A New Friedman’s Model for Evolutionary Game Problem

Authors : Nasir GANIKHODJAEV, Khaled FTAMEH, Pah Chin HEE

Pages : 24-30

Doi:10.55549/epstem.1050159

View : 17 | Download : 6

Publication Date : 2021-12-31

Article Type : Research Paper

Abstract :The term game in game theory means a problem, where some of the people or groups insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(players); share a set of rules and regulations that create the conditions and events that make up the beginning of the game. For instance, in the trade market, the buyers and sellers of some commodities interact in a random way. The reputation of sellers effects on increasing of selling. e.g., honest sellers are more attractive than cheaters for the buyers and the buyers can examine the products or unexamined. In this paper, a non-linear discrete dynamical system of Friedman model was considered. Also, we proposed a new model of interaction between these two populations insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(buyers and sellers);. investigate its limit run behavior where we found the limit converges to a fixed point insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(0,0); i.e., the sellers will always cheat and the sellers will not examine according to Friedman’s model which is denoted by the fixed point insert ignore into journalissuearticles values(0.0);.
Keywords : Discrete dynamical system, Evolutionary game, Friedmans godel, Simplex