Strategic Alignments Under Fire: Iran’s Pahlavi-Era Alliances and the Balance of Threat Framework

This study investigates Iran’s alliance strategies during the Pahlavi era (1925–1979) through the analytical framework of Stephen M. Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory. The theory posits that states form alliances not merely in response to the distribution of power, but rather as a reaction to perceived threats—shaped by factors such as aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. The core research question addressed here is: How can Pahlavi Iran’s alliance choices be explained through the intersection of external and internal threat perceptions? Within this framework, the study explores how Iran’s foreign policy behavior was influenced by both external threats—including Soviet expansionism, pan-Arabism, and revolutionary regimes in the region—and internal threats, such as the Tudeh Party, the Mossadegh administration, and economic vulnerability. The research is based on historical records, secondary literature, and policy documents, and systematically links empirical evidence with the theoretical framework. The strategic alliance with the United States was motivated not only by the perceived threat from the Soviet Union but also by the imperative to secure the regime against domestic opposition. Likewise, Iran’s clandestine cooperation with Israel functioned as a counterbalancing strategy against radical regimes such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. In addition, regional alignments with conservative monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan constituted complementary elements of Iran’s broader security architecture. During the 1960s, Iran’s pursuit of close ties with the United States alongside limited détente and arms deals with the USSR exemplifies a strategy of “hedging,” which is analyzed as part of the study’s conceptual framework. The findings suggest that Iran’s foreign policy during the Pahlavi period was predominantly shaped by threat perception, and that the explanatory power of Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory significantly increases when combined with the regime-security–oriented concept of omnibalancing and the notion of hedging.