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, Players and Instruments", *Working Paper 33*, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, December, <https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/11172009_41811clee09-3comb.pdf> (19 May 2021).
- Ejdus, F. (2017) "'Here is your mission, now own it!' The rhetoric and practice of local ownership in EU interventions", *European Security*, 26(4): 461-484.
- Ejdus, F. and Juncos, A. E. (2018) "Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding: Effectiveness, ownership, and resistance", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39(1): 4-27.
- EU-CIVCAP (2018) "EU-CIVCAP-Home", <<https://eu-civcap.net/>> (30 August 2020).
- European Commission (2010) "Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union", Official Journal of the European Union, C83, Vol. 53, 30 March, <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF>>, (29 October 2020).
- European Commission (2021) "Multi-Annual Indicative Programme, NDICI-Global Europe-Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention 2021-2027", <https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/mip-2021-c2021-8985-peace-stability-conflict-prevention-annex_en.pdf> (23 April 2022).
- European Commission (n/a) "EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2014-2020 (PEACE)", *Glossary*, <https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/glossary/p/peace-programme> (30 August 2021).
- European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016) "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council-Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform", JOIN/2016/031 final, Strasbourg, 5 July, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0031>> (19 May 2021).

- European Council (2012a) "President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy-Acceptance Speech at the occasion of the Award of the European Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi 2012 'Peace and the European Idea'", Vienna, EUCO 221/12, PRESSE 476, PR PCE 186, 16 November, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133545.pdf> (19 May 2021).
- European Council (2012b) "Joint statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace prize to the European Union", Brussels, EUCO 186/12, PRESSE 425, PR PCE 159, 12 October, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132807.pdf>, (30 August 2021).
- European Economic and Social Committee (2012) "Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the-The role of the European Union in peace building in external relations: best practice and perspectives", Rapporteur: Ms Morrice, REX/326-CESE 156/201 EN/o, Brussels, 19 January, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:068:0021:0027:EN:PDF>> (23 April 2020).
- European External Action Service-EEAS (2016), "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe-A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf> (30 August 2020).
- Foucault, M. (1976) *The Birth of the Clinic* (London: Routledge, 1976).
- Foucault, M. (1994) "Governmentality", in J. D. Faubion (ed.) *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, Vol. 3, (London: Penguin Books), pp. 201-222.
- Foucault, M. (2007) *Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, (New York: Picador).
- Garapon, A. (2013) "Michel Foucault: Visionary Insight into Contemporary Law", *Raisons Politiques*, 52(4): I-XIV, <<https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-raisons-politiques-2013-4-page-39.htm>> (30 August 2020).
- Hayes, B. (2012) "Does the European Union Deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?", *Transnational Institute*, 25 October, <<http://www.tni.org/article/does-european-union-deserve-nobel-peace-prize>>, (20 August 2020).
- Isleyen, B. (2018) "Building Capacities, Exerting Power: The European Union Police Mission in The Palestinian Authority", *Mediterranean Politics*, 23(3): 321-339.
- Jahn, B. (2006) "Classical Smoke, Classical Mirror", in B. Jahn (ed.) *Classical Theory in IR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 178-204.
- Juncos, A.E. and Blockmans, S. (2018) "The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges", *Global Affairs*, 4(2-3): 131-140.

