Cache-timing attacks without a profiling phase

Authors : Ali Can ATICI, Cemal YILMAZ, Erkay SAVAŞ

Pages : 1953-1966

View : 14 | Download : 5

Publication Date : 0000-00-00

Article Type : Research Paper

Abstract :Theoretically secure cryptographic algorithms can be vulnerable to attacks due to their implementation flaws. Bernstein`s attack is a well-known cache-timing attack that uses execution times as the side-channel. The major drawback of this attack is that it needs an identical target machine to perform its profiling phase where the attacker models the cache timing-behavior of the target machine. This assumption makes the attack unrealistic in many circumstances. In this work, we present an effective method to eliminate the profiling phase. We propose a methodology to model the cache timing-behavior of the target machine by trying hypothetical cache behaviors exhaustively. Our implementation results show that the proposed nonprofiled Bernstein`s attack has comparable insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(and better in some test instances); performance to the original attack with the profiling phase.
Keywords : Cryptography, side channel analysis, cache timing attacks