An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Authors : Özgür ÖZDAMAR

Pages : 205-230

Doi:10.20991/allazimuth.476858

View : 17 | Download : 7

Publication Date : 2019-07-01

Article Type : Research Paper

Abstract :This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran’s nuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran’s nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called the expected utility model insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(Bueno de Mesquita 2002);. Three analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program. 
Keywords : Expected utility theory, game theory, dynamic median voter model with coercion, forecasting, Iran, nuclear program, the Middle East