- Kappler S. and Richmond, O. (2011) "Peacebuilding and Culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Resistance or Emancipation?", *Security Dialogue*, 42(3):261-278.
- Kappler, S. (2012) "Divergent Transformation and Centrifugal Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping*, 19(5): 612-627.
- Liotard, J-F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Linklater, A. (2005) "A European Civilising Process?", in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 367-387.
- Mahr, E. (2018) "Local contestation against the European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39 (1):72-94.
- Manners, I. (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2): 235-258.
- Manners, I. (2008) "The normative ethics of the European Union", *International Affairs*, 84(1):65-80.
- Manners, I. (2010) "As You Like It: European Union Normative Power in the European Neighbourhood Policy", in R.G. Whitman and S. Wolff (eds.) *The Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective-Context, Implementation and Impact*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 29-50.
- Manners, I. and Murray, P. (2016) "The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(1):185-202.
- Merlingen, M. (2011) "From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP: Towards a Foucauldian Research Agenda", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(1):149-169.
- Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaitė, R. (2006) *European Union Peace Building: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy*, (London: Routledge).
- Nobelprize.org (2012) "The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012", *Press Release*, Oslo, 12 October, <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html> (14 October 2012).
- Pace, M. (2008) "The EU as a 'force for good' in border conflict cases?", in T. Diez, M. Albert, and S. Stetter (eds.), *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 203-219.
- Paris, R. (2010) "Saving liberal peacebuilding", *Review of International Studies*, 36(2): 337-365.

- Petrova, I. and Delcour, L. (2020) "From principle to practice? The resilience–local ownership nexus in the EU Eastern Partnership policy", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 41(2): 336-360.
- Rasmussen, M. V. (2010) "The Ideology of Peace: Peacebuilding and The War in Iraq", in O.P. Richmond (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding – Critical Developments and Approaches*, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 175-189.
- Rayroux A. and Wilén N. (2014) "Resisting Ownership: The Paralysis of EU Peacebuilding in the Congo", *African Security*, 7(1): 24-44.
- Richmond, O. P. (2009) "A Post-liberal Peace: Eirenism and The Everyday" *Review of International Studies*, (35): 557-580.
- Richmond, O. P. (2010a) "Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(3):665-692.
- Richmond, O. P. (2010b) "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory", in O. P. Richmond (ed.) *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding-Critical Developments and Approaches*, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 14-38.
- Richmond, O. P. (2012) "A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, Resistance, and Liberation", *International Political Sociology*, 6(2):115-131.
- Richmond, O. P. (2013) "Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(3): 378-400.
- Richmond, O. P., Björkdahl, A. and Kappler, S., (2011) "The emerging EU peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24 (3): 449-469
- Roland, P. (2010) "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", *Review of International Studies*, 36(2):337-365.
- Smith, M.E., Abdi, K., Barbieri, C., Gillette, E., De Zan, T., Dijkstra, H., Juncos, A. E., Habbida, N., Pirozzi, N., Simons, S., Venturi, B., and Zartsdahl, P. H. (2018) "Best Practices in EU Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding", *EU-CIVCAP Brochure*, 12 October, <https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/eucivcap-brochure-best_practices_in_eu_conflict_prevention_and_peace_building.pdf> (20 August 2020)
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2012) "SIPRI Statement on the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize", Press Release, 12 October, <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2012/2012_nobel_peace_prize>, (25 August 2019).
- Taylor, I. (2010) "Liberal Peace, Liberal Imperialism: A Gramscian Critique", in O. P. Richmond (ed.) *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding-Critical*

- Developments and Approaches, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 154-174.
- Tocci, N. (2017) "From the European Security Strategy to the EU Global Strategy: explaining the journey", *International Politics*, 54(4): 487-502.
- Tocci, N. (2021) "The European Union and Peacebuilding", in O.P. Richmond and G. Visoka (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 288-299.
- Tonra, B. (2010) "Identity Construction through the ENP: Borders and Boundaries, Insiders and Outsiders", in R. G. Whitman and S. Wolff (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective-Context, Implementation and Impact*, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 51-72.
- Vincent, H. (2017) "L'analyse des pratiques: une perspective philosophique à partir de Michel Foucault", *Cliopsy*, 18(2): 123-140.
- Visoka, G. and Richmond, O.P. (2017) "After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo", *International Studies Perspectives*, 18(1): 110-129.
- Wallenstein, P. (2010) "Strategic Peacebuilding: Concepts and Challenges", D. Philpott and G. Powers (eds.), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 45-64.
- Wilén, N. (2009) "Capacity-building or Capacity-taking? Legitimizing Concepts in Peace and Development Operations", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(3): 337-351.